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COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: THE ECONOMICS OF
GROUP STATUS PRODUCTION AND RACE
DISCRIMINATION
Richard H. McAdams*
n Shakespeare's history of King Henry V, when the time comes for
the young King to ready his troops to battle a much larger French
force at Agincourt, he delivers a stirring speech that many regard as a
masterpiece of inspirational rhetoric. Rejecting his advisor's lament
for more men, he responds: "No, my fair cousin:! If we are marked to
die, we are enow/ To do our country loss: and if to live,/ The fewer
men, the greater share of honour."' The King proclaims his personal
desire for honor, offers safe passage back to England for those who do
not wish to fight, and then describes how those who stay will be cele-
brated on future anniversaries of this day of battle, known as the
Feast of St. Crispian:
And Crispin Crispian shall ne'er go by,
From this day to the ending of the world,
But we in it shall be remembered;
We few, we happy few, we band of brothers:
For he to-day that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother ....
And gentlemen in England, now a-bed,
Shall think themselves accursed they were not here;
And hold their manhoods cheap, whiles any speaks
That fought with us upon Saint Crispin's day.2
For those of us who strive to be hard-headed theorists of human
behavior, and who use economics and game theory to reveal the conse-
quences of legal rules, our initial response to this speech is likely to be:
"What a disaster." The King and his soldiers are about to risk their
lives. Yet he denies wanting more men though additional troops
would obviously better their odds of surviving and winning. Such a
non sequitur can only raise doubts about the clarity of Henry's think-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.
I would like to thank Linz Audain, Ian Ayres, Anita Bernstein, Robert Cooter, Jacob Corr6, Ken-
neth Dau-Schmidt, John Donohue, Robert Ellickson, Alex Johnson, Pamela Karlan, Michael Klar-
man, Hal Krent, Saul Levmore, Anna-Maria Marshall, John Monahan, George Rutherglen,
Stewart Schwab, Maxwell Steams, Dan Steward, William Stuntz, and Peter Swire for their in-
sightful comments on earlier drafts, as well as the participants in the Faculty Workshops at Indi-
ana University School of Law and the University of Virginia School of Law. Scott Fisher, Julie
Keywell, and Joe Studer provided exemplary research assistance. My work on this Article was
supported by the Marshall D. Ewell Research Fund.
1 WILLT.Am SHAKEsEAE, HENRY V, act 4, sc. 3, I. 19-22 (John D. Wilson ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press i968) (1623).
2 Id. 11. 57-67.
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ing, which in turn can only increase the clances that his officers will
question his commands. And, one might ask, what are the meaning
and value of "honor" and "brotherhood"? If Henry wishes to motivate
his men, a better strategy would be to spell out the potential material
benefits (perhaps promising them more pay) or to remind them of the
serious penalties for breaking their promise to fight. Offering to pay
their way home, after the enhanced risk of loss has caused Henry's
troops to regret their decision to join him in France, is sheer insanity.
Finally, those "gentlemen in England now a-bed" will likely count
themselves lucky for the opportunity to free-ride on a victory. After
all, most of the benefits of victory - the general peace and prosperity
of England - cannot be withheld from those who do not fight.
Economics, especially "law and economics," prides itself on the uni-
versal application of its method.3 Yet a theory of human motivation
that did not grasp the meaning and power of this speech would be
seriously flawed. Military leaders are among the more pragmatic and
hard-headed people around and would likely scoff at this economic
analysis of Henry's speech. Military rhetoric frequently appeals to
honor and brotherhood.4 If such words prod men and women to risk
their lives, one can only imagine how much greater is the power of
such words relative to smaller material sacrifices. Consider, for exam-
ple, the possible economic consequences of the following words:
Standing in the presence of this multitude, sobered with the responsibil-
ity of the message I deliver to the young men of the South, I declare that
the truth above all others to be worn unsullied and sacred in your hearts,
to be surrendered to no force, sold for no price, compromised in no ne-
cessity, but cherished and defended as the covenant of your prosperity,
and the pledge of peace to your children, is that the white race must
dominate forever in the South, because it is the white race, and superior
to that race by which its supremacy is threatened.5
A principal purpose of this Article is to illuminate the economic power
of this white supremacist oration by Henry Grady and of Henry V's
3 See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE EcONOMIc APPROACH TO HuMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (x976);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 2I (4th ed. 1992); Fred S. McChesney, Des-
perately Shunning Science, 7, B.U. L. REV. 281, 281 (i991).
4 See MORRIS JANowrrz, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER 215, 220 (196o) ("In its contemporary
form a major aspect of military honor comprises a sense of brotherhood and intense group loy-
alty."); S.L.A. MARSHALL, MEN AGAINST FiRE 149 (i947) ("[P]ersonal honor is the one thing val-
ued more than life itself by the majority of men. The lips of the dying attest how strongly this
force influences individual conduct in battle."); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE Aiaty, FM 22-
100, MILITARY LEADERSHIP 33, 39 (i961). Echoing King Henry's St. Crispian speech, the mili-
tary spends millions of dollars annually to entice volunteers for "the few, the proud, the Marines."
See Paula Span, The Marines Go Medieval, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1992, (Magazine) at 25 (noting
that the Marine Corps' ad budget is almost $1o million).
5 HENRY W. GRADY, THE NEW SouTH AND OTHER ADDRESSES 55 (1969).
ioo6 IV'01.108:1003
HeinOnline  -- 108 Harv. L. Rev 1006 1994-1995
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT
justly celebrated speech, as well as to examine the precise parallel be-
tween the two.
Each speech appeals to group interests, group loyalty, and group
identity. The ubiquity of social groups says something of their impor-
tance: groups include not just firms, trade associations, and families,
but groups based on demographic traits such as race, gender, or age,
and those based on membership, such as fraternities or sororities, ama-
teur sports teams, gangs, the Rotary or Elks Clubs, or private lunch
clubs. Undoubtedly, some or all of these groups, like the firm,6 serve
the individual's interest by minimizing the transaction costs she incurs
while acting to satisfy her preference for whatever interest or function
the group facilitates. But that explanation offers no insight into the
meaning or power of the speeches of Henry V and Henry Grady.
This Article offers an economic theory to explain why individuals
make material sacrifices for group welfare. My thesis is that a mate-
rial view of human motivation underestimates both the level of coop-
eration that groups elicit from their members and the level of conflict
that groups elicit from each other. A single group dynamic connects
these added increments of cooperation and conflict: groups achieve sol-
idarity and elicit loyalty beyond what economic analysis convention-
ally predicts, but solidarity and loyalty within groups lead predictably,
if not inevitably, to competition and conflict between groups. The
connection is the desire for esteem or status. Groups use intra-group
status rewards as a non-material means of gaining material sacrifice
from members, but the attendant desire for inter-group status causes
inter-group conflict. This theory explains the power of King Henry's
speech, which appeals to the individual's identification with the group
("we band of brothers') and effectively describes the status reward by
contrasting other members of the group (those gentlemen left in Eng-
land) who will not share in it.7 At the same time, the war itself was
the product of England's desire for esteem and status - more specifi-
cally, Henry's desire for honor - which can only be achieved by con-
quering France.
This two-fold importance of status is essential to a genuine under-
standing of race discrimination, which has eluded economics. Discrim-
ination is a means by which social groups produce status for their
members, but pivotal to understanding this form of inter-group con-
flict is the role that status plays in generating the intra-group coopera-
tion necessary to make discrimination effective. Absent the desire for
intra-group status, selfish individuals would not make the material
6 See RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33-55 (i988).
7 Cf. Thomas Wolfe, Chickamauga, in CHICKAMAUGA AND OTHER CIvIL WAR STORIES 41,
6o (Shelby Foote ed., 1993) ("[The Civil War] would give us all a chance to wear a uniform ....
to shoot some Yankees and to run 'em north, and then to come back home and lord it over those
who hadn't been and be a hero and court the gals.').
1995] 1007
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sacrifices that discrimination requires. In this context, Henry Grady's
racist speech is an economically explicable (if unusually candid) means
of enlisting white troops in the ongoing status warfare, urging them to
"compromise[ ] in no [material] necessity"" the process of discriminat-
ing against, and thereby subordinating, the blacks whose inferior posi-
tion produces a status gain for whites. The rhetoric helps establish a
norm of white behavior, the abrogation of which will lower the in-
group status of non-conforming whites.
Race discrimination is the best and most important illustration of
what I view as a more general phenomenon of intra-group cooperation
and inter-group conflict. Before discussing race, however, I must ar-
ticulate the general theory - to establish empirically that, because of
concern for status, cooperation arises within groups and conflict occurs
between groups. Part I sets forth puzzling instances of intra-group co-
operation in experimental "dilemma" situations and elsewhere, which
are not explained by existing economic theory but are well explained
by concern for the esteem of other group members. Part I then pro-
poses a model that describes how "esteem payments" afford groups a
novel means of solving their collective action problems and, finally,
how this same mechanism leads inevitably to inter-group status con-
flict. Part II considers the particular problem of race discrimination
- the deficiencies in existing economic theory, the superior ability of a
status-production model to explain many race-related phenomena, and
the implications of such a model. In particular, if race discrimination
is a means of producing group status - if groups are engaged in a
form of status "warfare" - then discrimination presents the same case
for government prohibition that exists for more traditional government
restraints on force and fraud.
I. EXPLAINING "EXCESS" COOPERATION AND CONFLICT:
AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIAL GROUPS
Current economic theory fails to predict the prevalence of coopera-
tion and conflict in human affairs. Considerable evidence supports
David Hume's observation that "[w]hen men are once inlisted on op-
posite sides, they contract an affection to the persons with whom they
are united, and an animosity against their antagonists: And these pas-
sions they often transmit to their posterity."9 Economics has been slow
to address the function of social groups and the means by which they
engender levels of loyalty and hostility in apparent defiance of conven-
tional notions of material selfishness. But the psychic motivations that
explain these "passions" - and the resulting intra-group cooperation
and inter-group conflict - are reconcilable with rational self-interest.
8 GRADY, supra note 5, at 55.
9 DAvID HUME, ESSAYS 54, 58 (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty Classics 1985) (758).
1oo8 [Vol. ioS:1oo3
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This Part presents the modern evidence that supports Hume's
claim. Initially, section A examines the empirical evidence that people
cooperate beyond conventionally predicted levels. This "excess" coop-
eration is explained neither by sophisticated rational choice mecha-
nisms such as reciprocity, nor by unselfish motives such as altruism.
Instead, the experimental data indicate that cooperation is related to
group membership. Section B advances a theory to account for this
data: individuals who seek to maximize the esteem they receive from
others have selfish reasons to contribute to group status. Two concepts
of "group" are advanced: one defined externally by common character-
istics observable by third-parties, and one defined internally by rela-
tionships among the members. In each case, there are selfish but non-
pecuniary reasons for cooperating with one's group members. Finally,
section C suggests reasons that the very mechanisms that increase co-
operation within groups also increase conflict between groups, and
considers evidence that such status-based "excess" conflict exists.
A. The Empirical Evidence of "Excess" Cooperation
To understand conflict among social groups, we must first under-
stand how groups elicit cooperation from their members. Game theo-
rists study the strategic interactions of individuals, and their most
compelling contribution is their description of the difficulties groups
face in procuring the cooperation of members. In contrast to Adam
Smith's "invisible hand," which guides society to desirable outcomes
though individuals are selfishly motivated,10 game theory describes
"collective action problems" - situations in which individually ra-
tional decisions lead to sub-optimal collective outcomes." The classic
example is the prisoner's dilemma,' 2 but the basic problem exists in
10 See ADAM S~iTH, 1 THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 477-78 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chi-
cago Press 1976) (1776).
11 Jon Elster concisely describes the collective action problem:
Suppose that each member of a group has the choice between engaging in a certain activ-
ity and not engaging in it. The group has a collective action problem if it is better for all
if some do it than if nobody does, but better for each not to do it.
JON ELSTER, NUTs AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 126 (1989); see RUSSELL HARDIN,
COLLECTIVE ACTION 8-9, 16-22 (1982); MANcUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE Ac-
TION 5-22, 53-65 (1965).
12 In the example from which the dilemma draws its name, a prosecutor offers two prisoners
the same bargain. If both prisoners remain silent, the prosecutor will use existing evidence to
convict each of a minor crime for which each will serve one year in prison. If only one of the
two prisoners confesses, the confessor will serve no time, but her testimony will be used to convict
the non-confessor of a more serious crime for which she will serve five years. If both prisoners
confess, each will serve an intermediate sentence of three years. Each prisoner must make an
irrevocable decision without knowing how the other decides. Under these conditions, there is a
"dominant" strategy, meaning a strategy that is best for an individual regardless of what decision
the other individual makes. If prisoner B confesses, prisoner A is better off confessing and
thereby serving three years instead of five. If B remains silent, A is still better off confessing and
thereby serving zero years instead of three. Prisoner B faces exactly the same set of considera-
1095] 1oo9
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more complex situations with more than two parties: each individual
faces a choice essentially between cooperation and defection, where the
dominant strategy for each individual is defection, but where mutual
defection is worse for everyone than mutual cooperation. The interest
in studying such "games" is generated by the belief that they represent
a fundamental feature of social life. 13 Whether it is the undersupply of
"public goods," 14 the overconsumption of common resources,' 5 or re-
lated difficulties, the problem of collective action is commonly offered
as a rationale for government regulation. 16 Conversely, many private
economic practices can best be understood as mechanisms for solving
collective action problems.'7
The focus of this section and the next is a particular mechanism
for solving collective action problems commonly ignored by legal econ-
omists: groups achieve cooperation by allocating intra-group status. To
persuade the skeptical that the desire for esteem exists and is neces-
sary to explain important examples of cooperation, I could begin with
a number of real-world examples of group cooperation. 18 It is diffi-
tions. The dilemma occurs because A and B, each acting to further her own interests, will each
decide to confess, yet mutual confession yields an outcome (three years each) that is for each
unambiguously inferior to mutual silence (one year each). Although each would prefer mutual
silence to mutual confession, the individual nature of the decision making produces the latter.
13 See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7 (1984); ELINOR OS-
TRoM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
23-38 (1990); WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA 1-9 (1992).
14 Public goods are those goods that are non-exhaustible - because consumption by one does
not preclude consumption by others - and non-excludable - because it is not feasible to prevent
non-contributing individuals from enjoying the good once it is produced. See ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAiV AND ECONOMICS 46 (1988). Since everyone benefits when one produces a
public good, selfish individuals attempt to "free-ride" on the contributions of others, which leads
the market to undersupply such goods. See id. at 46-48.
Is When a depletable resource is publicly owned, each individual gains the full benefit of her
consumption but shares the cost with all other users. The result is inefficient depletion of the
resource. See OSTROM, supra note 13, at 1-3, 103-io; Garrett Hardin, The ragedy of the Com-
mons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
16 The state can solve the commons problem, for example, by defining and enforcing private
property rights. When one person bears all the costs of resource depletion, she will stop consum-
ing when the marginal cost of consumption exceeds the marginal benefit. See OSTROM, supra
note 13, at 12-13. When private ownership is impractical, regulation may simply prohibit over-
consumption. See id. at 8-11.
17 See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1o89, 1103-05, 1109-I (i98i); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and
Corporate Settings, 92 YALE LJ. 49, 76-85 (1982). Indeed, legal rules are sometimes justified by
the need to maintain problems of collective action. Each firm in a cartel, for example, has the
incentive to free-ride on price-fixing by underselling the cartel price, a strategy that prevents the
cartel from existing at all. Antitrust policy is urgently concerned with the tools firms might use to
overcome this collective action problem. See Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory
of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 295, 304-12 (1987). Indeed, the argument of Part
II.C.2 is that antidiscrimination laws are needed to prevent collective action by whites.
Is For example, in the summer of 1993, citizens of the communities flooded by the Mississippi
River volunteered hours of hard physical labor, filling and stacking sand bags to save their towns.
See Ralph Dummit, Neighbors Pitch In and Win, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 6, 1993, (St.
[Vol. IO8:IOO3IOIO
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cult, however, to distinguish subtle motivations in complex, uncon-
trolled events. Some might plausibly assert that, for any number of
reasons, the individual's pecuniary self-interest in such examples hap-
pens to conform to the group interest. Others, including some critics
of economic analysis, would argue that cooperation indicates the exist-
ence, not of a selfish interest in status, but of genuine altruism. 19
Given these difficulties, I turn first to laboratory experiments, which
can control for alternative motivations for cooperation.
i. Dilemma Experiments: Evidence of Non-Material Motivations
for Cooperation. - Since the 1950s, social scientists have conducted
experiments with the prisoner's dilemma game, its multi-party vari-
ants, public go6ds problems, and common resource problems. In each
test, experimenters structure monetary payoffs to make defection or
free-riding the dominant strategy.20 Despite the logical force of the
monetarily dominant strategy, researchers have not found uniform de-
fection. Many individuals defect, but a significant proportion - one-
quarter to two-thirds - chooses to cooperate.2 ' After more than two
thousand social dilemma experiments, 22 one of the "generally accepted"
conclusions is that, when pecuniary incentives appear to compel defec-
tion, "many subjects do not defect. '23  For those who employ game
Charles) at ISC. Flood control cannot be apportioned solely to those who contribute to it, and an
individual's contribution is not likely to determine the success of the group effort. One would,
therefore, have expected everyone to free-ride.
19 See AmrrAI ETzIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS 25-29 (1988);
ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS
2 2-36 (i988); HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY: A THEORY OF
SOCIAL CHOICE 11-14 (1982); Anartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 25, 34-36 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed.,
I990).
20 See N.L. Kerr, Motivational Choices in Task Groups: A Paradigm for Social Dilemma Re-
search, in EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL DILEMMAS 1-9 (Henk A.M. Wilke, Dave M. Messick & Chris-
tel G. Rutte eds., 1986); David M. Messick & Marilynn B. Brewer, Solving Social Dilemmas: A
Review, 4 REv. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. IX, 17-29 (1983). Until the early 1970s, "experi-
mental gaming was devoted overwhelmingly to two-person games," but has since focused on "[t]he
Multi-Person .. .Prisoner's Dilemma... and the strategically equivalent Commons Dilemma."
ANDREW M. COLMAN, GAME THEORY AND EXPERImENTAL GAMES i68 (1982) (citations omitted).
21 See ETzIONI, supra note ig, at 6o-6i; Linnda R. Caporael, Robyn M. Dawes, John M.
Orbell & Alphons J.C. van de Kragt, Selfishness Examined: Cooperation in the Absence of Egois-
tic Incentives, 1i BEHAV. & BRAIN SCL 683, 687-92 (1989); Robyn M. Dawes, Social Dilemmas,
31 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. I69, 185-86 (2980).
22 See Robyn M. Dawes, Alphons J.C. van de Kragt & John M. Orbell, Cooperation for the
Benefit of Us - Not Me, or My Conscience, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note ig, at 97,
100.
23 John M. Orbell, Alphons J.C. van de Kragt & Robyn M. Dawes, Explaining Discussion-
Induced Cooperation, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 811, 811 (r988). A recent study is
illustrative. In a matrix with the highest "sucker's payoff" (the payoff for cooperating when the
other party defects), there was a $7 loss if one cooperated when the other defected, and a $5 gain
for defecting when the other cooperated; mutual cooperation paid $2 each; mutual defection in-
curred a $5 loss for each. See John M. Orbell & Robyn M. Dawes, Social Welfare, Cooperators'
Advantage, and the Option of Not Playing the Game, 58 AM. Soc. REV. 787, 788, 791 (1993). The
19951 IOII
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theory to predict the consequences of legal rules, this residuum of co-
operation demands explanation.
24
One immediate and material explanation is reciprocity. When fu-
ture interactions are likely, reciprocity is possible, and defection may
no longer be the dominant strategy. One reciprocal strategy is "tit-for-
tat," in which one begins by cooperating and then responds in future
rounds by doing whatever the other player did in the previous
round.25 Considerable evidence demonstrates the success of tit-for-tat
in preventing mutual defection in iterated prisoner's dilemmas. 26
Reciprocity does not, however, explain the cooperation observed in
the dilemma experiments discussed above. Reciprocity requires future
interaction in which players can reciprocate past decisions. Theorists
still predict mutual defection for "one-shot" prisoner's dilemmas.2 7 Yet
a large number of the empirical tests of collective action problems
cooperation rate was SI%. In four other matrices, cooperation ranged from 35% to 54%. See id.
at 794. These games, however, are merely the control for the manipulations that were actually
the heart of this experiment, namely, dilemma games in which the players could "opt out" of the
game entirely. See id. Thus, cooperation in such experiments is sufficiently established that re-
searchers have moved on to more interesting questions. See also John M. Orbell, Peregrine
Schwartz-Shea & Randy T. Simmons, Do Cooperators Exit More Readily Than Defectors?, 78
AM. POL. ScI. REy. 147, 147, I55-6o (1984) (proposing theories to explain why cooperators are
less likely to exit than defectors).
24 One explanation is that the subjects do not understand the game, but there are several
reasons to reject this possibility. 'First, researchers in these studies typically take great pains to
ensure that the subjects understand the game. See Caporael, Dawes, Orbell & van de Kragt,
supra note 21, at 688. Second, considerable evidence suggests that permitting subjects to talk
with each other increases cooperation, even though discussion tends to increase the subjects' un-
derstanding of the strategic tension of the game. See infra notes 40-5o and accompanying text.
In fact, some evidence suggests that, absent discussion, cooperators understand the strategic struc-
ture of the game better than defectors. See Harold H. Kelley & Janusz Grzelak, Conflict Between
Individual and Common Interest in an N-Person Relationship, 21 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. I90, I95-96 (1972).
25 See ANATOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA: A STUDY IN
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 207-08 (1965).
26 See CoLMAN, supra note 20, at 124; see also AXELROD, supra note x3, at 40-42 (discussing
computer program prisoner's dilemma tournaments won by tit-for-tat); id. at 73-87 (discussing
real-world examples, including reciprocal cooperation in minimizing artillery casualties among op-
posing forces in World War I trench warfare). By reciprocating cooperation, a player using tit-for-
tat offers other players the possibility of large, long-run gains from repeated cooperative interac-
tions. By retaliating immediately and without exception to defection, the player also forecloses the
possibility of long-run gains from defection. See id. at 53-54, 118-20.
27 See AXELROD, supra note 13, at io. Even when the game is repeated, reciprocity works
only if the players do not know when the game will end. See id. Otherwise, each player reasons
that the last round of play represents a one-shot prisoner's dilemma in which the dominant strat-
egy is to defect. For any round preceding a round in which the player expects mutual defection,
the player has no reason to cooperate. This logic pushes back the decision to defect to the first
round of play. See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 43
(1989) (expressing uncertainty about this reasoning but noting the "nearly unanimously held view
that defection is the rational strategy" in finitely repeated games). But see HARDIN, supra note
ii, at 145-50 (denying that rationality requires defection regardless of how many times the game
is finitely repeated).
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were intentionally designed as "one-shot" games to exclude the oppor-
tunity for reciprocity, and these tests have repeatedly found significant
amounts of cooperation. 28 In the very circumstance in which there is
no material reason to cooperate, there is the undeniable fact of cooper-
ation. Thus, however powerful reciprocity may be in some contexts, a
significant residual level of cooperation remains unexplained. 29
One might note, finally, that the material stakes in these experi-
ments typically involve only a few dollars or less. Though higher
stakes might cause people to free-ride, the question is what explains
subjects' consistent failure to free-ride when low material stakes sug-
gest they should. After all, entire industries arise to capture stakes of
a similar size; what seems low in isolation is vast when aggregated
over a large population. Whether we can say the same of the motiva-
tions causing this residual cooperation requires us first to discover
what those motivations are.
2. Dilemma Experiments: Evidence of Non-Altruistic Motiva-
tions for Cooperation. - Critics and reformers of economic modeling
have pointed to the dilemma experiments described above as proof of
altruism or a commitment to principles of fairness. 30 Yet a full review
of the psychological research on collective dilemmas refutes this thesis.
Some sense of "group identity," rather than altruism or fairness, ex-
plains the variations in cooperation researchers have observed. 3 1 Of
particular note are studies revealing that individuals cooperate more
28 See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, Thomas Gilovich & Dennis T. Regan, Does Studying Econom-
ics Inhibit Cooperation?, 13, 14 fig.6 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard
Law School Library) (finding that 39.6% of economics majors and 61.2% of non-economics ma-
jors cooperated in a prisoner's dilemma); Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Experiments on the
Provision of Public Goods. L Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free-Rider Problem, 84
AM. J. Soc. 1335, 1349-5o (1979) (finding that the typical subject invested 57% of her available
resources in a public good, two-thirds of subjects invested more than half, and 22% invested all);
Orbell, van de Kragt & Dawes, supra note 23, at 813, 816-17 (finding that with discussion, 79%
of subjects cooperated, while with no discussion and other factors, 20% cooperated); Orbell,
Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, supra note 23, at 153 (finding that allowing exit and discussion led
over 75% to cooperate and that allowing exit and no discussion led x8% of those who chose to
stay to cooperate).
29 One might argue that, even in "one-shot" dilemma experiments, subjects fear being "pun-
ished" outside the experiment should they ever encounter the other players. Yet subject B will
not seek to punish subject A unless doing so would create some benefit for B. One might argue
that B will be less likely to cooperate with A in any future dilemma setting. However, when they
meet in a future real-world dilemma, A and B will have no reason to cooperate unless they expect
to interact with sufficient frequency to permit reciprocity. But given sufficient reciprocity, there is
no reason for B to mistrust A. One may be tempted to say that A has shown herself to be a
"defector" by nature, but A merely defected in the laboratory when it was rational to do so. A
new game is now afoot in which the tit-for-tat strategy is a good bet for both A and B. Subjects
should therefore not fear defecting in the one-shot experiment. That so many do not defect re-
mains a puzzle.
30 See sources cited supra note ig.
31 1 am not claiming that altruism and a concern for fairness do not exist, but only that
neither fully explains the residual cooperation in these experiments.
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frequently in dilemma games than do groups of individuals and stud-
ies revealing that discussion increases the level of cooperation in di-
lemma games.
First, many prisoner's dilemma studies have contrasted games be-
tween individual subjects with games between groups of subjects.
Holding the payoffs constant, these studies consistently find signifi-
cantly more cooperation when individuals play individuals than when
teams play teams.3 2 One study, for example, found that three-person
groups defected an average of 8.73 times in twenty rounds, compared
to an average of 1.8 defections out of twenty when individuals played
each other.33 This individual-group "discontinuity" is consistent with
research finding that the formation of a purely experimental "group"
can elicit a bias in favor of in-group members, against out-group mem-
bers, or both. Psychologists discovered this when they set out to create
a base line in which individuals would have no reason to favor their
own group.3 4 To their surprise, whenever subjects were divided into
groups, people consistently evaluated members of their own group
more favorably than members of other groups.35 Summarizing this ef-
32 See, e.g., Chester A. Insko et al., Interindividual-Intergroup Discontinuity in the Prisoner's
Dilemma Game, 38 . CONFLICT RESOL. 87 (1994); S.S. Komorita & C. William Lapworth, Coop-
erative Choice Among Individuals Versus Groups in an N-Person Dilemma Situation, 42 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 487, 494 (x982); Debra M. McCallum et al., Competition and
Cooperation Between Groups and Between Individuals, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 301,
314 (x985). Because cooperation fluctuates while the formal payoffs remain the same, these data
also demonstrate that pecuniary self-interest does not motivate the residual cooperation.
33 See John Schopler, Chester A. Insko, Kenneth A. Graetz, Stephen M. Drigotas & Valerie A.
Smith, The Generality of the Individual-Group Discontinuity Effect: Variations in Positivity-Neg-
ativity of Outcomes, Players' Relative Power, and Magnitude of Outcomes, 17 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 612, 616 (iggi). Individual players therefore earned more money than team
players. See id. Researchers view individual-group discontinuity as evidence of "ethnocentric
schemata for own and other group": individuals learn that inter-group relations are competitive,
while intra-group relations are cooperative. Id. at 613; see also Warner Wilson & Myra Kayatani,
Intergroup Attitudes and Strategies in Games Between Opponents of the Same or of a Different
Race, 9 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 24, 27 (1968) (explaining that pairs cooperated with
each other 84% of the time but cooperated with another pair only 43% of the time).
34 By establishing a base line group, researchers could have attempted to measure the causes
of group bias in a controlled setting. See HENRI TAJFEL, DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL
GROUPS XO (1978). In the original experimental design, experimenters "randomly classified [sub-
jects] as members of two nonoverlapping groups - ostensibly on the basis of some trivial per-
formance criterion." Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup
Behavior, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7, 13 (Stephen Worchel & William G.
Austin eds., 1986). The "trivial performance criterion" was initially whether they tended to over-
estimate or underestimate the number of dots on a page (when there was insufficient time for
counting) and was later some non-performance criterion (for instance, whether people preferred
Klde or Kandinsky). Subjects then made evaluative decisions about other subjects, anonomously
"awarding amounts of money to pairs of other subjects (excluding self) in specially designed book-
lets". Id. at 13-14.
35 The results were replicated "even when the assignment to groups was made explicitly ran-
dom." Thjfel & Turner, supra note 34, at 14; see also Louise Lemyre & Philip M. Smith, Inter-
group Discrimination and Self-Esteem in the Minimal Group Paradigm, 49 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 660, 660 (1985) (stating that "[m]ore than 2o experiments" suggest this finding).
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fect, one pair of researchers stated that "mere awareness of the pres-
ence of an out-group is sufficient to provoke intergroup competitive or
discriminatory responses on the part of the in-group."3 6
Additional confirmation of the importance of groups is provided by
dilemma experiments in which researchers elicited differences in coop-
eration by symbolically invoking "real-world" group memberships. In
one study, psychologists observed significantly more cooperation from
subjects sharing a common resource when they told the subjects that
they were being evaluated as a single group against groups not then a
part of the experiment (for example, college students versus non-stu-
dents) than when they told the subjects that they were being evaluated
as members of one of two subgroups in the experiment (for example,
psychology majors versus economics majors).3 7
These studies appear to confirm David Hume's insight that indi-
viduals "have such a propensity to divide into personal factions, that
the smallest appearance of real difference will produce them."38 The
experimenter's arbitrary division of subjects into groups is sufficient to
"factionalize" them, causing more competitive behavior between groups
36 Thjfel & Turner, supra note 34, at 13. Subjects not only favored in-group members but
followed a strategy of maximizing the relative difference between the groups, even when that
strategy prevented them from maximizing absolute gain for their own group. See TAJFEL, supra
note 34, at 8o; Lemyre & Smith, supra note 35, at 66o.
37 See, e.g., Roderick M. Kramer & Marilynn B. Brewer, Effects of Group Identity on Re-
source Use in a Simulated Commons Dilemma, 46 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1044,
1055-56 (1984). The common resource was represented by a sum of 300 points, from which each
individual could "harvest" zero to ten points on each of twelve or twenty-four rounds. See id. at
1047. Because the pool would grow by a certain amount each round, the pool would be self-
sustaining if the individuals restrained their consumption to an average of five points per round.
But the points could be cashed in at the end of the experiment (typically for five cents each),
which created an incentive to take as much as possible for oneself. See id. at 1047-48, 1051,
1053. In each experiment, three subjects were told that three other subjects (who did not actually
exist) would send their choices from another linked computer facility. See id. at 1046. In one
experiment, the subjects were also told that the other subjects were elderly residents of the com-
munity and either that the researchers were studying how residents of the local community be-
haved in comparison to residents of other communities, or that the researchers were studying
"'how the behavior of young people compares to the behavior of elderly persons.'" Id. at 1048.
In another experiment, the monetary value of the points was not fixed but was determined by
either a single lottery for all six subjects or two lotteries, one for each three-person subgroup. See
id. at 1053. These simple manipulations produced statistically significant differences in behavior.
See id. at 1049, 105I, 1054. The study reports:
[I]n no case did the mean take per trial block of individuals in differentiated subordinate-
group-identity conditions reach the optimal level required to sustain the resource pool.
When a superordinate group boundary was salient, however, mean individual takes
reached or fell below this optimal level in all three experiments under depletion conditions.
Id. at 1o55.
Other studies reach similar results. See Marilynn B. Brewer & Roderick M. Kramer, Choice
Behavior in Social Dilemmas: Effects of Social Identity, Group Size, and Decision Framing, So J.
PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 543, 548-49 (1986); Kenneth L. Dion, Cohesiveness as a Determi-
nant of Ingroup-Outgroup Bias, 28 J. PERSONALrIY & Soc. PSYCHOL. x63, 166-71 (1973).
38 HuME, supra note 9, at 56-57. Factionalization implies cooperation within factions as well
as conflict between them.
1995] 1O15
HeinOnline  -- 108 Harv. L. Rev 1015 1994-1995
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
than between individuals and favoritism for members of one's own
"group." Neither a general concern for the welfare of others nor a
concern for fairness explains why subjects were so much less coopera-
tive with other subjects whom the experimenter placed in a different
group.3 9
The second body of studies that challenge the altruism-fairness ex-
planation are those involving discussion. Repeated study shows that
permitting communication between the subjects in a prisoner's di-
lemma situation dramatically increases the level of cooperation;40 in-
deed, discussion as much as doubles cooperation rates.41 Yet "in none
of these experiments does group discussion change the fact of defec-
tion's dominance";42 given the structure of the experiments, there is no
reason for any threat or promise to be credible. 43
To explain this puzzle, researchers varied the conditions of discus-
sion in multi-party prisoner's dilemmas. In one study, the experiment-
ers randomly divided subjects into two groups and placed each group
in a separate room.44 The experimenters permitted ten minutes of dis-
cussion in half the groups and no discussion in the others. In addition,
half the groups were told that their decisions would affect the payoff
for their own group, while the other half were told that their decisions
would determine the payoff for the other group and, conversely, that
the decisions of the other group would determine the payoff for their
group.45 The results were striking. When subjects believed their deci-
39 One might explain the data as the product of "group altruism." This term, however, ob-
scures the fact that the individuals not only feel more "altruistic" toward members of their groups
than toward non-members, but also seem willing to sacrifice the welfare of non-members for the
sake of their group. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. And there is no reason to
think that it is less "fair" for teams than for individuals to cooperate in a prisoner's dilemma.
40 See Gary Bornstein, Amnon Rapoport, Lucia Kerpel & Tani Katz, Within- and Between-
Group Communication in Intergroup Competition for Public Goods, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 422, 424 (1989); Orbell, Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, supra note 23, at 154-55 (reporting
that, when subjects had the third option of exit, discussion not only increased cooperation but
decreased exit); Orbell, van de Kragt & Dawes, supra note 23, at 811.
41 See, e.g., FRANK, supra note ig, at 142 (reporting that 37% of subjects cooperated when
permitted only io minutes of discussion and forbidden to make promises to cooperate, 61% coop-
erated when permitted 30 minutes of discussion but forbidden to promise, and 68% cooperated
when permitted 30 minutes of discussion without restrictions); Robyn M. Dawes, Jeanne McTav-
ish & Harriet Shaklee, Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions About Other People's Behav-
ior in a Commons Dilemma Situation, 35 J. PERSONALrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 5 (1977) (finding
that defection rates in a prisoner's dilemma game declined from 73% with no communication to
65% with communication not regarding the game, to 26% with communication regarding the
game but no promises, and to 16% with communication that included promises).
42 Orbell, van de Kragt & Dawes, supra note 23, at 8xx.
43 Communication should, in theory, be relevant only if it permits someone to make a credible
threat or promise. There is every reason for people to try to fool others into believing their
promises to cooperate or retaliate, but in a one-shot game between strangers, there is no self-
interested reason for people to follow through on those promises or threats.
44 See Dawes, van de Kragt & Orbell, supra note 22, at 103-07.
45 See id. at 103-04.
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sions would affect the payoffs of members of their own group, discus-
sion increased cooperation from thirty-four percent to sixty-nine
percent. But when subjects believed that their decisions affected
payoffs for the other group, discussion slightly reduced cooperation.
46
The researchers concluded that "discussion does not enhance contribu-
tion when beneficiaries are strangers. '47 Of course, all of these sub-
jects were "strangers" to each other in the sense that they had never
met before the experiment and were randomly assigned to the different
groups. Yet with ten minutes of discussion about their upcoming deci-
sions, they were, in an important economic sense, no longer strangers.
Limited discussion was sufficient to dramatically increase cooperation
if and only if the discussants were the beneficiaries of the cooperation.
These findings further demonstrate that altruism and fairness do
not fully explain excess cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma. If dis-
cussion invoked a general concern for others or for fairness, it should
not matter that the beneficiaries are arbitrarily placed in another
room. Instead, discussion seems to permit formation of a group iden-
tity that creates a special reason for discussants to cooperate.48 In the
transcripts of the subjects' pre-decision discussion, people frequently
referred to what "we" - the members of the group - should do.
Moreover, where one group knew that its decisions would affect only
the other group, there were "frequent statements that the best results
would occur if we all keep and they all give to us."49 The motive
seems to fall far short of altruism or fairness.5 0 The kind of speech
that so effectively increases cooperation tends to be an appeal not to
principle, but to solidarity. Thus, successful inspirational rhetoric -
like Henry Grady's racist speech - is often centered around repeated
invocations of an "us against them" image.
3. Cooperation Outside the Laboratory: Further Evidence That
Groups Matter. - Although laboratory experiments more easily con-
46 See id. at io6 (from 33% to 31%).
47 Id.
48 Dawes and his colleagues have suggested promise-making as an alternative explanation for
the effect of discussion (subjects can promise only if discussion is permitted). See Orbell, van de
Kragt & Dawes, supra note 23, at 818. But more recently they found greater support in the
transcripts of the discussions for the group identity explanation. See Dawes, van de Kragt &
Orbell, supra note 22, at 109. Indeed, other studies on the effects of discussion on cooperation
have found that most of the increase in cooperation can be obtained even if promising is not
allowed. See sources cited supra note 41; see also Orbell, Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, supra note
23, at 158-59 (summarizing the group-identity explanations subjects gave for their decision not to
exit a dilemma game).
49 Dawes, van de Kragt & Orbell, supra note 22, at iog.
So Based on zo years of research, including "27 different no-discussion conditions with i,x88
subjects in 178 groups, and for 12 different discussion conditions with 637 subjects in 95 groups,"
Dawes and his colleagues conclude that "with no discussion, egoistic motives explain cooperation;
with discussion, group identity - alone or in interaction with verbal promises - explains its
dramatic increase." Id.
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trol for alternative explanations, it is also appropriate to consider two
real-world collective action problems: social protest and war.
Although law and economics scholars have criticized Title VII,51 none
has attempted to explain why individual blacks participated in the
civil rights protests that led to its enactment. Social protests - such
as marches, boycotts, and "sit-ins" - are costly to the individual.
Although a group may benefit from collective protest, the gains will
likely be enjoyed by all members of the group, regardless of whether
they participated in the protest. Thus, social movements are rife with
collective action problems, which usually prevents such movements
from forming or succeeding. Posing this problem, Dennis Chong in-
quires how the civil rights movement of the 195os and I96Os suc-
ceeded in mobilizing considerable collective action.5 2 Given the
violence of white resisters, Chong rejects the possibility that material
rewards explain the participation,53 recounting instead the importance
of social incentives5 4 within small, pre-existing groups such as black
churches.-5
Consider also the high-stakes collective action problems in war. If
all soldiers attempt to free-ride on the combat efforts of others, the
result is a rout. S.L.A. Marshall argues forcefully that, for the bulk of
soldiers, the only thing that stops them from fleeing in the face of fire
is the opinion of those with whom the soldiers have formed social
ties.5 6 Marshall's evaluation is based on the fighting effectiveness of
"battle stragglers," soldiers separated from their fighting unit who tem-
-5 See sources cited infra note 120.
52 See DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1-12
(iggi). After reading Chong's explanation of how the movement solved its collective action
problems, I came to believe that the prevailing economic criticisms of Title VII are based on
assumptions that would make an explanation of the civil rights movement impossible; if selfish
whites cannot coordinate discrimination in the face of market competition, neither should blacks
have been able to cooperate to succeed in a civil rights movement.
53 See id. at 32-33.
S4 See id. at 34-35 ("The desires to gain or sustain friendships, to maintain one's social stand-
ing, and to avoid ridicule and ostracism are all social goals that constitute selective incentives for
individuals to participate in collective action."). Chong explains how this non-material concern for
reputation served as a motivator in civil rights activities like the freedom rides, the Montgomery
bus boycott, the Selma voting drive, and the Greensboro lunch counter sit-in. See id. at 55-65.
"We refuse one-time gains through free riding in order to retain the esteem, respect, and continued
goodwill of those we care about." Id. at 55.
55 See id. at 35-36. Although social pressure is most effective in small, tightly knit groups,
"[l]arge groups nevertheless can take advantage of the selective incentives provided by social pres-
sures if they in turn comprise a network of much smaller organizational units." Id. at 35.
56 Marshall claims:
During combat the soldier may become so gripped by fear that most of his thought is
directed toward escape. But if he is serving among men whom he has known for a long
period or whose judgment of him counts for any reason, he still will strive to hide his
terror from them.... The majority are unwilling to take extraordinary risks and do not
aspire to a hero's role, but they are equally unwilling that they should be considered the
least worthy among those present.
MARSHALL, supra note 4, at 148-49; see JANOWITz, supra note 4, at 220.
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porarily join an unfamiliar company. He found that individual strag-
glers had almost no "combat value" in a new unit, while small squads
of stragglers "tended to fight as vigorously as any element:"5 7
Within the group increments the men were still fighting alongside old
friends, and though they were now joined to a new parent body, they
were under the same compulsion to keep face and share in the common
defense. The individual stragglers were simply responding to the first
law of nature which began to apply irresistibly the moment they were
separated from the company of men whom they knew and who knew
them.5 8
Even in the face of death - high stakes indeed - individuals cooper-
ate not merely to secure material rewards, but also to preserve the
opinion that group members hold of them. This, of course, is the very
dynamic King Henry manipulates in his St. Crispian speech.
B. Economic Explanations of "Excess" Cooperation:
The Production of Inter-Group and Intra-Group Status
If neither material self-interest nor altruism explains the residuum
of cooperation, what can? And why does the level of cooperation vary
so significantly with the manner in which individuals are categorized
by group? This section proposes an answer: group-based status pro-
duction. In the experiments discussed above, individuals behave self-
ishly, not altruistically, but their selfish end is the production of the
non-material good of esteem. If individuals seek such non-material
ends, members of social groups have another means of solving collec-
tive action problems - by allocating esteem to induce members to
make contributions to group welfare. Once we add esteem conse-
quences to the material payoffs of individual decisions in such settings,
we can explain both the fact and the nature of residual cooperation.
This section argues that human beings seek esteem from others; in
aggregate terms, they seek social status. Individuals derive status from
groups in two ways: first, individuals gain esteem from strangers
based on visible group memberships; and second, within a socially
connected group, individuals are especially concerned with the esteem
of fellow members. In each case, though for different reasons, status
production creates a non-material incentive for group cooperation.
i. The Individual Preference for Esteem and Status. - If one
assumes that individuals behave rationally, the only explanation for
the subjects' behavior in the experiments discussed in Part L.A is that
the subjects receive benefits from cooperation, or avoid costs from de-
fection, that are not part of the formal, pecuniary payoff structure of
S7 MARSHALL, supra note 4, at i5i.
S8 Id. at I51-52.
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the game. One simple way of explaining the cooperation is that the
benefit they receive is the esteem of their fellow game-players.
In an earlier article, I described the pervasiveness and power of
what I called "negative relative preferences - preferences for ap-
proaching or surpassing the consumption level of others."59 In particu-
lar, I offered evidence that people care greatly about achieving a
relative social rank or social status.60 What one gains by attaining
"status," however, is merely a state of mind - the opinion of others in
society - that one is particularly worthy in some way. To understand
"excess" cooperation, we should start with precisely this point: that one
of the "basic pleasures" 61 people seek in life is the esteem of others.62
That people care what others think of them is a parsimonious ex-
planation of many phenomena. The desire for esteem explains, for ex-
ample, why people are obsessed with the impression their goods make
on others.63 The desire for esteem also underlies the common emotion
of embarrassment: individuals feel a momentary but acute pain from
loss of esteem at having others observe their missteps or indiscre-
tions.64 And this desire for esteem helps explain the well-established
finding that individuals conform dramatically in the face of a group
judgment. Even when there is no material cost to disagreement, indi-
viduals appear to fear that dissent will adversely affect how others
view them.65
Given this behavior, it is not implausible to say that some individ-
uals would cooperate in what is nominally a prisoner's dilemma solely
59 Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. I, 9 (1992) (emphasis omitted).
60 See id. at 38-48.
61 BECKER, supra note 3, at 145 (arguing that economics should strive to explain behavior
with only a few preferences that reflect basic pleasures).
62 It would be trivial to say that people care about what others think of them as a means to
furthering various material ends; the evaluations others make obviously affect the resources one
can gain in trade. My claim, however, is that people also care quite a bit about what others think
of them as an end in itself.
Esteem is objectively manifested in the ways people show each other respect: for example,
who is permitted to speak first or without interruption; who is asked for advice and counsel; who
sets the standard of fashion or humor. These objective prerogatives are valued, in my model,
only as manifestations of the esteem individuals seek and are not separate ends in themselves.
63 See McAdams, supra note 59, at 38-44. The desire for esteem also explains why people
care how their salary compares to that of their co-workers and why people save according to the
size of their income relative to others. See id. at 45-46.
64 Consider, for example, being the only member of an audience to begin applauding at an
inopportune moment. Embarrassment does not depend on the prospect of pecuniary consequences
from one's blunder. We feel discomfort because - caring generally for esteem - we suffer when
others think ill of us, even if they are strangers. Of course, people may internalize norms and feel
embarrassment (or guilt) even when others are not present. But my point is that there is often an
increase in the intensity of feeling if others know of our offending conduct.
65 See Bibb Latan6, The Psychology of Social Impact, in CONTEMPORARY READINGS IN SO-
CIAL PSYCHOLOGY 288, 291 (David A. Scroeder, David E. Johnson & Thomas D. Jensen eds.,
2985) ("Eighty years of experimental evidence strongly shows that individuals are influenced by
the actions and expectations of others.").
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to preserve the minimal esteem strangers (in that community) normally
feel for one another. Individuals add the "esteem rewards" and "es-
teem penalties" to the material payoffs and choose accordingly. Es-
teem concerns may change the total payoffs enough to make
cooperation rational. 66
2. Members of "Shared-Trait" Groups Cooperate to Produce In-
ter-Group Status. - To explain the dilemma experiments adequately,
an esteem theory must also explain why the level of cooperation varies
with "group identity" measures. The concept of "shared-trait groups"
explains the existence and variation in the level of cooperation ob-
served in the experiments. By "shared-trait" group, I mean a collec-
tion of individuals who have in common some readily observable
feature. In American society, people can roughly agree on how to
group individuals - for example, by age, by language, or by physical
characteristics we refer to as "race." In each case, on the basis of ca-
sual observation, one can determine reasonably well whether individu-
als fall within the category.
Observable traits are important because, when individuals encoun-
ter a stranger, they have no other basis for making an esteem judg-
ment. If individuals feel particularly high or low esteem for others
with the same trait, they tend to extend that judgment to the stranger.
I am not describing irrational prejudice, but a simple application of
the economics of information. Given the scarcity of information, it is
rational to use cheaper information - proxies - to infer the existence
of more expensive, individualized information. 67 The economics litera-
ture describes the use of proxies for making decisions of material con-
sequence (such as employment), but proxies can also be used for the
allocation of status. Shared-trait group membership is a proxy people
use for granting or withholding esteem to individuals they do not
know personally.
The use of observable traits as proxies gives individuals a reason
to care about the esteem-generating behavior of those with whom they
share an observable trait. If an individual shares a trait with others,
she expects strangers to extend her the esteem they have for the group
that shares the trait. If these third-party observers know only an indi-
vidual's putative group membership, the individual expects them to
66 Esteem concerns primarily reduce the benefits of defecting when the other party cooperates,
possibly to the extent that a player is better off cooperating when the other party cooperates.
Even with esteem, a player is still better off defecting when the other party defects, but defection
is no longer the "dominant" strategy. Moreover, because mutual cooperation is better for both
parties than mutual defection, communication may increase cooperation by assuring each that the
other will cooperate.
67 The statistical theory of discrimination, for example, posits that people use race as a proxy
to evaluate others by assuming in the absence of more specific information that the person has the
average qualities of her race. The individual will benefit from the use of proxies if the savings in
information costs outweigh the costs of inaccuracy. See infra note 116.
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judge her entirely on the basis of that membership. She therefore has
a selfish concern that the group be highly esteemed in comparison to
other groups. Even though the "members" of a group may not know
or feel any affinity for each other, third-party categorization gives
these members a reason to care about the group's status.
This proxy effect provides a parsimonious explanation of the varia-
tion in cooperation observed in the experiments reviewed above: in the
laboratory, the experimenter is the third party who categorizes individ-
uals. Any set of subjects the experimenter designates as constituting a
group has a "shared trait" for purposes of the experiment. The sub-
jects know that the researcher is observing and evaluating them as
members of the group she created. 68 In collective action experiments,
the only means of distinguishing successful from unsuccessful groups is
the extent to which the group cooperates and achieves the best collec-
tive result. Subjects in such experiments may earn additional benefits
for cooperating or face additional costs for defecting - thus, esteem
consequences may make cooperation a rational strategy.
Further, in the prisoner's dilemma studies, individuals playing the
game against individuals cooperated at higher levels than teams play-
ing the same game against teams.69 With team-play, individuals ex-
pect that the esteem they receive depends on the success of the
arbitrarily created groups to which they belong. The proxy effect
works to raise the payoff of defecting when the other team cooperates
(the one way of "beating" the other team) and to lower the payoff of
cooperating when the other team defects (thereby "losing'). With indi-
vidual play, however, either there is no cognizable "group," or the
group contains both of the subjects in the game. Thus any proxy ef-
fect works toward cooperation. If subjects understand that the experi-
menter will have other pairs play the game, they may imagine
themselves being evaluated as a pair against other pairs, which raises
the payoff of mutual cooperation (the best "pair" outcome) and lowers
the payoff of mutual defection (the worst "pair" outcome).70
68 Once the group boundary arises, subjects within one group may also anticipate evaluating,
and being evaluated by, subjects in the other group.
69 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
70 Similarly, in the commons depletion experiments, subjects cooperated more if they believed
the experimenter was evaluating all of them as a single group rather than as part of one of two
subgroups. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. In the former case, the subjects apparently
viewed depleting the pool as a form of group failure, the cost of which is a lower evaluation of
the group and all its members. In the latter case, gaining the esteem of being on a successful
team arguably required depleting the pool at a higher rate so that one's team of subjects would
reap more than the other team. The "minimal inter-group paradigm" studies do not present a
dilemma, but note that subjects rated others so as to maximize the difference in outcome between
the groups rather than to maximize the absolute outcome for their own group. See supra notes
34-36 and accompanying text. The individuals behaved as if they sought to gain individual es-
teem by maximizing the proxy value of membership in their group.
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To the experiments previously reviewed, we may now add studies
on relative deprivation as a cause of social protest. Relative depriva-
tion refers to the fact that individuals react strongly to deprivation
when others have what they lack.71 "Psychologists hypothesize that a
central component of people's angry feelings over deprivation is a
comparison between themselves and others who have the desired
thing. ' 72 Numerous studies have demonstrated the importance of com-
parison with others to feelings of relative deprivation and to behavior
motivated by such feelings.73 Most important, many of these studies
find that attitudes about inter-group comparisons predict participation
in social protest, whereas attitudes about interpersonal comparisons do
not. People are more likely to protest when they feel that the group to
which they belong is relatively deprived than when they simply feel
that they as individuals are relatively deprived.7 4
In sum, laboratory experiments show that, even when the group is
an entirely arbitrary construct, individuals seek to acquire esteem from
"non-group" members by raising the status of what, in the eyes of
those non-group members, is the individuals' group. Outside the labo-
ratory, concern with how one's shared-trait group is regarded also
motivates significant action.
3. Members of "Socially Connected" Groups Cooperate to Pro-
duce Intra-Group Status. - A second, more conventional understand-
ing of the group posits that the members are, in some manner, socially
connected. These socially connected groups are comprised of people
who know each other, the paradigm cases being families, networks of
friends, or social clubs. Such groups have two noteworthy features,
71 See Robert Folger, Reformulating the Preconditions of Resentment: A Referent Cognitions
Model, in SOCAL COMPARISON, SOCIA.L JUSTICE, AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATION 183, 184-212
(John C. Masters & William P. Smith eds., i987); James M. Olson & J. Douglas Hazlewood,
Relative Deprivation and Social Comparison: An Integrative Comparison, in 4 RELATIVE DEPRi-
VATION AND SOCIAL COMPAISON I, 2-5 (James W. Olson, C. Peter Herman & Mark P. Zanna
eds., 1986).
72 McAdams, supra note 59, at 34; see also Faye Crosby, A Model of Egoistical Relative Dep-
rivation, 83 PSYCHOL. REV. 85, 90 (1976) (maintaining that the first precondition of relative depri-
vation is that "[tlhe person who lacks X must... see that someone else ... possesses X").
73 See Thomas D. Cook, Faye Crosby & Karen M. Hennigan, The Construct Validity of Rela-
tive Deprivation, in SOcIAL. COMPARISON PROCESSES 307, 320-23 tbl. 4 (Jerry M. Suls & Richard
L. Miller eds., 1977) (collecting studies).
74 See Lise Dub6 & Serge Guimond, Relative Deprivation and Social Protest: The Personal-
Group Issue, in 4 RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON, supra note 71, at 201,
204-10. One researcher summarizes:
[F]raternalistic [relative deprivation] is useful for predicting white racism and support of
black political candidates in the United States, militancy among black Americans and their
approval of violence to gain their rights, attitudes of Qu6bec nationalism among
Francophone Canadians in Montreal, subjective satisfactions among members of Toronto's
Chinese community, and outgroup attitudes among Chinese in Toronto and Muslims in
India, respectively.
Kenneth L. Dion, Responses to Perceived Discrimination and Relative Deprivation, in 4 RELA-
TIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON, supra note 71, at i59, 174.
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each of which contributes to the group's ability to overcome collective
action problems: individuals tend to care especially about the esteem
of their fellow group members, and individuals tend to grant esteem to
members who contribute to group welfare.
The first feature of socially connected groups is that individuals
tend to value the esteem of fellow group members more than they
value the esteem of non-members. If we care what others think of us,
we care more intensely the more well-informed an opinion is; those
with whom we have frequent interaction - group members - know
us best. Moreover, the dilemma experiments in which the simple act
of discussion generated greater cooperation among discussants indicate
that even minimal social connection can significantly increase the con-
cern for the esteem of another. In addition, the very reason many so-
cial groups exist is that the members share some skill, trait, or interest;
members tend to value the esteem of in-group members more than
outsiders because members share a sense of what skills or traits are
worth possessing.75 Finally, there is a self-reinforcing aspect to the
concern for intra-group status: we tend to value most the opinion of
those we esteem highly, and we prefer to belong to social groups in-
cluding such people. 76
Given the especially high concern for esteem from socially con-
nected group members, we can better understand high-stakes coopera-
tion in the collective action problems presented by social protest and
war.7 7 Military and social protest groups elicit cooperation by re-
warding members with esteem or prestige based on how much they
contribute to the group's welfare. Yet even if people seek intra-group
esteem, the question remains why individual group members provide
intra-group esteem to those who contribute to group welfare. The sec-
ond noteworthy feature of socially connected groups is that members
readily provide esteem to those who benefit the group; even without a
central authority, members tend not to free-ride completely on the "es-
teem payments" of other members.
People provide esteem to members who benefit the group because,
up to a point, thinking well of others is not a cost. To the contrary,
75 Although there are exceptions, individuals tend to value more highly the positive traits that
they believe they possess. See, e.g., George R. Goethals, David M. Messick & Scott T. Allison,
The Uniqueness Bias: Studies of Constructive Social Comparison, in SOCIAL COMPARISON 149,
149-50 (Jerry Suls & Thomas A. Wills eds., iggi); Pawel Lewicki, Self-Image Bias in Person
Perception, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 385-87 (1983).
76 Even if an individual admires only a few leaders or "heroes" in the group, she will care
about the opinion of other group members, who (especially if they know her better than the
heroes do) can dramatically influence the leaders' esteem for her. Thus, a few highly admired
people within a group can cause everyone in the group to care much more about the esteem of
group members than they do about that of non-group members. See CHONG, supra note 52, at
59-60; ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
237-38 (1991).
77 See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text
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esteeming others is a valuable "consumption good." A person deprived
of this good - who finds no one in the world worth esteeming - is
far less happy than one who has located a small collection of worthy
souls. Nor is an individual who esteems twenty others necessarily
poorer than someone who esteems only ten others to the same degree.
To the extent that esteem is not costly,7 8 there is no reason to free-ride
by withholding esteem from others. Instead, group members tend to
allocate esteem in a way that brings them some return by rewarding
those who contribute materially to group welfare and, at a secondary
level, by rewarding those who allocate esteem in a manner that bene-
fits the group. Imagine, as an analogy, that people have a kind of
currency that is useless except for making group members feel better.
It would be irrational to keep the currency or to distribute it ran-
domly; one might as well provide it as a reward for those who contrib-
ute to group welfare and withhold it to punish those who do not.7 9
Departing briefly from an economic description of human behavior,
I can state the point in more realistic psychological terms. "Thinking
well of others" is often reflexive rather than deliberate. People who
might free-ride on material payments tend not to free-ride on esteem
"payments" because they reflexively admire and respect those who
benefit the group. Imagine, for example, a chessmaster, a person who
not only intensely studies the game, but also socializes predominantly
with others who do the same. Taking egoism seriously means that this
person will consider chess-playing ability to be an important measure
by which others can be judged. Individuals elevate the importance of
those traits or skills that they possess.8 0 This process helps the indi-
vidual secure self-esteem. But a consequence of thinking that a partic-
ular trait is desirable is to esteem others who possess the trait and to
78 There may be costs to thinking well of others, but probably only when one grants very
high levels of esteem. First, if one has a relative preference for obtaining a particular rank (for
example, being a top violinist), esteeming many others may mean conceding that one has not
achieved the rank one desires. See generally McAdams, supra note 59, at 7-26 (describing analy-
ses of relative preferences in which one derives pleasure from another's consumption level in
relation to one's own). For most individuals, however, it is still costless to believe that a limited
number of others are exemplary in some way, either because one can still believe oneself superior
to them or because one's relative preference is merely to be in the top tier. Similarly, there may
be a cost in deciding how much esteem others merit. But this "decisional cost" itself may be zero
if it is merely the by-product of the ego-enhancing process of valuing one's own qualities and of
the information picked up about others in the course of daily life. (Of course, because this deci-
sional cost is not always zero, people use "proxies" to allocate esteem.) Finally, a cost may be
incurred in expressing esteem. (In some circumstances, esteem is inferred without expression, but
only because esteem is sometimes expressed under those circumstances.) But I would make the
same argument for expression that I do for esteem: people have a preference for expressing their
beliefs, and thus the smile, gesture, or phrase that expresses esteem, within limits, is simply not a
cost. Some commentators explain voting in this manner. See infra note 217.
79 A group may also formalize the awarding of intra-group status by giving awards, special
titles, or privileges. The abundance of such external tokens of esteem testifies to their success.
80 See supra note 75.
19951 1025
HeinOnline  -- 108 Harv. L. Rev 1025 1994-1995
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
esteem them in relation to how much of the trait they possess. It is
neither plausible nor coherent for the chessmaster to withhold esteem
from other people who excel in chess. Barring an overshadowing neg-
ative trait, an individual will more or less automatically esteem others
who have the traits the individual most values in herself, or the traits
the individual would most like to acquire for herself.
Frequently, people reflexively esteem traits or behaviors that in-
crease the welfare of the group. A player's success at chess tourna-
ments raises the prestige of the chess club to which she belongs and
earns her esteem within the club. A soldier whose skill or effort saves
the lives of his fellow squad members earns their esteem. Moreover, if
one who is known to value a particular trait withholds esteem from
those who possess it, she risks appearing envious and losing the esteem
of others.81 Especially within a group of people who desire a particu-
lar trait, refusing to esteem the trait (or at least to appear to esteem it)
calls into question the dissenter's commitment to or understanding of
shared values. Of course, some members may nonetheless be envious
and refuse to provide esteem. But since esteem is at least partially
reflexive, there is less than complete free-riding in allocating esteem,
and the group can achieve a significant level of coordination.
Sociological evidence supports the theory that socially connected
groups allocate esteem to overcome collective action problems. So-
cially connected groups, as I have defined them, consist of relatively
small numbers of people who know each other. Sociologists have long
been interested in how, within larger groups in society, "norms" arise
as an important decentralized mechanism of social control.8 2 Esteem
allocation, it turns out, provides the necessary micro-level explanation
for social norms; the functioning of social norms, in turn, demonstrates
the full power of intra-group cooperation.
Although economically inclined theorists have mostly ignored
norms, one important exception is Robert Ellickson. In Order Without
Law,83 Ellickson summarizes and supplements the empirical literature
on the success of norms in regulating individual behavior.8 4 Ellick-
81 See McAdams, supra note 59, at 79-8o.
82 See MICHAEL HECHTER, PRINCIPLES OF GROUP SOLIDARITY 40-58 (1987); WILLIAM J.
GOODE, THE CELEBRATION OF HEROES 204-34 (1978).
83 See ELLICKSON, supra note 76. Other notable exceptions are GEORGE A. AKERLOF, AN
ECONOMIC THEORIST'S BOOK OF TALES 95-97 (1984); and Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudi-
cation and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
215, 224-27 (1994).
84 Ellickson defines norms as one of the five types of "rules" that comprise a system of social
control. Rules are categorized based upon the source of both the "rules of behavior and [the]
sanctions that back up those rules." ELLICKSON, supra note 76, at 126. First-party control comes
from within the actor and is enforced by self-sanction; second-party control is exerted by the other
party with whom the primary actor is dealing and is enforced by personal self-help. Norms are
one example of third-party control. They emanate from what Ellickson calls "social forces" and
are enforced by non-hierarchical third-party enforcers. See id. at I3. The other sources of third-
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son's empirical contribution is his study of norms that govern the reso-
lution of various disputes over livestock between neighbors in Shasta
County, California. s5  Like other social norms that arise within "close-
knit groups," the Shasta County norms are a means of enhancing
group welfare. The norms are a non-legal means by which the group
facilitates desirable collective action. 6 To some degree, what Ellickson
and others identify as efficient norms are enforced by reciprocity be-
tween neighbors who expect to interact indefinitely, and the norms are
therefore explicable in material terms.8 7 But the unique contribution
norms make to cooperation - the additional power of norms beyond
reciprocity - is third-party enforcement. 8 What Ellickson has in
mind are sanctions administered not by the immediate "victim" of a
norm violation, but by "friends, relatives, gossips, vigilantes, and other
nonhierarchical third-party enforcers."89 Third parties sanction - by
gossip, scorn, ostracism, or physical retaliation - those who violate
the norms or informal rules of the group.90
My point, however, is that this informal third-party enforcement
cannot exist without the desire for esteem. There is no material incen-
party control are organizations, which provide organizational rules and sanctions, and govern-
ment, which provides legal rules backed by state enforcement. See id.
85 Ellickson studied disputes over damages from cattle trespass, allocation of the costs of
boundary fences, and damages from automobile accidents caused by cattle wandering onto high-
ways. He found that the first two classes of disputes (but not the third) are resolved by social
norms that arise independently of and differ from legal rules. See id. at 40-103.
86 See id. at x67. Ellickson also reviewed studies that demonstrate the effectiveness of norms
both in the whaling industry in the i8th and 19th centuries and among orchard owners in Wash-
ington state. See id. at i89, 191-2o6. He concludes that "members of a close-knit group develop
and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain
in their workaday affairs with one another." Id. at 167 (emphasis omitted).
87 The enforcement mechanism for reciprocity is personal self-help. For example, when his
neighbor fails to cooperate in controlling cattle trespass or contributing to boundary fences, a
rancher may withhold some favor he usually grants, detain trespassing cattle, or engage in mild
physical retaliation. See ELLICKSON, Supra note 76, at 57-59, 79-81. Ellickson labels the strategy
these neighbors employed "even-up." It is a more complex form of reciprocity than tit-for-tat,
applicable to a wider variety of circumstances. See id. at 225-29.
88 1 am relying on Ellickson's definition of norms as a means of third-party, not reciprocal,
control. Robert Cooter, on the other hand, implies that norms add to reciprocity only because
individuals "internalize" certain obligations of behavior. See Cooter, supra note 83, at 221. Like
Ellickson, I categorize internalization of norms as "first-party" or "self" control and conceive social
norms as an independent form of "third-party" control. See ELLICKSON, supra note 76, at 126
n.8, 243-46. The difficult question is why this third-party enforcement exists. My claim is that
such enforcement succeeds without internalization (or reciprocity) as long as individuals seek the
esteem of others. Thus, while Cooter emphasizes the motivation of guilt - a negative feeling
that exists even when others do not know of one's transgression, I emphasize shame - a negative
feeling that exists only when others believe one has transgressed. See generally JEROME KAGAN,
THE NATURE OF THE CHILD 145-49 (1984) (discussing the development of distinct emotions of
guilt and shame).
89 ELLICKsoN, supra note 76, at 13r n.21.
90 See id. at 131, 213-19. In Ellickson's taxonomy, social norms are enforced by "vicarious
self-help." Id. at 131-
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tive to obey norms unless there is a material cost attached to violating
them. There is no material cost associated with violation unless some-
one imposes a material penalty. And there is no material incentive for
others to bear the cost of inflicting such a penalty; after all, norm-
enforcement is, for the group, a public good, and like all public goods,
faces the problem of free-riding.91 Ellickson says that there is a
secondary enforcement norm that compels people to punish those who
violate norms and that those who fail to do so will also be sanctioned.
But then the question arises why anyone would bear the cost of sanc-
tioning those who failed to sanction a substantive norm violator. As
Jon Elster argues, "People do not frown upon others when they fail to
sanction people who fail to sanction people who fail to sanction people
who fail to sanction a norm violation. '9 2 As one moves away from the
original norm violation, "the cost of receiving disapproval falls rapidly
to zero."93 Yet if the cost of refusing to enforce a norm at any level
falls to zero, there is no reason for anyone to enforce the norm, and
hence no reason for anyone to follow the norm.9 4
A concern for esteem as an end in itself, however, is sufficient to
defend norm enforcement against the infinite regress Elster describes.
Elster's argument assumes that mechanisms like gossip, scorn, and os-
tracism work only to signal who is to be subject to material sanctions
and are only as effective as those material sanctions. But if disap-
proval itself exerts a real force, then the gossip, scorn, and ostracism
are themselves sufficient to enforce norms; they punish the violator by
lowering the esteem she receives from the community.95 In addition to
91 See ELSTER, supra note 27, at 132 n.113. The individual reasons that either enough others
will enforce the norm to ensure its effectiveness without her contribution or not enough others
will enforce the norm to permit it to work even with her contribution. In either case, there is no
material reason for her to enforce the norm.
92 Id. at 133.
93 Id.
94 Ellickson responds that "[plerhaps the perception, or better yet the existence, of a few virtu-
ous leaders or other committed third-party enforcers at the highest level of social control creates
incentives for cooperative activity that cascade down and ultimately produce welfare-maximizing
primary behavior." ELLiCKSON, supra note 76, at 237. Given his assumption, Ellickson is right.
If most individuals perceive that certain members of the community are willing to inflict punish-
ment on norm-violators notwithstanding the material irrationality of doing so, this core group can
terminate the otherwise infinite regress and provide a foundation or "backstop" for the whole
enforcement mechanism. Yet there is no reason for people to perceive the existence of such a
group unless it actually exists. And Ellickson offers no explanation of why this core group of
people ignore their own self-interest. Of course Ellickson may believe that such people are in fact
pursuing a non-material self-interest in the form of status, but he does not make such an argu-
ment explicitly. See id. at 238 n.23 (noting "the elevated status of leaders and their special role in
the enforcement of norms'). The desire for esteem is a more general and reliable backstop for
norm enforcement than material self-interest.
95 Gossip transmits information on which people make reflexive esteem judgments. Elster has
responded that expressing disapproval "requires energy and attention that might be used for other
purposes" and that "[one may alienate or provoke the target individual, at some cost or risk to
oneself." ELSTER, supra note 27, at 133. But others need not always express disapproval; some-
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this direct support, the desire for esteem may produce a secondary en-
forcement norm that requires material sanctions for violators of the
primary norm. To avoid esteem punishment, individuals may have to
bear some cost incurred by imposing material sanctions on norm viola-
tors. Thus, the considerable body of evidence that shows that social
norms govern behavior further supports the significance of esteem mo-
tives, especially within socially connected groups.
In sum, individuals care particularly for esteem within socially con-
nected groups. Even without a central authority, individuals tend to
provide esteem to those who contribute to the welfare of such groups,
and this process of esteem allocation facilitates wider social norms that
bring about further cooperation. Of course, group members will still
free-ride when their desire for material well-being outweighs their de-
sire for intra-group status, but esteem allocation will ameliorate, if not
eliminate, collective action problems.
C. The Consequences of Intra-Group Cooperation:
Inter-Group Conflict
Intra-group cooperation increases inter-group conflict. Status is
both an additional means of ensuring intra-group cooperation and a
new end of intra-group cooperation, and it contributes in both ways to
conflict between groups. Given that social groups often conflict over
material resources, the desire for intra-group status means that group
members will cooperate more effectively in such disputes, which en-
sures that groups will be more effective "combatants" whenever mate-
rial conflict arises. More important, the very mechanism that
facilitates greater intra-group cooperation will ensure a new form of
conflict: competition for inter-group status. This latter result is the un-
fortunate and inevitable connection between cooperation and conflict.
Groups sometimes engage in zero-sum competition with other
groups. A classic example is lobbying. When interest groups pursue
what economists call "rent-seeking" legislation, such as farm subsidies
and tax "loopholes," they seek merely to transfer resources from one
group to another.9 6 Cartels similarly seek to extract the profits of non-
competitive pricing from consumers. For lobbying groups and cartels,
individual contributions to the group's rent-seeking endeavor tend to
be undersupplied; selfish members free-ride on the efforts of other
members. But the cooperation secured by intra-group status produc-
times one is confident that by violating a social norm, she has lowered herself in the eyes of
others. Further, because people enjoy expression as an end in itself, expressing disapproval is not
always costly. One may alienate the target individual by disapproving of her - but that is the
whole point. Rather than bear the cost of retaliating against those who express disapproval of
one's norm violation, the rational actor often just obeys the norm in the first place.
96 See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Inter-
pretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLuM. L. REV. 223, 224 n.6 (1986).
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tion means that individuals contribute more heavily than they other-
wise would toward their group's effort to win a conflict.97
Indeed, intra-group esteem production, and social norms based on
such esteem, may provide the only explanations for the success of very
large groups in lobbying despite powerful incentives for individuals to
free-ride. Judge Richard Posner has conceded some uncertainty, for
example, in explaining how farmers cooperate in legislative activities. 98
I propose that the answer is the same for farmers as it is for the
ranchers Ellickson studied in Shasta County. Although the occupa-
tional status of farmers or ranchers is not as observable as, for exam-
ple, their race, it is one of the first things strangers detect about them.
And within a geographic area, farmers and ranchers tend to be so-
cially connected. Thus, farmers and ranchers have an interest in the
status generally accorded their occupation and a means of inducing
contributions to that status. Intra-group esteem allocation elicits mate-
rial contributions to group material welfare, such as monetary contri-
butions to lobbying efforts. For individual farmers and ranchers, the
amount contributed may be small, but multiplication by a large
number produces considerable political clout.99
There is a second reason intra-group esteem allocation increases
group conflict. Individuals compete for esteem. One arena of competi-
tion is group status competition, in which individuals seek to produce
status for themselves by raising the status of their groups. 00 Under
certain conditions, status is zero-sum, so that satisfaction of the status
preferences of one group's members necessarily means non-satisfaction
of the status preferences of another group's members.
In another article, I detailed the conditions under which relative
preferences "inherently" conflict - that is, the circumstances under
which the relative position is genuinely zero-sum.' 0 ' Although I fo-
cused there primarily on individual status-seeking, those conditions ex-
ist for social groups when members of different groups seek
97 Absent this effect, free-riding may be so great that the group never forms at all. Thus
another reason intra-group status production causes more group conflict is that it ensures there
will be more groups,
98 See Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 19 ('993).
99 Posner attempts to explain how lawyers cooperate in rent-seeking. See id. His most plausi-
ble claim for why individual lawyers bear the cost of organizing to produce cartel-protective legis-
lation is that they believe such activities will make them better known, "thereby increasing the
likelihood that [others] will refer cases to [them]." Id. at 20. But among the other lawyers a given
lawyer knows, there are more compelling reasons for making referrals, such as the expectation of
material reciprocity. Status, however, provides an explanation: when the material costs are low,
lawyers "pay" organizers with status; and because organizers enjoy high status, lawyers seek to
associate with them by giving them referrals.
100 By raising their group's status, individuals produce status for themselves in two ways.
First, they share in the enhanced status their group enjoys. Second, for the reasons discussed
above, they are rewarded with intra-group status for contributing to their group's welfare.
101 See McAdams, supra note 59, at 49-55.
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incompatible positions for their groups along some common, observa-
ble, and reasonably objective dimension. When these conditions do
not hold, group status production is socially benign. 10 2 But the condi-
tions do hold, for example, when groups compare themselves along the
"common dimension" of generalized social status'03 and seek a position
of superiority on that scale.' 4 Under such circumstances, social status
is entirely relative. Investment in such zero-sum competition is there-
fore socially wasteful; the extent of the investment measures the size of
the inefficiency.' 05 In particular, note the social waste of an obvious
group optimizing strategy: one way to raise the status of one's group is
to invest in lowering the status of other groups.10 6 Thus, the desire for
esteem may lead to "subordination" as groups attempt to sabotage
each other's general social position.
The status theory of cooperation and conflict may now be summa-
rized. First, individuals seek, as an end, the esteem of others; in ag-
gregate terms, they seek social status. Second, because socially
connected group members are a key source of esteem, individuals will
make material sacrifices on behalf of the group to gain intra-group
status. Conversely, the group will reward such status to those who
contribute to its welfare. Third, because another source of status is
the larger society beyond one's social groups, one measure of group
welfare is its status within society. Consequently, groups will use in-
tra-group status "payments" to encourage members to contribute mate-
rially to inter-group status. Finally, because general social status is
relative, one group can raise its inter-group status by lowering the sta-
tus of other groups.
102 For example, even if groups A and B seek superiority over each other, there is no inherent
preference conflict if group A members wish to be superior in characteristic X and group B
members wish to be superior in characteristic Y. The student bodies of two rival universities can
both prosper, for example, if the students at the school that excels in football value only the
sports comparison, while the students at the school that excels in placing students in graduate
programs care only about the academic comparison.
103 There are certain characteristics that are widely valued in American society, such as
wealth, education, and occupational prestige. See ROGER S. MASON, CONSPICUOUS CONSUMP-
TION 108, 113 (ig8i); Marcus Felson, Invidious Distinctions Among Cars, Clothes and Suburbs,
42 PUB. OPINION Q. 49, 56-57 (1978). One can describe an individual's general social status by
roughly summarizing these widely valued characteristics. See MIHALY CSIKSZENTMEIALYI & EU-
GENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, THE MEANING OF THINGS: DOMESTIC SYMBOLS AND THE SELF 31
(198I) ("[Status symbols] are in some ways a summary of all the salient characteristics of the self,
a global measure of the owner's standing in the community."). Even if some people are indiffer-
ent to their relative wealth, education, or occupational prestige, they tend to be esteem-seekers
and care about the social status these items earn for them.
104 Conflict exists in a variety of other circumstances as well. See McAdanms, supra note 59, at
52-54. For example, conflict arises if one group seeks superiority and the other seeks equality.
105 See id. at 5S-59. An exception is when the competition encourages investment in a public
good. See id. at 59-62.
106 Cf Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, AM. ECON. REV., May
r983, at 267 (discussing strategies intended to increase costs for rival firms).
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The experimental data support the prediction of inevitable inter-
group conflict. In the minimal inter-group paradigm studies, the mere
categorization of individuals into arbitrary groups caused a significant
bias in the evaluations subjects gave the members of other groups.
Similarly, there was less cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games
solely as a consequence of having groups play against other groups
instead of having individuals play against individuals. And in com-
mons depletion games, individuals were more cooperative - less in-
clined to free-ride - if they were told they were being evaluated as a
single group (against groups not then part of the experiment) than if
they were told they were being evaluated as a member of one of two
subgroups (in the experiment) facing the depletion problem.10 7
But group status competition matters because it exists outside the
laboratory. Part II shows the real-world effect of these theoretical rea-
sons for conflict. For now, consider again Ellickson's work on social
norms. Ellickson adduces considerable evidence that the opposition of
Shasta County ranchers' to legislative proposals to close the range can-
not be explained by additional material costs that the ranchers would
bear. He concludes that the opposition is instead a function of sym-
bolic politics: "The simplest explanation for the Shasta County cattle-
men's opposition to a closed-range ordinance proposed for a rural area
is that they regard a closure as a conspicuous kick in the teeth." 0 8
Presumably, the answer is the same for the other side. Non-ranchers
fight the political battle to establish symbolically their place in the so-
cial structure. If so, consider the full implications of this example:
even when the law is materially irrelevant (because group norms su-
persede it), groups expend political resources solely for the purpose of
symbolically establishing their superiority over each other.
The ranchers, of course, did not describe their motivation this way.
The ranchers maintained a "folklore" that the range issue had dire ma-
terial consequences. 0 9 This use of folklore or ideology is understanda-
ble. People rarely esteem actions motivated expressly by a desire for
status." 0 Further, altruistic concerns or moral principles may lead us
to condemn more strongly the pursuit of zero-sum social status (which
necessarily lowers the welfare of others) than the pursuit of more con-
107 See supra notes 32-37, 44-49 and accompanying text
108 ELLICKSON, sufp'a note 76, at 117.
109 See id. at 1,7-18. The ranchers believe the open range provides greater immunity from
liability than it actually does. Ellickson says this misunderstanding leads to inaccurate decisions
regarding care and insurance. See id. I argue, however, that the belief persists because it sup-
ports the group's production of status. See infra pp. xo58-6o.
110 Even when one seeks status through positive accomplishments, admitting to a status moti-
vation undermines one's status. See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES 66-69 (1983); McAdams, supra
note 59, at 41-44. The esteem of others, Elster argues, is something one cannot bring about
directly, but only as the "by-product" of some other activity. See ELSTER, supra, at 66 ("[Nlothing
is so unimpressive as behaviour designed to impress."). People still seek status, but they require a
plausible non-status explanation for their conduct.
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ventional selfish ends (which do not necessarily harm anyone). The
prevailing folklore provided the ranchers a more defensible reason for
their opposition to the closed-range ordinance, one that allowed them
to circumvent these obstacles to their pursuit of status."'
Consequently, even with material stakes, symbolism may motivate
significant political action. Public choice theorists emphasize the mate-
rial ends that interest groups seek, though they may concede the non-
materiality of purely symbolic matters (such as the recent controversy
over removing the Confederate emblem from the State Flag of Geor-
gia1 12). Even when individuals articulate a material motive, however,
they may actually be struggling over symbols and be motivated by
status. Even if a closed range were clearly efficient, for example,
ranchers might still oppose it for status reasons. 113 If so, Ellickson's
evidence for the efficiency of social norms demonstrates how the
mechanisms that facilitate norms commonly lead to inefficient group
conflict.
Consider now one extended example of intra-group cooperation
and inter-group status: the problem of race discrimination. Indeed,
discrimination is more than a simple "example" of the theory I have
presented. Race discrimination best reveals the degree to which group
status production is a powerful and pervasive fact of social life.
111. A NEW ECONOMIC THEORY OF RACE DISCRIMINATION
Nobel Laureate Gary Becker pioneered what is now the prevailing
economic theory of race discrimination. He began with the simple
claim that people who discriminate act as if they have a "taste" for
avoiding contact or association with members of other races. 114 Dis-
III Status production commonly involves such rationalizations. I explain the phenomenon
more fully in the context of race discrimination. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
112 See Ken Foskett, Retreat on Issue a Sore Point for Governor, ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 29,
1994, at Fi.
113 Even when individuals articulate a moral motive for their political positions, status compe-
tition may better explain the legal change sought or opposed. See, e.g., JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD,
SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 12-35,
44-50, I88 (1963). My argument here thus falls in line with recent work on the psychology of
procedural justice. Independent of outcomes, individuals care greatly about the procedures used
in adjudicating disputes or allocating resources. According to psychologists, the explanation is
that individuals care about the esteem they receive within their groups and adjudicatory proce-
dures reveal that esteem. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 230-37 (1988); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW I73-76
(99o). My point is to extend this insight from procedural to substantive rules: independent of the
substantive effects of legal rules, individuals care about the symbolic effects those rules have on
their social status.
114 See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971) ("If an individ-
ual has a 'taste for discrimination,' he must act as if he were willing to pay something, either
directly or in the form of a reduced income, to be associated with some persons instead of
others."); see also id. at r5 ("Discrimination is commonly associated with disutility caused by
contact with some individuals . .. ").
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crimination is thus defined as an act by which one seeks to avoid this
undesired association.'1 5  Although there are alternative economic ex-
planations for discriminatory behavior, 16 this "associational prefer-
ence" model has dominated the law and economics discussion of
discrimination. 117 Based on this model, Becker argued that unfettered
market competition would tend to drive out discrimination. 118 In turn,
other economic theorists contend that, within a free market, laws
prohibiting race discrimination are unnecessary and inefficient." 9
115 Becker uses a "discrimination coefficient" to describe the degree to which individual market
actors discriminate:
The money costs of a transaction do not always completely measure net costs, and a [dis-
crimination coefficient] acts as a bridge between money and net costs. Suppose an em-
ployer were faced with the money wage rate 7c of a particular factor; he is assumed to act
as if n(i + di) were the net wage rate, with di as his [discrimination coefficient] against
this factor.
Id. at 14. Becker provides a similar description of co-worker and customer discrimination, see id.
at 14-15, and uses a "market discrimination coefficient" to measure differences in market wage
rates or other prices due to discrimination, id. at 17-18.
116 The model of "statistical discrimination" claims that race is only a proxy for other qualities
people care about. See RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 33-35, 40-41 (1992); Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical The-
ory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659, 659 (1972). Without more specific and costly
information about individuals, discriminators assume that each member of a category has the
average qualities of others in that category. Thus, white employers who discriminate are merely
drawing rational statistical inferences about individual blacks given the cost of acquiring more
specific information. Information costs do not, however, explain the racial animus that Becker's
theory addresses; for example, they do not explain white supremacists' violence against blacks.
Further, the idea of race as a proxy is inconsistent with Jim Crow definitions of race according to
factors that were not at all observable. See infra p. 1042. My claim is not that statistical discrim-
ination does not exist but that we require a different theory for the paradigmatic case of racial
animus.
117 "[B]y increasing.., contact.., trade imposes nonpecuniary, but real, costs on those mem-
bers of either race who dislike association with members of the other race." POSNER, sufra note
3, at 651. Similarly, Epstein's characterization of discrimination as a "refusal to deal" reflects a
model in which discriminators seek to avoid association with members of other races. EPSTEIN,
supra note z16, at 29-30; see also Harold Demsetz, Minorities in the Market Place, 43 N.C. L.
REv. 271, 271 (1965) (equating "discrimination against" with an "aversion to association" with).
An important but under-recognized exception (to which I am indebted) is George A. Akerlof,
Discriminatory, Status-Based Wages Among Tradition-Oriented, Stochastically rading Coconut
Producers, 93 J. POL. ECON. 265, 265 (1985). See infra pp. io64-69.
118 See BEcKER, supra note 14, at 35-37; see also Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law in
the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or Competitive?, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 1161, 1163 (1984) ("Becker's
argument that discrimination is unprofitable to the discriminators and should eventually disap-
pear from a competitive market setting is widely accepted." (footnote omitted)). One might
charge that Becker's model is proved wrong by the continued existence of discrimination. Epstein
responds that little discrimination remains and that what does remain is likely to be desirable,
based on efficiency considerations omitted in Becker's analysis. See EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at
47-78, 9I.
119 See EPSTEIN, supra note 1I6, at 9, 12; Demsetz, supra note 117, at 271, 275-93; Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1311, 1312 (1989)
(speculating that sex discrimination law has diminished women's welfare); Richard A. Posner, The
Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REv. S13, 514 (1987) [hereinafter Posner,
Title VII].
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Many have questioned and criticized this economic analysis of dis-
crimination. Yet legal criticism has generally taken one of two forms,
neither of which offers an alternative economic theory of discrimina-
tion. The first accepts arguendo the starting point of the theory -
that discrimination is "non-association" - and then challenges the eco-
nomic implications Becker and others draw from this model.120 A sec-
ond group of critics, including critical race theorists, feminists, and
others skeptical of economic analysis, rejects not only the non-associa-
tion description of discrimination, but also the entire method of eco-
nomics.' 21 Thus, critics of Becker's model have generally not been
interested in using economics to develop a comprehensive alternative
theory.'
22
This lack of interest is unfortunate. The economic theory of dis-
crimination as non-association fails not because it employs the eco-
nomic method, but because it is not sufficiently faithful to that
method. Perhaps what seems so barren about the application of the
economic method in this context is that it seems to require overlooking
what many regard as the central realities of race discrimination: dis-
crimination produces for its practitioners a gain beyond the mere
avoidance of association, and discrimination victims suffer not just
material harm, but also degradation. 123  In contrast, the alternative
economic theory I offer shows such facts to be central to evaluating
the efficiency of anti-discrimination laws.
120 Thus, some theorists have argued that, even under Becker's model, competitive markets
can perpetuate discrimination, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimina-
tion, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 22, 22 (iggi), and that the laws against discrimination are efficient,
see, e.g., John J. Donohue mH, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1412 (1986)
[hereinafter Donohue, Title VII]; John J. Donohue I, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the
Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1337, 1347-48, 1366-67 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Donohue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination].
121 See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural
Remedies for Racial and Sexual Disadvantages in Employment, 79 GEo. L.J. 1659, 1663 (1991);
Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race, 91 MmCH. L.
REv. 1183, 1188-93, 1195-97 (993).
122 A partial exception is John J. Donohue EEI & James J. Heckman, Re-evaluating Federal
Civil Rights Policy, 79 GEt. L.J. '713, 1728-29 ('99i). The authors briefly propose an alterna-
tive to Becker's model in which race discrimination is supported by coercive social norms and
universal belief in the inferiority of blacks. See also J. Hoult Verkerke, Free to Search, io5
HARV. L. REv. 2080, 2090-93 (1992) (discussing the economic importance of coercive social norms
and reviewing Ric-ARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GRouNDs: THE CASE AGAiNST EMPLoYMENT
DISCRTMINATION LAWS (1992)). Neither work, however, explains the intra-group cooperation nec-
essary for discriminatory norms to function or the existence of racist beliefs.
123 Gary Becker, for example, makes the first point implicitly by defining discrimination solely
as a means of avoiding a psychic "cost" one suffers from association. See BECKER, supra note
114, at 14-I5, 153. The harm of discrimination is simply the loss of the benefit economic trades
would have created, a loss shared by both discriminators and victims. See id. at 29-30; POSNER,
supra note 3, at 651. Epstein exemplifies the second point. In Forbidden Grounds - a 5o-page,
purportedly exhaustive attack on the laws that prohibit employment discrimination - there is no
mention of the rich literature on the psychological harms of racism.
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This Part proceeds in three sections. Section A critiques the associ-
ational preference model. I argue that the theory fails to explain a
wide variety of empirical data on race-motivated behavior. Discrimi-
natory individuals do not object to all forms of association with the
targets of their discrimination, and race affects the behavior of some
individuals well beyond what can be explained by a distaste for asso-
ciation. Section B offers an alternative economic account - a status-
production theory of race discrimination based on the theory of intra-
group cooperation and inter-group conflict that I developed in Part I.
This theory better explains the behavioral evidence. Section C dis-
cusses two implications of the status-production model, which mark
considerable departures from Becker's model: first, race discrimination
may persist in the face of market competition; and second, race dis-
crimination represents a market failure similar to unregulated theft,
one that may justify coercive restraint of private status "confiscation."
Throughout this Part, I concentrate on race discrimination, and within
that category, I primarily address discrimination by whites against
blacks. Although I believe the model has a wider application, for now
the discussion is more profitably focused on an intensive study of one
example.
A. Empirical Failures of the Associational
Preference Model of Discrimination
Notwithstanding the popularity of the associational preference
model, it does not adequately explain discriminatory behavior. In par-
ticular, the model has trouble accounting for patterns of behavior dur-
ing the Jim Crow era of segregation, which is precisely when and
where we most need a theory of animus-based racial discrimination.
Regarding this era, the associational preference model is both over-
and underinclusive, predicting both more and less racially discrimina-
tory behavior than we actually find. The only way to force the model
to fit the data is to posit a large, unwieldy set of associational prefer-
ences quite in tension with the reductive method of economics.
i. Overinclusiveness: The Prevailing Model Overpredicts Dis-
crimination. - The desire for non-association initially seems a sensi-
ble explanation of the separatist behavior of whites in the Jim Crow
South, as exemplified by their enforcing separate seating in restaurants
and on common carriers, separate rest room facilities and water foun-
tains, and separate hotel accommodations, hospitals, and schools. Yet
white behavior, even in the Jim Crow South, was far from universally
separatist. Southern whites, including whites who frequently practiced
discrimination, sometimes seemed indifferent to associating with
blacks.1 24 Two examples are particularly powerful.
124 See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 590 (x944) ("[T]he more general allegation
that there is an inherent repulsion to personal intimacies and physical contact between the two
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First, southern whites commonly employed black domestic workers
in their homes.'2 5 If the desire to avoid contact with blacks explains
segregation, then one would not expect whites to associate with blacks
by hiring them within the home; living with another person is a far
more intimate and extended association than, for example, sharing a
seat on a bus. 26 To the contrary, whites were quite willing to boast of
employing live-in black women servants and often allowed such ser-
vants considerable control in rearing white children. 2 7
The second example involves an even more intimate association:
sex. Notwithstanding a general miscegenation taboo, white men in the
South frequently engaged in sexual relations with black women.'28
These liaisons constituted a willingness to associate intimately with
blacks on the part of the very whites whose discriminatory behavior
we seek to explain. 129
One might respond to these examples that Becker only claims that
discriminatory whites bear a non-monetary cost from associating with
blacks. He does not claim that this cost is always prohibitive. Whites
will associate whenever the benefits of a particular association out-
weigh the costs. Whereas sitting on a bus or at a lunch-counter is a
milder form of association than the two examples considered above,
the benefits that accrue from domestic services or sexual intimacy may
be entirely absent from the milder forms of association. Thus, the
benefits of employing black domestic help or engaging in sexual activi-
[racial] groups is unfounded."); see also C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM
CROW 31-32, 42 (3d ed. 1974) (stating that, during the two decades after Reconstruction and
before Jim Crow segregation, contact between the races was considerable).
12S See, e.g., JOHN DOLLARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERNTOWN 96 (1937) (reporting
that in Southerntown, the pseudonym Dollard gives to the town in which he lived and studied
racial relations in the early 1930s, "97 percent of the women listed under 'domestic and personal
service' [in the census] are Negro women").
126 See MYRDAL, supra note 124, at 59o, 652 (noting "the acceptability [among whites] of phys-
ical contact with favorite servants" and stating that "the Negro maid knows the life of her white
employer as few white persons know it").
127 See PATRICIA H. COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 71 (1991); MYRDAL, supra note
124, at 597. Indeed, black women sometimes nursed white infants. See WOODWARD, supra note
124, at 42-43; More Slavery at the South, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 25, 1912, at 196-2oo, reprinted in
BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA 227, 227 (Gerda Lerner ed., 1972) (under the title I Live a
readmill Life).
128 Such relations began during slavery. See BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN 33 (1981); JAC-
QUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW 37 (1985). Writing during the Jim Crow
era, Dollard suggested that "many, if not most, southern boys begin their sexual experience with
Negro girls." DOLLARD, supra note 125, at 139; see also W.E.B. DuBois, DARKWATER 163-86
(1920) (discussing sexual relations between white men and black women).
129 See DOLLARD, supra note 125, at 143 ("A Negro woman reported with indignation that a
number of white men in Southerntown have Negro mistresses.... [S]ome of these ... are the
ones who insist on segregation."); KENNETH B. CLARK, DARK GHETTO 68-69 (1965) (noting that
the civil rights movement put social pressure on "any Negro woman who [was] known to be the
mistress of... a segregationist.., to break that relationship").
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ties with black women might have outweighed the associational
costs.130
Although the benefits of some associations are greater than others,
there is still something implausible about Becker's model. In his
model, some whites are so repulsed by blacks that they find their mere
presence in public places intolerable for even a brief time, yet they are
not sufficiently repulsed to avoid hiring blacks to work in their homes,
nor to refrain from seeking sexual relations. In the case of domestic
workers, it is true that the wages for black women were lower than
those for white women.131 Yet in the segregated South, whites were
generally poorer than in other parts of the country, and most domestic
workers were black. Nonetheless, it was considerably more common
for southern whites than for whites in other regions to employ domes-
tic workers and more common for the employment to be full-time. 132
If segregationist whites wished to avoid contact with blacks, one
would expect to observe the opposite relationship. 3 3 Similarly, if asso-
ciation occurred because most whites could not afford white labor, one
would expect - contrary to the facts - that wealthier southern
whites would not have hired black nannies. Finally, while the power
of white men to compel black women to engage in sexual activity
helps explain the frequency of this interaction, there remains an incon-
gruity between the image of married white men's abhorring the most
fleeting public associations with blacks, yet seeking out long-term sex-
ual associations with black women.134 Given the spousal exception to
rape laws then in effect,135 married men were guaranteed a means of
sexual gratification. To choose a black mistress under these circum-
stances is simply inconsistent with a general preference for avoiding
contact with blacks.
As a final example of the overinclusiveness of the associational
model of discrimination, both in the Jim Crow era and today, consider
discrimination on the basis of sex. One might expect that there is
130 Following RIcHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 138-41 (1993), one could say that white
men incurred considerably lower costs in obtaining sexual gratification from black women than
from white women. To engage in sexual relations with white women, white men in the Jim Crow
South usually had to assume the costs of marriage or the risks of extramarital sexual affairs (legal
sanctions for rape or adultery, or extra-legal sanctions from a woman's male relatives). Regarding
African American women, however, the law permitted no marriage to white men and in practice
imposed no penalties for rape, while legal institutions permitted no private retaliation by blacks.
See DOLLARD, supra note 125, at 145, 151.
131 See M .DAL, supra note 124, at io86.
132 See id. at 284, 1083-84.
133 Indeed, Myrdal reports that black women fared better at getting domestic work in the
South: in other regions, many whites "have a prejudice against using Negro women in their
homes, partly because they believe them to be less dependable, partly because they shun the
contact with an alien race." Id. at 1083 (emphasis added).
134 Regarding long-term affairs, see DuBois, cited above in note 128, at 172.
135 See SUsAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 72 (1987).
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enough in common between race and sex discrimination that a single
economic theory could make some progress in explaining both. In-
deed, Becker claims that his theory "can be applied to 'discrimination'
and 'nepotism' in all their diverse forms," including discrimination
against women. 3 6 Yet there is something seriously amiss in describing
discrimination against women as the result of a preference men have
for avoiding association or contact with women. Nor can one easily
redefine the discriminatory preference as somehow only applying to
the workplace, for men who wish to exclude women from certain jobs
may have no difficulty with, or may actually prefer, to see women
serve in other capacities, for example, as secretaries.
In all of these examples of overinclusiveness, discrimination seems
to result from the desire to avoid certain kinds of associations, not to
avoid association per se. A better theory would explain what distin-
guishes the desired and despised associations.
2. Underinclusiveness: The Prevailing Model Underpredicts Dis-
crimination. - The associational preference model also underpredicts
discrimination. Race affected the behavior of whites beyond their
seeking to avoid contact or association with blacks. If discriminatory
whites sought merely to avoid associating with blacks, for example,
why did they prohibit interracial marriage? In other respects, the as-
sociational preference theory explains laws mandating segregation.
Without such laws, a white person with a strong associational prefer-
ence against blacks might need to use public transportation, for exam-
ple, only to find that blacks were dispersed throughout the train or
bus seats. Jim Crow laws prevented involuntary associations in such
circumstances. But southern whites had no reason to fear the possibil-
ity of involuntary marriages with blacks. Marriage is one form of as-
sociation that individual whites could certainly avoid without the aid
of a legal prohibition.
The explanation, of course, is that no individual white supported
anti-miscegenation statutes to prevent herself (or more importantly
perhaps, himself) from associating with blacks. The purpose was to
prevent other whites from entering into such associations. 137 Discrimi-
natory whites acted to satisfy not just a desire to avoid certain associa-
tions with blacks, but a desire that other whites avoid them as well.
Indeed, some of the most explosive and well-documented instances of
racial violence occurred precisely because white men objected to as-
sociations (or perceived associations) between black men and white
136 BECKER, 1supa note 114, at ii.
137 See MRDAL, supra note 124, at 587 ("Every single measure [of enforced segregation] is
defended as necessary to block 'social equality' which in its turn is held necessary to prevent
'intermarriage.'").
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women. 138 Thus, there was significant race-based behavior not ex-
plained by the desire to avoid contact with others.1 39
The evidence of such "third party preferences" extends well beyond
the taboos against interracial marriage and sexual relations between
white women and black men. Whites in the Jim Crow South moni-
tored each other for compliance with a wide range of social norms
concerning race. Whites expected each other to observe taboos
"against eating at a table with Negroes, having them in the parlor of
one's house as guests, sitting with them on the front porch of one's
home, and the like." 140 One white southerner of the era told sociolo-
gist John Dollard that "[iut made his blood boil . . . when he went
North, to see Negroes riding in streetcars side by side with whites, to
see them eating in the same restaurants, to see Negro men and white
women together. It would have the same effect, he added, on any
southerner."141
The failure of the associational preference model to predict these
other norms is no minor omission. In the Jim Crow South, whites
were subject to social sanctions and violence if they failed to abide by
the customs of segregation, for example, by refusing to engage in the
derogation of blacks.142 Dollard recounts how white outsiders - like
himself - were subjected to indoctrination into the ways of racial cus-
138 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 129, at 69; IDA B. WELLS-BARNETT, ON LYNCHINGS 5-12
(Arno Press 1969) (1892). We can reject the response that conduct aimed at other whites served
merely to minimize undesired contact with blacks. Admittedly, forbidding whites to marry (or
otherwise associate with) blacks made it less likely that whites would accidentally make contact
with a black person through his or her white spouse (or friend). But this fact is not an adequate
explanation of white-on-white coercion. A preference for non-association cannot explain the de-
gree to which interracial social contact, especially between black men and white women, was such
a central and emotionally charged matter. If the only point were to avoid associating with the
black member of an interracial couple, whites should have found interracial couples more accept-
able than all-black couples - the former included one person with whom it was acceptable to
associate - and should have found a passing sexual affair less troubling than a long-term serious
relationship. Yet segregationist whites found the idea of interracial couples abhorrent, and no less
so when the relationship was fleeting. See CLARK, supra note 129, at 69; DOLLARD, SUpra note
125, at 165-66; MYRDAL, supra note 124, at 588.
139 This violence in turn raises another example of the overinclusiveness of the associational
preference model. Even violence requires a form of physical "contact" the discriminatory white is
supposed to abhor. Lynchings were often very public affairs; sometimes hundreds or thousands of
whites would flock to the scene. See, e.g., ARTHUR F. RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING 12
(1933). White spectators who crowded around protracted torture-lynchings apparently wished to
avoid only certain kinds of contact or "association." See id. at 143-44.
140 DOLLARD, supra note 125, at 350-51 ("Any of these acts would imply social equality instead
of social inferiority for the Negro!).
141 Id. at 45-46.
142 See id. at 187 ("The white person in Southerntown has no more option about calling a
Negro 'Mr.' than the Negro has to demand the title."). Dollard reports the case of a "prominent
white man in the state who had to meet a talented Negro woman from Southerntown on various
occasions both in town and out of it" and who addressed her with the title "'Mrs.' when they
were away, but by her first name in Southerntown." Id. at 346.
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tom.143 Usually, these attempts at indoctrination were successful, he
notes, and caused whites who did not initially accept "southern views"
of race relations to adopt them and to engage in the derogatory behav-
iors practiced by whites toward blacks.' 44 Those who refused to abide
by such customs were themselves subjected to derogation. 4
Another example of the underinclusiveness of the associational
preference model is that it does not predict this customary derogation
of blacks. Insulting behavior was an entrenched part of Jim Crow
that manifested itself in countless petty ways, such as the custom of
whites to address blacks, regardless of their age or education, by their
first names, without benefit of titles such as Mr. or Mrs. 146 In general,
whites demanded deference and submissiveness from blacks. 147 Mere
desire to avoid association does not explain such behavior. 48
Consider, finally, how the associational model harbors a crucial
definitional ambiguity. The people to whom Jim Crow laws referred
by racial terms such as "negro" were by no means certain. As many
scholars have demonstrated, race is an imprecise, socially created cate-
gory.149 There were putatively black people who "passed" as white'3 0
143 See id. at 12.
144 Dollard observes:
When ['Yankees'] come down South ... they usually accept the social arrangements and
become loyal white-caste members. A number of cases of this were pointed out, especially
those of northerners who had come to do business in the South .... [Regarding one such
person,] [i]t seemed very likely that he had to accept southern views because his social
contacts and those of his wife and family were with whites; he could not stand out against
the tremendous pressure of white sentiment; and further, he could advance his economic
interests only by codperating with the dominant group.
Id. at 48.
145 "There are constant and potent pressures to compel every white person to act his caste r6le
correctly." Id. at 49; see also id. at 46-48 (discussing the meaning and effectiveness of epithets
whites use against whites who do not conform to racial norms). Dollard's black informants
warned him to be careful not to treat them as he treated whites nor as he treated blacks in the
North. See id. at 8.
146 See id. at i8i. In one town, southern white postal workers even effaced such titles on
envelopes addressed to blacks. See NEIL R. MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY 24 (1989). In contrast,
whites referred to each other with various titles of respect, id. at 23-24, and blacks referred to
whites with such deferential titles as "Mr.," "sir," or "boss." See DOLLARD, supra note 125, at 181,
346. Similarly, whites permitted blacks to come to their house only at the back door, and whites
typically summoned blacks from their dwellings by honking a horn. See id. at 46, 120.
147 See DOLLARD, supra note 125, at 178-79; see also McMILLEN, supra note 146, at 23-28
(contrasting racial "etiquette" for blacks and whites in Jim Crow Mississippi).
148 A proponent of the associational preference model might claim that insulting behavior
served merely to deter blacks from future association. Yet nothing in the historic literature I
reviewed suggests that whites insulted blacks to deter unwanted association. Whites refused to
give blacks titles of address and insisted that blacks use the back door whether or not the white
initiated and desired the association.
149 See, e.g., F. JAsisEs DAvIS, WHO is BLACK? 19-23 (iggi); Robert J. Cottrol, The Historical
Definition of Race Law, 21 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 865, 865 (1988); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as
Property, io6 HARv. L. REv. 1707, 1737-41 (i993).
ISO See, e.g., MYRDAL, supra note 124, at 683-84; PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS 223 (iggi); Harris, supra note 149, at 1710-13.
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and people who considered themselves to be white although, by legal
definitions, they were not.'5 ' In saying only that people desire to
avoid association with members of another "race," the associational
model says nothing about why or how it is that individuals define race
as they do. We are left with the nearly circular and highly unenlight-
ening proposition that people discriminate to avoid associating with
the people against whom they discriminate. 5 2
3. Efforts to Preserve the Model Are Inconsistent With Eco-
nomic Reductionism. - The associational preference model fails to
explain the historic data concerning the Jim Crow South. However,
perhaps one could modify the theory to account for the data. One
could enlarge the number of associational preferences used to describe
observed behavior and contract the scope of each preference. For ex-
ample, in response to my claim that a preference for non-association is
overinclusive, one might posit instead a number of discrete associa-
tional preferences: a preference for avoiding association with blacks in
public transportation, another for avoiding use of the same rest room,
several more for avoiding common use of motels, lunch counters, and
so on. One could then account for the absence of discriminatory be-
havior in contexts such as domestic service and sexual relations merely
by positing that no associational preference exists in these areas. One
might similarly respond to my claim that the associational model is
underinclusive. To explain white-on-white social coercion, one could
assert an additional preference not to associate with members of one's
own race who associate with members of another race. 53 By ex-
panding the number of preferences, one can preserve the basic descrip-
tion of discrimination as a form of non-association. 5 4 Race-based
behavior can thus be portrayed as the product of a multitude of dis-
crete associational preferences, including third-party associational pref-
erences, that co-exist with discrete areas of associational indifference.
From an economic perspective, however, there is something obvi-
ously wrong with this manner of defending the associational model.
Expanding the number of preferences is fundamentally contrary to the
reductive methodology of economics. A parsimonious theory would
151 See Harris, supra note 149, at 1739.
152 Racial ambiguity also intensifies the overinclusiveness problem. Given the lengths that
some southern states went to in excluding from the "white" race people with only distant black
ancestry, see id., one would suspect that the associational preference against Africans would be of
unmitigated intensity. So why would whites who wished to exclude people who had any African
ancestry from the white train car ever employ people of full African ancestry in their homes?
153 What is really required to explain the data is a more complex set of third-party preferences:
a desire that members of one's race not associate with other races in public transportation, an-
other that they not associate with other races by using the same rest rooms, another desire that
they avoid association by using the same motel, lunch counter, and so on.
154 Even with this strategy, one cannot explain the derogation of blacks as the consequence of
an associational preference. One could, of course, posit a discrete preference for disparaging
blacks.
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explain the data of race-based behavior with a single preference. Few
economists understand this point better than Gary Becker. Long after
his discrimination work, Becker wrote persuasively of the need to
avoid explaining behavior by differences in tastes and to assume in-
stead the existence of similar stable preferences among consumers. 55
Toward this end, he proposed a household "production function, "1156
which posits that consumers allocate their time and other inputs to
"produce" satisfaction of a few basic pleasures. For example, people
do not have one preference for canned apples, another for electric can
openers, and yet another for microwave ovens. Instead, people have a
desire for nourishment (and perhaps another for culinary pleasure),
and they "produce" satisfaction of this desire by combining a variety
of goods with their own time and effort. The virtue of the latter ap-
proach is that it avoids explanations based on differences or fluctua-
tions of taste and compels the theorist to search instead for
explanatory variables that are observable and verifiable. 1 7
Ironically, Becker's model of race discrimination exemplifies the
very failings that his household production function was meant to cor-
rect. Under Becker's original model, one observes separatist behavior
by whites and posits that they have a preference for non-association.
There is no inquiry into what white consumers might be producing by
such behavior. If different whites with identical wealth engage in dif-
ferent levels of discriminatory behavior, the associational preference
model can only make the unfalsifiable claim that some whites have a
greater taste for non-association than others. 158 Responding to my ar-
guments for over- and underinclusiveness by positing a separate pref-
erence for each kind of observed discriminatory behavior only
compounds the problem and places- even more explanatory weight on
unobservable differences. A theory that can explain race-motivated
behavior as serving a single preference is preferable to a fragmented
associational preference model.
I55 See George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON.
REV. 76, 76 (1977).
156 Gary S. Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of Time, 75 ECON. J. 493, 495 (1965).
157 For example, if we say that people buy microwaves because they have a preference for
microwaving food, we can explain the fact that people with identical wealth buy different quanti-
ties of microwave ovens only by saying that some people have stronger preferences for micro-
waves than others. The claim is unfalsifiable because no independent measure of consumer
preferences exists except the observed behavior one seeks to explain. With the household produc-
tion function, however, we can avoid such unfalsifiable explanations. We could predict, for exam-
ple, that people with less leisure time for cooking (labor being one production input) will make
greater use of capital intensive devices like microwave ovens.
Iss Compare Stigler & Becker, supra note 155, at 89 ("[N]o significant behavior has been illu-
minated by assumptions of differences in tastes. Instead, they, along with assumptions of unstable
tastes, have been a convenient crutch to lean on when the analysis has bogged down.") with
BECKER, supra note 114, at 121 ("[T]he regional difference in market discrimination.. . must be
'explained' by a regional difference in tastes.").
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B. The Status-Production Model of Race Discrimination
As an alternative to the associational preference model, I propose
that we understand race discrimination as an especially virulent and
pathological form of status production. Discrimination and racist be-
havior generally are processes by which one racial group seeks to pro-
duce esteem for itself by lowering the status of another group. The
key to understanding this behavior is to perceive its subordinating
quality. Status comes about by disparaging others, by asserting and
reinforcing a claim to superior social rank. Under this view, the asso-
ciational preference model is partly, but only partly, correct. One ob-
vious way to express disrespect toward others is to refuse to associate
with them. But non-association is over- and underinclusive because
one can subordinate those with whom one associates and because,
when non-association is used, it does not exhaust the means of
subordination.
Observers of race relations have long noted the importance of sta-
tus to discrimination. Commentators from the Jim Crow era,15 9 as
well as modern sociologists and social psychologists studying race, 160
have observed that discrimination produces status for its practitioners.
John Dollard, a Jim Crow contemporary and a sociologist, reported
that "the novelty in the South is that one has prestige solely because
one is white.' 16' W.E.B. DuBois described the "public and psychologi-
cal wage" earned by white workers solely from the social status of
their race.162 Today, critical race theorists and other commentators in-
sist on the importance of the appropriation of social status to an un-
derstanding of race discrimination. 63 Yet this insight is more than a
159 See, e.g., MYRDAL, supra note 124, at 591 ("[Wihat white people really want is to keep the
Negroes in a lower status."). "[I]n the three-cornered tension among upper class whites, lower
class whites, and Negroes, the two white groups agree upon the Negroes as a scapegoat and the
proper object for exploitation and hatred. White solidarity is upheld and the caste order pro-
tected." Id. at 598; see also FRANK TANNENBAUM, DARKER PHASES OF THE SOUTH 8-9 (1924)
(examining the "fear of changing status").
160 These social scientists reject non-instrumental theories that locate prejudice in individual
cognitive or personality processes. See DAVID T. WELLMAN, PORTRAITS OF WHITE RACISM
24-26, 48-62 (2d ed. 1993); Herbert Blumer, Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position, I PAC.
Soc. REV. 3, 3 (1958); Lawrence Bobo, Group Conflict, Prejudice, and the Paradox of Contempo-
rary Racial Attitudes, in ELMNATING RACISM 85, 95-98 (Phyllis A. Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor
eds., 1988); Riia Luhtanen & Jennifer Crocker, Self-Esteem and Intergroup Comparisons: Toward a
Theory of Collective Self-Esteem, in SOCIAL COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 211, 225.
161 DOLLARD, supra note 126, at 173-74. Professor Dollard observes:
The gain here is very simple.... [11t consists of an illumination of the image of the self,
an expansive feeling of being something special and valuable. It might be compared to the
illusion of greatness that comes with early stages of alcoholization, except that prestige is
not an illusion but a steadily repeated fact.
Id. at 174.
162 W.E.B. DuBoIs, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 700 (1935).
163 See, e.g., DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS 13 (iggi); Derrick Bell, White
Superiority in America: Its Legal Legacy, Its Economic Costs, 33 VILL. L. REV. 767, 774 (1988);
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criticism of existing theory: it is the starting point of a new economic
account of race (and other forms of) discrimination - an account that
succeeds as a social science theory because it predicts and explains
much of what we observe concerning race.
I. The Economics of Racial Status Production. - Only visible
distinctions affect the level of esteem one receives from strangers.
Consequently, individuals care greatly about the status associated with
their visible characteristics. To produce status, one can invest in ac-
quiring visible traits that others consider desirable, 164 or one can in-
vest in making others consider one's existing visible traits desirable.
One may pursue this latter strategy directly, by accumulating accom-
plishments that enhance the trait's status, or indirectly, by lowering
the status accorded the traits of others. 65 When members of a group
pursue the indirect production strategy of lowering the status accorded
other traits, they engage in "discrimination."
Race defines a "shared-trait" group because it is constructed
around observable traits. Race discrimination is thus a means by
which people who share certain roughly similar and observable traits
that come to be known as "race" produce social status for themselves.
Status production does not explain why the particular visible charac-
teristics we associate with race become important to status production,
but once they are salient, the theory explains why they remain impor-
tant. 66 Not only do people compete for esteem by investing in subor-
dination of previously defined groups, but people invest in preserving
group boundaries to maintain their position in a high-status group.' 67
Kimberl W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, ioi HAtv. L. REv. 1331, 1381 (i988); Harris, supra note 149, at 1758.
164 For example, individuals seek to acquire and display "status symbols" such as consumer
goods that demonstrate economic success or fashionable taste. See McAdams, supra note 59, at
38-44. Or one might invest.in acquiring physical features that will enhance status. See, e.g.,
Body Work, U.S. NE-WS & WORLD REP., Oct. 17, 1994, at is, 15 (observing that Americans spent
over $1.7 billion in cosmetic surgery in 1993).
165 When socially connected groups share a visible trait, they can coordinate either form of
status production for the shared trait.
166 Race is a category constructed along the lines of observable traits, but not determined by
them. See supra p. 1042. Barbara Fields observes, therefore, that "race" cannot explain "why
people of African descent have been set apart for treatment different from that accorded to
others" because "race is just the name assigned to the phenomenon" of categorization. Barbara J.
Fields, Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States of America, NEw LEFT REv., May/June
r9go, at 95, ioo. The proxy effect of observable traits does not explain which physically observa-
ble features will come to dominate the production of status (why not left- versus right-handed-
ness?). Which observable features determine racial distinctions is a matter of historical
circumstances. For Africans in America, race arose as part of the ideology of slavery. See id. at
ioi; Harris, supra note 149, at 1715-21. Once the categories are in place, however, status produc-
tion explains their tenacity. Thus, once the idea of "whiteness" arose, white southerners protected
their status by adopting stringent standards for being white, and immigrants struggled to gain the
status of being white. See Harris, supra note 149, at 1744 & n.162; ROEDIGER, supra note z63, at
133-63.
167 See infra note 182.
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This model of race discrimination raises two questions. First,
given that discrimination is costly, how do whites, absent a central
coercive force, prevent other whites from free-riding on each other's
investment in the status of their shared trait? Second, how exactly
does one inflict a status loss on another group?
(a) Overcoming the Free-Rider Problem. - In the manner de-
scribed above, socially connected whites allocate esteem to overcome
the problem of free-riding. 168 Through "esteem payments," a socially
connected group can reward (or punish) those who make (or fail to
make) contributions to group status. For socially connected whites, the
status accorded whiteness is an important determinant of the group's
status among strangers. We can expect socially connected whites to
use esteem payments to ensure investment in racial status production.
The necessary condition for this racial status production is an over-
lap between socially connected and racial (shared-trait) groups. In the
United States, the "overlap" of socially connected and racial groups is
not complete. Obviously, not all whites are socially connected. If
many socially connected groups comprise a common-trait group, each
subgroup may have an incentive to free-ride rather than to contribute
to the enhancement of the common trait's external status.
Unlike the problems experienced by unconnected individuals shar-
ing a common trait, however, this free-rider problem can be solved.
The empirical evidence of real-world cooperation suggests that sub-
groups - including military units in war and black churches in the
civil rights movement - manage to avoid complete free-riding. 169
Three factors permit white groups to enjoy similar success. First, ge-
ography provides a way to subdivide individuals. Much of the benefit
one receives from possessing a trait others esteem, and much of the
cost one incurs from possessing a trait others disdain, comes from indi-
viduals within the geographic area in which one lives and works.
Given this geographic limit, some people will live in places where it is
possible for everyone who shares a common trait to be socially con-
nected. In small towns, for example, all the people of a given race
may know each other personally or know of each other by reputa-
tion.170 If so, the socially connected group can achieve what is, for it,
an optimal or nearly optimal investment in the status of the shared
trait.
Second, even in a larger geographic area, whites as a group may be
"privileged" in that some group member benefits sufficiently from the
168 See supra pp. 1020-28.
169 See supra pp. iox8-g.
170 The theory of status allocation thus explains higher levels of discrimination in smaller
towns: individuals who fail to contribute to maintenance of the external status are easily identi-
fied and punished. See DOLLARD, supra note 125, at iS.
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public good to be willing to bear the entire cost of providing it.171 In
the case of race, the "member" is a subgroup of socially connected
whites who benefit sufficiently from racial subordination that they are
willing to bear the costs of discriminating regardless of what other
whites do. Particularly where members of a socially connected group
have few other options for status production, they benefit from some
investment in raising the value of their shared trait.172 Because these
groups are socially connected, they can use intra-group esteem to elicit
even very high-stakes contributions to group status.
Finally, social norms can arise among a collection of socially con-
nected groups. Socially connected groups, as I have defined them, are
quite small. An individual is likely to belong to many socially con-
nected groups. Her reputation will extend beyond her own socially
connected group to the groups that share members with her groups.
Thus, if at least one white subgroup finds it productive to invest in
raising the status of the shared trait, it may be able to pressure other
white groups to do the same. Concerned with their reputations among
"nearby" groups, members of these other subgroups may be pressured
into investing in racial status production. Out of this process may
arise social norms of discrimination that transcend individual sub-
groups. Indeed, when Ellickson says norms arise within "close-knit
groups," he has in mind communities that include numerous groups
that are socially connected according to my definition.' 73 The evi-
dence suggests that norms can, at this level, induce cooperative ac-
tion.174 Discriminatory norms are the final means by which shared-
trait groups control free-riding.
In sum, absent a central coercive authority, substantial overlap of
shared-trait and socially connected groups is sufficient to make subor-
dination of other groups an effective means of producing status.
Before proceeding, however, we must ask why such overlap occurs.
Obviously, history and culture produce considerable stratification of
socially connected and shared-trait groups.' 75 Yet part of the problem
theorists have had in understanding racial and ethnic hatreds is dis-
cerning why these contingent factors seem to produce such permanent
171 See CHONG, supra note 52, at 13. Even though a person cannot prevent others from free-
riding on a public good, if the private benefits she obtains from such a good exceed her private
costs, she will contribute to its provision.
172 The theory thus predicts higher levels of discrimination among low-status whites. See infra
P. 1o55.
173 ELLICKSON, supra note 76, at r8o-81.
174 To Ellickson's compilation of data on social norms, Chong adds that the civil rights move-
ment of the xg6os succeeded because it managed to combine the efforts of various pre-existing
socially connected groups, such as black churches. See CHONG, supra note 52, at 35-36.
175 Race is the obvious example: because dark-skinned Africans were brought to America as
slaves, socially connected groups were highly stratified by skin color. Immigration provides other
examples: a minority culture may, for a time, maintain distinctive language and clothing so that
its socially connected groups also share easily discernible traits.
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distinctions, and why such contingent factors so frequently exist.
There is, unfortunately, an economic force that works toward overlap
after historic or cultural reasons should have had time to dissipate. A
shared-trait group's potential for status production 76 is a resource to
exploit, and a socially connected group offers the way to exploit that
potential. In other words, when individuals can choose between so-
cially connected groups, one in which people share a common visible
trait has a comparative advantage for status production over one in
which people do not share a common visible trait. Consequently, it is
not entirely accidental that groups tend toward the very overlap neces-
sary to make status production viable.177
(b) Mechanics for Lowering a Group's Status.- The second
question raised above is how members of one group can lower the
status of members of another group. In general, one lowers the status
of others by signaling, to them and to third parties, that one does not
hold them in high esteem. 178 One can signal simply by reporting in a
factual manner how one feels about the other individual. It is more
effective, however, for an individual to resort to disparaging and in-
sulting words or actions. Aristotle instructed that, to be effective, an
insult must be gratuitous and must not otherwise accord with the in-
sulter's self-interest.179 Refusing to engage in economic trades that
would otherwise be mutually beneficial is, therefore, an effective way
to disparage others. Because American society grants esteem partly on
the basis of wealth, 8 0 economic discrimination is doubly effective; it
both disparages and inflicts economic loss on the other party.
176 The potential exists only when one expects to prevail in the status "war" that status pro-
duction will bring about. If one shares traits with the majority or the economically and politically
powerful, one can expect that subordination of the remainder will succeed. Attempting to pro-
duce status on the basis of traits shared by a minority may, however, prompt effective counter-
subordination.
177 There are also reasons external to the status-production model to expect continued overlap
between shared-trait and socially connected groups. For example, at least in economies that lack
a reliable legal infrastructure for enforcing contracts, socially connected minority ethnic groups
may enjoy a comparative advantage in informal contract enforcement. See Sumner J. La Croix,
Homogenous Middleman Groups: What Determines the Homogeneity?, 5 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 211,
217-20 (1989); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An
Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, xo J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 359-62 (198i).
178 See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, x565-68 (x989); Patricia
Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response
to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 127, 129 (987).
179 See ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC II.2.I378b-79a (W.D. Ross ed. & W. Rhys Roberts trans., 1924).
The true snub occurs only when one goes out of one's way to ignore someone. Refusing to accept
a gift is, other things being equal, more insulting than refusing to make a gift. Refusing to accept
an invitation to do something one enjoys is more insulting than refusing to participate in an
activity one does not enjoy. In each case, acting against one's own interests is both a less equivo-
cal and a more intense signal of one's desire to insult.
180 See McAdams, supra note 59, at 40 & n.I58, 42 n.170.
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Subordination will fail to raise one's status, however, if those one
subordinates are able to respond in kind with equal force. The ques-
tion arises, how does one "win" a competition for status if the competi-
tion is a mutual effort to manifest disrespect for each other? An
important part of the game of subordination is to gain the approval of
third-party observers - to induce them not to esteem the target of
one's subordination. One obvious strategy, however, is to eliminate
the existence of genuine third-parties by including them either in one's
own group or in the group one is disparaging. Because a majority of
opinion is, all else equal, better than a minority, this strategy often
involves defining one's own group as the majority.' 8 ' There are many
ways to categorize people according to their physical characteristics,
which is why we see struggles over the definition of race. 8 2 Status
production explains not only the struggle, but also why it so frequently
involves an attempt to define oneself as belonging to a majority group.
2. The Explanatory Power of the Status-Production Model. -
The status-production theory of discrimination is reductive in that it
consciously omits some of the detail of racism and race discrimination.
But even though the theory is not a complete account of the problem,
it is a useful starting point for explaining race-related behavior and
beliefs. 8 3 The status-production theory explains considerably more as-
pects of race discrimination than the associational preference model.
This section uses the theory to explain three categories of data: de-
scriptions of the Jim Crow South; the contemporary relation between
status and discriminatory attitudes; and the evolution of racial beliefs.
(a) Using Status Production to Explain the Jim Crow South. -
The initial virtue of the status-production model is its ability to ex-
plain discriminatory behavior in the Jim Crow South. Status produc-
tion predicts both the separatist behavior the associational preference
theory does explain and the behavior it does not explain. Consider
again the evidence that whites engaged in, and coerced other whites to
engage in, behavior that disparaged and insulted blacks.18 4 When sta-
181 Individuals do not, however, invariably prefer to be in the numerical majority. If a minor-
ity is high-status as a consequence of enjoying disproportionate political or economic power, or
other badges of status, individuals may struggle to define themselves as belonging to that group
instead of to the majority.
182 For group status production, there must be at least two groups, and thus, at least one
boundary. Rigorously enforcing the boundary symbolizes the greater exclusivity of the dominant
group. Thus race definitions that treat black ancestry as "tainting" an apparently white person
contribute to the disparagement of blacks and the production of status for those defined as "truly"
white.
183 Like Becker, I believe that the appropriate starting point for explaining discrimination is
the paradigmatic case of overt racial animus. Although status production suggests that econo-
mists have misclassified some subtle racial animus as statistical discrimination, status production
is only a starting point. It should be supplemented with other theories, including, where appropri-
ate, the theory of statistical discrimination.
184 See pp. 1040-41.
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tus production rather than aversion is the model, these behaviors are
not only explicable; they are paradigmatic. By expressing disrespect
and contempt toward a minority group, whites raise their relative sta-
tus. Through allocation of intra-group status, whites induce other
whites to produce inter-group status through acts of subordination.
Whites' reluctance to associate with blacks in some contexts but
not in others is coherent given the consequences different forms of as-
sociation have for status production. Some associations imply rough
equality; others do not. Whites avoided associating with blacks in the
former cases, but as long as the hierarchy was in their favor, not in
the latter. Refusing to work alongside blacks in the symbolically equal
rank of "co-worker," to sit next to or to use the same facilities as
blacks, and to permit intermarriage were all effective means of dispar-
aging and subordinating. 8 5
On the other hand, whites did not need to avoid associations that
preserved the status hierarchy they desired. Some occupations, such as
domestic servant, carry a social stigma; it is predictable that whites
who abhorred other forms of association would employ blacks in such
a capacity. Similarly, the sexual double standard in the Jim Crow
South meant that extra-marital sexual relations had very different im-
plications for men and women. White women known to have "lost
their virtue" suffered public humiliation. Men, however, suffered no
serious reputational loss and were assumed to enjoy the dominant role
in any such relationship. Thus, it is not surprising that white men did
not tolerate black men inflicting such a social disgrace on white
women, while white men simultaneously enjoyed for themselves a
wider sexual freedom and the attendant subordination of black
women. We can now understand the particular emotional significance
of sexual relationships between black men and white women: such il-
licit relationships were viewed as placing blacks in a dominant posi-
tion over whites, while simultaneously depriving the women's white
male relatives, suitors, or spouses of the status of their expected domi-
nant position. 8 6 In contrast to this racial double standard for extra-
marital sexual relations, even white men were prohibited from mar-
rying black women because such a formal association would confer
status on the black member of the couple.'8 7
Further, recall that whites enforced various racial customs against
other whites. It is no longer necessary to posit a uniquely powerful
third-party preference to explain such behavior. A white individual's
desire for status is a sufficient explanation, because the individual's
185 Moreover, for whites, occupying the subordinate position in a hierarchical relationship was
a fate worse than equality. Having black elected officials was, therefore, anathema to discrimina-
tory whites because it implied such a subordinate position.
186 See DOLLARD, supra note 125, at 143-45.
187 See MyRDAL, supra note 124, at 5go.
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status "as a white" depends entirely on the behavior of other whites.
Because subordination of blacks is a "public good" for whites, whites
are keenly interested in the extent to which other group members con-
tribute and are willing to punish those who interfere with production
of this good.'8 8 Thus, Jim Crow whites were predictably concerned
about other whites who associated with blacks in a respectful manner
that implied social equality. Dollard's sociological account of a south-
ern town in the 1930s was certainly not informed by contemporary
game theory, but his observations clearly indicate the status punish-
ment for what we now call a "free-rider":
A feature of white solidarity, as has been noted, is the harsh term that
brands the caste traitor - 'nigger-lover.' Such a man enjoys the benefits
of white solidarity, but does not stand by his caste. In the epithet there
is an implication of inferiority and perhaps a threat of being classed with
the scorned Negro.' 8 9
The effectiveness of status payments is demonstrated by the economic
boycotts whites successfully employed against other whites who broke
ranks' 90 or against blacks who threatened the existing order. 19 ' Boy-
cotting is a classic cartel behavior, usually made impossible by free-
riding, but whites overcame their collective action problem and suc-
ceeded in inducing other whites to contribute to enforcing discrimina-
tory status-producing norms.' 92
The status-production model also explains the high level of vio-
lence directed against blacks. Private violence could enforce subordi-
nating customs that were either too complex or too patently offensive
188 The punishment takes the form of lowered intra-group status. "The white people enforce
caste rules with ominous unanimity and one is compelled, by one's white-caste membership, to
assist to some degree in the personal derogation of the Negro and the expression of hostile pres-
sure against him." DOLLARD, supra note 125, at 349. Social ostracism was a powerful threat: "If
one lives in Southerntown, 'not to be received' is a very serious matter and would be more so if
one's family were there; living would be quite intolerable without opportunity for friendly con-
tacts within the white caste." Id. at 354.
189 Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
190 See RAPER, supra note 139, at 20. When a lynching occurred, "[tihe general public either
justified or condoned the lynching, and any individual or group who disagreed was made to
suffer. Merchants, bankers, lawyers, and preachers faced a public boycott - or thought they did
- should they take a stand in defense of law and order." Id. Raper reported that a National
Guardsman who used his bayonet to cut a white man who was attempting to remove a black
rape suspect from custody "was never able after that time to keep employment in [that town]."
Id. at 244.
191 See DOLLARD, supra note 125, at 127.
192 The well-documented violence directed by whites against blacks is evidence that whites
overcame the incentive to free-ride. After all, one incurs some cost by participating in a lynching,
given the value of one's time and the risk of criminal ramifications which, while extremely low,
were higher than zero. See RAPER, supra note 139, at 2, 32. The costs could be quite high if the
lynching was preceded by an "extended man-hunt[ J" by "undeputized" men, or if law enforcement
officials uncharacteristically resisted or threatened to resist a mob's attempt to remove a suspect
from jail. Id. at I, 9-io, 14-15, 32, 244-
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to be legislated. For example, it was difficult to state precisely in stat-
utory language the tone of voice or the amount of eye contact a black
person was permitted to use when addressing a white person, or other
nuances that distinguished respectful from disrespectful behavior. But
violence succeeded in enforcing a deferential demeanor.1 93 Similarly,
violence prevented black economic progress, which whites were not
willing or able to prohibit more directly. Southern whites engaged in
a delicate hypocrisy. They passed laws that made it difficult for
blacks to succeed economically, but white southerners' wish to believe
that blacks' economic failure was their own doing probably prevented
them from enacting laws that would facially deprive blacks of all pros-
pect of economic success. Thus, when black successes threatened
white status, whites used violence to defend their position and keep
blacks in their place. 194 Indeed, historians of the Ku Klux Klan have
described the organization as arising from the need of low-status
whites to recapture a sense of social position.195
Finally, status production better explains the public choice aspects
of Jim Crow segregation. Pecuniary selfishness sufficiently explains
the rent-seeking goal of legislation to restrain competition from or for
black labor. 96 But material motives cannot explain how large white
193 See DOLLARD, supra note 125, at 176-77 ("[W]hite people become aggressive as soon as
Negro submission is withheld, and many stories are told of the 'what I did with that "uppity"
nigger' type."); RAPER, supra note 139, at 48 ("'The Negro must stay in his place' is a common
phrase, and the white people who have defined 'his place' may be expected to react violently if
they think he is either getting out of it or showing dissatisfaction with it.").
194 See MYRDAL, supra note 124, at 563. Myrdal reports:
Economic fear is mixed with social fear: a feeling that the Negro is "getting out of his
place," and [that] the white man's social status is being threatened and is in need of de-
fense.... [Tihis feeling [underlies the] common saying... that "a lynching now and then"
is expedient or necessary in keeping the Negroes from becoming "uppity." . . . [A]fter the
First World War many lynchings of Negro soldiers - sometimes in uniform - were
openly motivated by the fear that they had gotten "wrong ideas" about their social status
while serving in France.
Id.; see also WALTER WHITE, ROPE AND FAGGOT I (1969) (suggesting that "lynching is much
more an expression of southern fear of Negro progress than of Negro crime").
195 "While the Klan undoubtedly retained large numbers of middle-class supporters [in the
192os] until its ultimate decline, the available evidence suggests that these were largely among the
socially marginal and status-deprived elements in the stratum .... Its leaders spoke the language
of the underdog Protestant" SEYMOUR M. LIPsET & EARL RAAB, THE POLITICS OF UNREASON
125 (1978). In the decade after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), "the Klan
tended to be less of a resistance than a status movement for some of those left insecure or unrec-
ognized by society." DAWm M. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM 6 (1965). Racial violence also
served to unite diverse white subgroups. See RAPER, supra note 139, at 47 ("[L]ynchings often
serve as socializing forces ... [that] tend to minimize social and class distinctions between white
plantation owners and white tenants, mill owners and textile workers, Methodists and Baptists
196 "Enticement" laws, for example, restricted the ability of southern plantation owners to hire
workers away from other plantations, see MYRDAL, supra note 124, at 248-49, and thus depressed
the wages of blacks. See EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at 46, 246-49; Robert Cooter, Market Affirma-
tive Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 133, 139-41 (1994).
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groups overcame the collective action problem they faced in pursuing
those ends. In particular, because the white laborers' interests were
often at odds with the material ends of white capitalists, success was
not assured merely because the legislature was all white. Intra-group
status allocation, however, can explain how those competing socially
connected white subgroups could each induce contributions toward the
subgroup end to secure the desired legislation. Even when the end
was material, status was still important as a means of accomplishing
the objective. 197
(b) Using Status Production to Explain Who Discriminates. -
The associational preference model has little to say about why some
people discriminate more than others, except for the circular claim
that some people have stronger discriminatory tastes than others. 19
The status-production model offers a deeper explanation of these
differences.
First, the status-production model explains why whites in the Jim
Crow South were more intensely discriminatory than whites in other
parts of the United States. One is tempted to make some claim about
the relevance of slavery; surely it is not a coincidence that the region
that maintained black slavery the longest was the most hostile to
blacks. But the associational model would suggest just the wrong re-
lationship: where slavery was common, "contact" with blacks was
more common,199 so that the absence of slavery in the North would
seem to imply that northern whites had a stronger preference for
avoiding contact than southern whites. 200
The status-production model explains the relationship between ge-
ography and discriminatory behavior in the hundred or so years after
the Civil War. First, southern whites had a lower social status than
northern whites. Southerners had lost a war, had had emancipation
forced upon them, and had suffered economic devastation and armed
occupation. Thus, for many southern whites, discrimination repre-
sented a scarce means of reclaiming lost status.20 1 In addition, newly
freed slaves in the South had lower social status than free blacks in
197 Nor does rent-seeking explain why race, as opposed to any other means of grouping, was
the axis along which individuals chose to organize. The status-production theory, however, ex-
plains why there is frequent overlap between shared-trait groups, like races, and the socially con-
nected groups that are capable of inducing their members to contribute to lobbying activities. See
supra notes 175-176 and accompanying text.
198 See BECKER, supra note 114, at 17, 21, I56.
199 See WOODWARD, supra note 124, at 13.
200 An associational preference proponent might respond that slavery was more prevalent in
the South because it was a more productive means of agriculture for southern than for northern
farmers. Yet southern whites seemed to permit more association than slavery required, at least for
house servants and in urban areas. See, e.g., id. at i2-i6. Moreover, even if agricultural econom-
ics explains why slavery predominated in the South, it cannot explain why southerners were more
discriminatory than northerners.
201 See DoLLARD, supra note 125, at So-5i, 186.
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the North. Slavery had so degraded blacks that equal relations be-
tween former slaves and whites had a greater potential to lower the
status of whites than relations between whites and any other group -
including blacks - in the North. Thus, after Reconstruction, southern
whites employed segregation to counter the threat that black economic
progress 20 2 and a new generation of less deferential blacks 20 3 posed to
white status. Perhaps most important, the larger population of blacks
in the South204 made their upward mobility a greater threat to white
status than it was in the North; stated conversely, the larger black
population meant that racial subordination was more productive of
status for southern than for northern whites.205
The status-production model also explains the shape of contempo-
rary attitudes on race. For instance, among whites, there is a strong
inverse relationship between social status and discriminatory racial at-
titudes.20 6  The poorest and least educated whites, for example, were
202 See wHITE, supra note 194, at ir.
203 See, e.g., CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE 25 (1987) ("[T~he most direct trigger for
the initial wave of Jim Crow legislation was increasing black unwillingness to defer to whites.'0.
204 See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 8o VA. L.
REv. 7, 30 ('994) ("At the beginning of the twentieth century, over go% of American blacks lived
in the eleven former Confederate states . . ").
205 The smaller the upwardly mobile group, the less their success will push other groups down
in relative terms; indeed, effectively subordinating a larger group necessarily places one higher in
social rank than subordinating a smaller one. The status-production theory thus explains why,
within southern counties, severity of discrimination was positively correlated with black popula-
tion. See id. at 68. A larger group, however, is more difficult to subordinate than a smaller one;
absent disproportionate economic or political power by the majority, we might expect that as the
size of the minority population approaches a majority, subordination will level off or decline. In
the Jim Crow South, however, whites enjoyed such disproportionate power that they could effec-
tively subordinate a black majority, and the above correlation still held in such cases. See id.
Becker's theory also fails to explain why segregation appeared to be so one-sided, imposed by
whites on blacks. See MYRDAL, supra note 124, at 575-77. Whites appeared to have had a
stronger aversion to interracial contact than blacks. Violence may have deterred blacks from ex-
pressing their desire to avoid association with whites. But in the associational model, because the
only purpose of violence is to deter association, the one-sidedness of violence suggests that blacks
wanted association more than whites. The status-production model offers an explanation: given
the stark status hierarchy, whites stood to lose social status by associating in equal relationships
with blacks, while blacks did not. This explanation is consistent with the call by some black
intellectuals at the time for separatism. See, e.g., Robert S. Browne Urges "A Formal Partitioning
of the United States Into Two Totally Separate and Independent Nations," in BLACK PROTEST
THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY S16, 526-28 (August Meier, Elliott Rudwick & Francis
L. Broderick eds., 2d ed. 1971). Segregation loses some of its stigma when the minority chooses to
separate rather than having the majority choose to exclude. Moreover, if one can form suffi-
ciently intense feelings about group members, it is possible one will no longer care about the
esteem granted or withheld by non-members. Cf. Julius Lester, The Angry Children of Malcom X,
in BLACK PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra, at 469, 483 ("[The white
man] is not to be lived with and he is not to be destroyed. He is simply to be ignored . . ").
206 See, e.g., Donald L. Noel & Alphonso Pinkney, Correlates of Prejudice: Some Racial Differ-
ences and Similarities, 69 Am. J. Soc. 6og, 61l-12 (r964); Thomas J. Pavlak, Social Class,
Ethnicity, and Racial Prejudice, 37 PUB. OPINION Q. 225, 229-30 (x973); A. Wade Smith, Racial
Tolerance as a Function of Group Position, 46 Am. Soc. REv. 558, 563-67 (198i).
1054 IVo]. 108:1003
HeinOnline  -- 108 Harv. L. Rev 1054 1994-1995
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT
the most likely to participate in lynching blacks.20 7 Sociologist Judith
Caditz summarizes: "For decades social scientists have tried to under-
stand reasons people affirm prejudicial attitudes and engage in dis-
criminatory behavior. Much social science literature supports the
thesis that status-threatened people will exhibit prejudicial attitudes
toward minorities. '208 Caditz adds that those who think their mem-
bership in ethnic, religious, occupational, and other social groups or
classes is important are more likely to hold ambivalent or negative
attitudes about blacks.20 9 These findings are the most direct contem-
porary evidence supporting the status-production model. Whites with
the most limited opportunities for producing status will predictably be
prepared to engage in more discrimination, because lowering the status
of others is one of their last remaining mechanisms of status produc-
tion.210 Similarly, the more closely one identifies with one's racial or
ethnic group - that is, the more one's status depends on the status of
racial traits, the more one can produce status by subordinating (or be-
ing willing to subordinate) others on racial grounds.
The literature on racial attitudes and status is not without conflict.
Some research suggests that status mobility is a better predictor of ra-
cial attitudes than status position and finds that those who have exper-
ienced significant change in status have more negative racial attitudes
than those whose status is relatively stable. 211 In particular, newly ar-
207 See RAPER, supra note 139, at 6, io-ii.
208 JUDITH CADrrz, WHITE LMERALS IN TRANsrrIoN 91 (1976). A review of psychology litera-
ture reveals a similar finding: "the more negative the self-attitudes, the greater the number of
unacceptable targets and the more negative are attitudes toward them." HOWARD J. EHRLICH,
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 163 (1973); see also JOHN E. FARLEY, MAJORITY-I-
NoRITY RELATIONS 26 (2d ed. 1988) ("Persons in lower [socioeconomic status] groups tend to
report more negative views toward out-groups, to be more ethnocentric, and to express more
stereotyped thinking... ."); GEORGE E. SmpsON & J. MILTON YINGER, RACIAL AND CULTURAL
MINORITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 66-70 (5th ed. 1985) (finding
"strong evidence[ for class differentials in prejudice).
209 See CADrZ, supra note 208, at ioo-oi. For example Caditz found that "[t]hose affirming
the importance of their ethnic group exhibit more dilemmas toward busing, apartment rentals to
blacks, and hiring blacks than the comparison group." Id. at 1o.
210 Individuals can obtain status by achievement or talent - for example, displaying wealth is
a common means of gaining esteem. See McAdams, supra note 59, at 38-44. Those who have
neither wealth nor some other positive accomplishment as a basis for esteem are the most likely
to seek esteem in other ways, such as subordination.
211 Caditz's research supports this finding. She queried white "liberals" about race:
In general, the more stable and status secure, the more likely white liberals will affirm
favorable attitudes toward interracial social situations. Conversely, the more status inse-
cure, the more status threatened white liberals will feel, and consequently, the more likely
they will be to reveal attitudes unfavorable toward interracial situations.
CADrrZ, supra note 208, at 107. Yet Caditz found "no significant differences between groups
compared on the basis of their actual ranks in occupation and in education." Id. at 104. She
concludes that "mobility per se, irrespective of the actual ranks, is associated with the degree of
favorableness toward ... interracial situations." Id.; see also BRUNO BETTELHEIM & MORRIS
JANowrrz, DYNAMICS OF PREJUDICE 150-51 (i95o) (finding the greatest prejudice against blacks
among the downwardly mobile, followed by the non-mobile, then the upwardly mobile); Joseph
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rived immigrants unable to speak the dominant language have often
lost whatever status they enjoyed in their homeland, while their reason
for having left is often to gain a higher status than was possible in
their homeland. During this time of high status mobility, many immi-
grants engage in high levels of discrimination. 2 12 Status competition
explains the tension that often exists between different minority groups
as each new group seeks to establish its place in the social hierar-
chy.2 13 The exact relationship is part of an ongoing social science de-
bate. Without seeking to resolve that debate here, I note only that the
associational preference model offers no hope of explaining such
patterns.
(c) Using Status Production to Explain Racial Beliefs. - There
is considerable evidence that, since the I95os, white attitudes have
shifted enormously toward greater tolerance of African Americans.
Whites have shown a greater willingness to accept the principle of
equal opportunity and less willingness to express negative statements
about blacks.214 Yet there is also significant evidence that race contin-
ues to matter. Whites still appear to discriminate racially in politics, 215
and whites and blacks differ considerably in their views regarding the
Greenblum & Leonard I. Pearlin, Vertical Mobility and Prejudice: A Socio-Psychological Analy-
sis, in CLASS, STATUS AND POWER 480, 491 (Reinhard Bendix & Seymour M. Lipset eds., 1953)
(finding more ethnic prejudice among upwardly and downwardly mobile than among non-mobile
persons).
212 See MYRDA., supra note 124, at 6o3 ("[ihe development of prejudice against Negroes
[was] usually one of [the] first lessons in Americanization for [new immigrants residing in the
North]. Because they are of low status, they like to have a group like the Negroes to which they
can be superior."); see also ROEDIGER, supra note 163, at 133-63 (discussing the history of Irish-
American racial consciousness).
213 See CADrrz, supra note 208, at 118 (discussing conflict between blacks and Mexican Ameri-
cans); ROEDIGER, supra note 163, at 133-63 (discussing conflict between blacks and Irish
immigrants).
214 Professor Bobo reports:
In 1942, approximately 6o% of whites believed that blacks were less intelligent than
whites. By 1964, that figure had declined to less than 25%. A substantial majority of
white Americans in 1942 approved of the blatantly discriminatory proposition that "white
people should have the first chance at any kind of job," whereas in 1972 nearly ioo% of
whites in a national survey rejected that statement.
Bobo, supra note 16o, at 88 (citations omitted). See generally HOWARD SCHUMAN, CHARLOTTE
STEEH & LAWRENCE BOBO, RACIAL ATTIrUDES IN AMERICA 71-138 (1985) (discussing trends in
white racial attitudes between 1942 and I983). Even if survey subjects are concealing their "real"
views, the survey results suggest that something has changed, if only the willingness to admit to
anti-black or anti-integrationist views.
215 Whites remain reluctant to vote for black politicians. Cf. Donald R. Kinder & David 0.
Sears, Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life, 40 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 414, 427-30 (198I) (analyzing white voters' racial attitudes and
preferences); John B. McConahay & Joseph C. Hough, Jr., Symbolic Racism, 32 J. Soc. ISSUES
23, 36-44 (1976) (analyzing voter preferences in terms of "symbolic racism"). That reluctance in-
creases when blacks are a large percentage of the population. See SCHUtMAN, STEEH & BOBO,
supra note 224, at 204. Regarding economic discrimination, see notes 239 and 258 below.
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appropriate measures for achieving equality and integration. 216 This
section uses status production to speculate on the causes of this limited
evolution. The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I describe a
static theory of racial beliefs, arguing that status production explains
how biased racial belief formation or "ideology" can persist despite its
instrumental costs. Second, I venture a dynamic theory to account for
the evolution of those beliefs, claiming that ideology is essential for
status production to succeed and that dramatic shifts in attitudes occur
when external events strip status-seeking of its ideological cover.
The desire for status can systematically distort beliefs. The con-
ventional assumption is that false beliefs are costly because mistakes
impede the individual's effort to satisfy her preferences. This ap-
proach mistakenly assumes that beliefs are useful only as a means of
determining what behavior will serve one's interests. To the contrary,
casual observation confirms that people derive pleasure from merely
expressing their beliefs. Indeed, the act of voting is expressive, and
many rational choice theorists have abandoned any attempt to explain
political voting except as an expressive activity enjoyable in and of
itself.2 17
Once we understand that people gain utility from expressing their
beliefs, we can identify a category of beliefs not subject to the usual
economic constraints. We can now imagine, for example, why people
bother to form beliefs about so many things that do not seem instru-
mentally important, such as who is the best goalie in professional
hockey, whether a celebrity is guilty or innocent of criminal charges,
or which of two films is better. People form such beliefs for the plea-
216 See SCHUMAN, STEEH & BOBO, supra note 214, at 154-62 (discussing disparity between
black support for principles of integration and implementation of such principles); Bobo, supra
note x6o, at 88-89; Thomas F. Pettigrew, Racial Change and Social Policy, 441 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 114, 119 (1979) ("[W]hite Americans increasingly reject racial injustice in
principle but are reluctant to accept the measures necessary to eliminate the injustice."). Of
course, white opposition may arise out of commitment to libertarian principles or beliefs about the
cost and benefits of such proposals. But the question remains why whites and blacks hold such
different views on these matters. See SCHUMAN, STEEH & BOBO, supra note 214, at 139-62;
Lawrence Bobo, Attitudes Toward the Black Political Movement: Trends, Meaning, and Effects on
Racial Policy Preferences, 5i Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 287, 299-300 (x988).
217 Many have argued that voting is not instrumentally rational. One ballot can affect the
outcome of an election only if the vote would otherwise be tied. Thus, the odds against one
vote's affecting the outcome of a modem American election are so great that the cost of voting
(even the very low risk of dying on the way to the ballot box or the five minutes it takes to vote)
apparently outweighs by a wide margin any expected instrumental benefit. See, e.g., DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHILIP P. FRicKEY, LAw AND PUBLIC CHOICE 24-27 (1991). Voting is rational, how-
ever, if understood as an expressive end in itself. The utility derived from voting "is related to
the utility that people derive from speaking their mind about some subject, even though nothing
will be changed thereby." Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The
Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. I, 29 (x993); see also Geoffrey Bren-
nan & Loren Lomasky, The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington: Toward a Smithian Theory
of Electoral Behavior, I EcoN. & PHIL. 189, i99 (i985) (arguing that voting is "a potentially
valued avenue for the expression of moral sentiments").
1995] 1057
HeinOnline  -- 108 Harv. L. Rev 1057 1994-1995
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
sure that comes from expressing them. The novelty of these otherwise
non-instrumental beliefs is that the normal economic correctives to
false belief formation do not apply. For expressive purposes, a "good"
belief is not necessarily an accurate belief, but rather one that is plea-
surable to express. Of course, even if a category of beliefs serves only
expressive ends, there are some constraints on belief formation. Our
cognitive mechanisms may make it difficult for us to believe certain
things that are manifestly contradicted by experience. Moreover, we
may not experience the full pleasure of expressing our beliefs if others
find them palpably false in an uninteresting way.2 18
Most important for our purposes, however, is the constraint of self-
esteem. Some beliefs are more pleasant than others. For expressive
purposes, people are more likely to adopt beliefs that enhance, rather
than degrade, their self-esteem. If the issue is the talent of a celebrity,
for example, a person is more likely to think highly of the celebrity if,
through some connection - having attended the same school, for ex-
ample - the celebrity's talent will enhance the individual's self-es-
teem. If esteem can influence expressive belief formation in this
manner, esteem can also affect conventionally instrumental beliefs -
beliefs concerning how best to satisfy one's preferences. As long as the
gain in esteem from the bias toward esteem-producing beliefs is larger
than any instrumental loss from the bias, then such a bias serves the
individual's overall interests. There is considerable evidence to sup-
port this claim: research shows, for example, that people tend system-
atically to overevaluate their own performance and characteristics.21 9
Such a bias may even be essential to mental well-being.220 Self-evalu-
ation is clearly an instrumental belief - one needs to know what
one's talents and abilities are - yet the need for self-esteem is suffi-
cient to create some deviation from strictly impartial beliefs about
oneself.
If esteem production favorably biases one's self-evaluations, esteem
production may also cause a positive bias toward the social groups to
which one belongs.22' One may gain pleasure from believing positive
things about one's groups. Moreover, groups will reward status to
218 Supermarket tabloids and talk radio often thrive on the expression of palpably false beliefs,
apparently because they are false in an interesting way.
219 See Hazel Markus, The Self in Thought and Memory, in THE SELF IN SOCIAL PsYcnoL-
OGY 102, 125 (Daniel M. Wegner & Robin R Vallacher eds., ig8o); Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon
D. Brown, Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, xo3
PSYCHOL. BULL. 193, 197 (1988) ("[A] great deal of research in social, personality, clinical, and
developmental psychology documents that normal individuals possess unrealistically positive
views of themselves ... .
220 See Taylor & Brown, supra note 219, at i97; Howard Tennen & Sharon Herzberger, De-
pression, Self-Esteem, and the Absence of Self-Protective Attributional Biases, 52 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 72 (1987).
221 See Tajfel & Turner, supra note 34, at 7; cf. Taylor & Brown, supra note 2x9, at 195
(stating that "individuals [tend] to see their intimates as better than average"); Alvin Zander &
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those who hold beliefs that are conducive to group welfare. A
favorable bias regarding group members may strengthen intra-group
cooperation by increasing the apparent material advantage available
from transacting with members rather than non-members.
But groups may encourage and reward beliefs more complex than
simple bias. For example, although he does not explain how belief
distortion occurs, Richard Posner has invoked such distortion to ex-
plain how certain cartels solve collective action problems.222 Accord-
ing to Posner, the distinguishing feature of certain successful cartels -
which he terms "guilds" - is their having an "ideology.1223 A guild is
a social as well as an economic institution in which members have
adopted a common "personal morality" of loyalty, conformity, and
craftsmanship, and which has achieved a certain "mystique" involving
the idealization of quality over quantity.2 24 The "mutually reinforcing
combination" of this morality and mystique comprises "the ideology of
guild production," which serves the "the self-interest of producers in
the cartelization of production.1225
Posner appears to mean that guild members convince themselves
that the public interest is served by the restrictions on market entry
and production necessary to cartelize an industry. This analysis im-
plies that a principled concern for the public good has some force in
motivating behavior, so that cartel members would be even more
likely to free-ride if they realized that cartel pricing is contrary to the
public interest. Ideology, however, turns the moral force against free-
riding. An ideological commitment to quality allows the guild member
to believe that conduct that would undermine the cartel - lowering
quality and expanding output - would harm the public. 226 Self-inter-
Warwick Armstrong, Working for Group Pride in a Slipper Factory, 2 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
293, 304 (1972) (discussing how interest in team pride affects beliefs about the team).
222 See Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. x, xo ('993); see
also ELSTER, supra note ii, at 37-38 (describing "wishful thinking," a process by which individu-
als form beliefs they previously wished to be true). See generally THOMAS GiLOviCH, How WE
KNow WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLIBIrY OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 75-87 (I991)
(discussing how desire leads to self-serving beliefs); DAVID PEARS, MOTIVATED IRRATIONALITY
41-66 (1984) (discussing explanations for self-deception).
223 See Posner, supra note 222, at 11-12.
224 See id. at ii. "[Ain aid to, and perhaps even a condition of, successful cartelization is the
creation of an ideological rather than a purely contractual community." Id. at 20.
225 Id. at ii. Posner compares the characteristics of medieval guilds to the modern legal pro-
fession. He argues that lawyers have used guild-like strategies to cartelize the supply of legal
services and that a certain part of what passes as "jurisprudence" is this profession's self-serving
ideology. See id. at 1-3.
226 See id. at 8. ("We are therefore not surprised that the charter of the weavers' guild recites
that monopoly is necessary to protect the public from deceptively cheap - because shoddy, but
difficult to recognize as such - merchandise sold by foreigners and other undependable people.").
Posner traces how the "quality-protection rationale (or rationalization) for prohibiting entry"
evolved into the basis for all guild life, particularly for a restricted output through a "vigorously
propagated . . . norm of craftsmanship." Id. at 8-9. Absent this moral restraint, enforced by
1995] 1059
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ested self-deception thus serves the cartel's long run interests by curb-
ing the individual's impulse to free-ride on the restraint of others.
Return now to racial beliefs. In Posner's terms, negative stereo-
types are part of a racial "guild's" efforts to monopolize production of
esteem. Even for beliefs that serve an instrumental purpose (such as
evaluating potential employees), the desire for esteem will cause an in-
dividual to adopt distorted beliefs about racial groups as long as the
esteem benefit exceeds the instrumental cost. Consequently, the status-
production model can explain differences in voting behavior between
blacks and whites. A person may gain esteem by believing positive
things about political candidates from her own group and, at least in a
relative sense, negative things about politicians of other races. If peo-
ple do not vote for instrumental reasons, there is no instrumental
check on the accuracy of these beliefs. A small bias may suffice to
explain a significant difference in voting behavior because, for differ-
ent racial groups, the bias works in opposite directions.22 7
If one assumes that this analysis correctly explains the existence
and direction of racial bias, the question remains how to explain the
evolution of white attitudes regarding race. Recall that status produc-
tion commonly involves the denial that one's motive is status produc-
tion.228 When one seeks to gain status by lowering the status of
others, it is all the more important to deny that one is degrading
others in order to look better by comparison. Consequently, "guild
ideology" never acknowledges its self-serving nature. Members of Pos-
ner's representative guild do not openly declare, even among them-
selves, that they desire to restrain competition in order to charge
higher prices and earn monopoly profits. Similarly, whites never ex-
plain their discriminatory behavior as serving the function of status
production. Even in the Jim Crow South, whites attempted to justify
segregation not by reference to naked self-interest but by claims that
blacks were inherently inferior, that blacks preferred segregation, or
informal sanctions within a socially cohesive body, individual guild members would seek greater
profits by expanding output, thus depriving the guild of its monopoly power. See id. at 8, so.
227 Thus, if voting has only expressive benefits, whites must believe, more often than blacks,
that policies that help blacks are bad ideas and that black candidates will do a poor job. Indeed,
many studies have found that self-interest does not explain white opposition to black candidates
or other race-related voting. Personal vulnerability on an issue does not successfully predict atti-
tudes or voting behavior concerning those issues. See James R. Kluegel & Eliot R. Smith, Affirm-
ative Action Attitudes: Effects of Self-Interest, Racial Affect, and Stratification Beliefs on Whites'
Views, 61 Soc. FORCES 797, 83 (1983); David 0. Sears & Harris M. Allen, Jr., The rajectory of
Local Desegregation Controversies and Whites' Opposition to Busing, in GROUPS IN CONTACT:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DESEGREGATION 123, 128-29 (Norman Miller & Marilynn B. Brewer eds.,
1984).
228 See supra note iio and accompanying text.
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that segregation somehow reflected the natural order of things.229 To-
ward this end, the Jim Crow doctrine of "separate but equal" was
ideal. Separation was a means of expressing contempt; the pretense of
equality served to deny the status motivation.2 3 0
When proponents of a status-driven ideology can no longer confi-
dently deny the status motivation of their beliefs, the ideology fails
and proponents must search for another ideology. This insight may
explain the evolution of white attitudes toward segregation. Although
the exact causal strands are difficult to disentangle, events leading up
to and including the modern civil rights movement undermined the
ability of whites to believe that their existing racial beliefs were any-
thing other than a self-serving ideology. World War II provided one
ideological shock, as revulsion to Nazi claims of racial superiority was
difficult to square with rationalization of southern racial practices. 23 1
Rising levels of black education and job skills put a material strain on
racial ideology by raising the attractiveness of black labor and thus
the cost of absolute racial exclusion.232 I suspect the most immediate
cause of ideological breakdown occurred during the civil rights move-
ment, when photographs captured segregation extremists using violent
229 Myrdal observes:
It would, indeed, be possible to defend the caste order simply by arguing that it is in the
white people's interests to keep the Negroes subordinate. Such a defense would be logi-
cally tight. ... Unlike the rationalizations [that Negroes like to be separated or that sepa-
ration is necessary to prevent social friction], it need not look forward to an ultimate social
equality as ideal....
The remarkable thing, however, is that, in America, social segregation and discrimina-
tion will practically never be motivated in this straightforward way as being in white peo-
ple's interests. Indeed, to judge from the discussion in all social classes of whites, and this
is particularly true of the South, one is led to believe that such base and materialistic
considerations never enter into their thoughts.
MYRDAL, supra note 124, at 585. Religion and science provided ideological rationalizations for
slavery and then segregation. See STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 42-43 (i98i);
RAPER, supra note 139, at ig (stating that lynchers and lynching apologists "assume that the
Negro is irredeemably inferior by reason of his race - that it is a plan of God that the Negro
and his children shall forever be 'hewers of wood and drawers of water'"). Indeed, that southern
segregationists seemed to believe their charge "that the civil rights movement was communist-
inspired" reflected an unwillingness to accept that local blacks opposed Jim Crow segregation.
Klarman, supra note 204, at 81; see also NEEL R. MCMILLEN, THE CITIZENS' COUNCIL 207 (Illini
Books 1994) (1971) ("In the folklore of the Deep South there is no more cherished fiction than that
of Negro contentment with segregation.").
230 In fact, the pretense of equality served to enhance the production of status because whites
could then (choose to selfishly) believe that the failures of blacks to achieve equality were their
own fault. In a sense, whites could gain the benefit of cheating in a competition without the loss
of self-respect that comes from acknowledging that one is cheating.
231 See Klarman, supra note 204, at 23-26.
232 See id. at 20-21 (describing how World War II labor shortages increased black employment
in skilled positions); id. at 52-65 (reporting that urbanization and industrialization increased de-
mand for black labor and that industrial jobs created a black middle class less vulnerable to
white control); id. at 65-67 (detailing increased education levels). In other words, discriminatory
norms may be stable given fixed economic conditions but may change if new conditions make
transacting with blacks more materially beneficial.
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means, often against women and children, to suppress peaceful pro-
tests. Violence against peaceful demonstrators was, even for some
southern supporters of Jim Crow, irrefutable evidence that whites
were not (at least morally) superior, that blacks were indisputably un-
happy with segregation, and that segregation was not a naturally or-
dained moral order.233  One of the constraints I have suggested for
non-instrumental beliefs is "palpable falsity"; the events of the 1950s
and I960s made salient to whites the falsity of the belief that inten-
tional racial segregation is something other than selfishly hurtful.
Whatever the causal mechanism, many whites have come genuinely
to believe that segregation is wrong. This shift does not mean, how-
ever, that a psychological veil of prejudice has simply been lifted from
their eyes. The expressive beliefs whites adopt about race can no
longer be of the crude form needed to justify segregation, but the
quest for the production of status continues. Having abandoned the
older ideology, whites still tend to oppose policies and candidates that
would increase the social status of blacks.234 Whites can give up old,
extreme stereotypes and still embrace negative views of blacks. Unless
one consciously scrutinizes the statistical validity of one's generaliza-
tions about other groups - an unlikely scenario - even false stereo-
types will rarely be palpably false. Thus, one may acknowledge the
good faith and intellectual integrity of conservative arguments on
political issues concerning race - like busing, affirmative action, and
welfare - and still worry that the same status-maximizing bias that
first rationalized slavery and then segregation infects much of the pub-
lic thinking on these matters. It is more pleasant to believe that one
lives in a society in which everyone (or at least everyone else) is being
treated as well as she deserves, that past transgressions have been
righted, and that fairness and justice require no further sacrifice. The
evolution of white attitudes, therefore, reflects an ideological adjust-
ment to status production under changed circumstances. The final de-
scriptive virtue of the status-production theory is that it offers some
insight into this otherwise puzzling evolution of white attitudes.23 5
233 The immediate effect was to convince many northern whites that segregation was suffi-
ciently immoral to merit national legislation. See id. at 145-49. As to southern whites, I specu-
late that the same force contributed to long term attitude changes.
234 See supra notes 215-216.
235 The model also provides a useful beginning for economic analysis of sexism. Like racial
features, one's sex is reasonably observable. Men, like whites, often belong to exclusive socially
connected groups. Racism and sexism each allow the oppressor to "feel superior; thus, a 'poor
white' in the South can console himself with the thought that he is not a 'dirty nigger' ....
[Tihe most mediocre of males feels himself a demigod as compared with women." SIMONE DE
BEAUVOiR, THE SECOND SEX at xxiv (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1953) (r949).
As Beauvoir notes, however, there are important differences between sexism and racism. See id.
at xviii. Within the status theory, the most important distinction is the extent to which men and
women depend on each other for their social status. Men typically belong to socially connected
groups, such as families, that contain women. Given such relationships, a man who disparages
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C. Implications of the Status
Production Model of Discrimination
The associational model of discrimination has two key implications:
market competition will erode discrimination and, partly for that rea-
son, prohibiting race discrimination is inefficient.2 36  The status-pro-
duction model leads to different conclusions on both points.
ir. The Persistence of Race Discrimination. - Becker drew an
analogy between race discrimination and transportation costs, both of
which increase the cost of certain trades.2 37 It is uncontroversial that,
other things being equal, those who can minimize transportation costs
achieve a competitive advantage over those who cannot. If the anal-
ogy with discrimination is sound, we should also expect that whites
with less intense tastes for discrimination will enjoy a competitive ad-
vantage over those with more intense tastes and will tend to dominate
a competitive market.23 8
Under the status-production model, discrimination is not the result
of costs that discriminators incur from contact with members of other
groups, but is a means of producing status. The discriminator does
bear a cost in discriminating - forgoing otherwise beneficial trade
with the objects of the discrimination - but that cost is an investment
in the production of status. As long as such investments are cost-effec-
tive for the discriminator, the status-production model predicts that
race discrimination will persist in the face of market competition.239
women would seem to threaten his own status. The male's response to this problem is twofold.
First, he claims the dominant position within the family relationship. Second, he seeks a means
of distinguishing the females with whom he associates from the rest of the females of the world.
Of course, status is obtained from other men in this manner only if it derives from some male
consensus as to what constitutes desirable female behavior or attributes. Consequently, social
norms arise within socially connected groups of men that define a standard of female behavior.
Men then gain status by being associated with women who follow these roles well. Thus, men
subordinate a group that includes family members by employing a rich ideology of gender roles
that allows them to distinguish between their female relatives and other women - between
"good" and "bad" women.
Another key distinction between racism and sexism is that, unlike blacks, women are not in
the minority. Successful subordination often requires a majority, since an equally large class of
victims may respond with equally effective counter-subordination. But even a non-majority group
with disproportionate material and political power can still succeed in subordinating others. That
men succeed in setting the terms for esteem seems to depend upon them having economic superi-
ority - a fact that must first exist for reasons status production does not explain. For an inter-
esting game theory explanation, see Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing
Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421, 429-54 (1992).
236 But see Donohue, Title VII, supra note 12o, at 1412; Donohue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimi-
nation, supra note 12o, at 1347-48.
237 See BECKER, supra note 114, at i9-2i & n.3, 32-38.
238 See id. at 43-45 ("[Wff the production function of each firm were linear and homogeneous,
[market discrimination] would equal zero if at least one employer had... zero [taste for discrimi-
nation]."); POSNER, supra note 3, at 651.
239 There is significant evidence of persistent discrimination in competitive markets. See, e.g.,
ALICIA H. MUNNELL, LYNN E. BROWNE, JAMES MCENEANEY & GEOFFREY M.B. TOOTELL,
1995] io63
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Consequently, the transportation analogy is inapt. Discrimination may
exist in a competitive equilibrium for at least three reasons: the power
of discriminatory social norms; the existence of reciprocity between
whites; and, under certain circumstances, the effect of esteem-produc-
ing racial biases. I will examine each of these in turn.
(a) The Stability of Discriminatory Norms. - This section
presents a theory of discriminatory social norms. I begin with George
Akerlof's economic theory of a racial caste system. I then raise and
respond to two key objections to Akerlof's theory - that it does not
explain why anyone enforces the caste-based norms, and that it does
not capture the complexities of modern American society. I conclude
that, despite market competition, status production can support a sta-
ble system of discriminatory norms.
Akerlof has provided an explanation for the resiliency of the dis-
criminatory customs of a caste society.240 It is the essence of a caste-
system, Akerlof says, that "any transaction that breaks the caste taboos
changes the subsequent behavior of uninvolved parties" who may act
to punish the caste-breaker.2 4 1  Third party reactions change the
calculus for those who have not internalized the norm:
Those who fail to follow, or even to enforce the caste customs do not
gain the profits of the successful arbitrageur but instead suffer the stigma
of the outcaste. If the punishment of becoming an outcaste is predicted
to be sufficiently severe, the system of caste is held in equilibrium irre-
spective of individual tastes, by economic incentives; the predictions of
the caste system become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
2 42
MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTERPRETING HMDA DATA 2 (Federal Reserve Bank of Bos-
ton Working Paper No. 92-7, 1992) (finding that black mortgage applications in the Boston area
were turned down 6o% more often than applications from similarly situated whites); MARGERY A.
TURNER, MICHAEL Fix & RAYMoND J. STRUYI, OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES Di-
MINISHED: RACIAL DISCRUINATION IN HIRING 37-59 (iggi) (reporting Urban Institute studies
that found employment discrimination); Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New
Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause 12-16 (994) (unpublished manuscript, on file at the
Harvard Law School Library) (finding that car dealers offered worse deals to black than to white
test purchasers). Some commentators reject such studies on methodological grounds. See, e.g.,
EPSTEIN, supra note x6, at 5i-58 (critiquing the Urban Institute and Ayres studies). I merely
note that the intensity of one's methodological skepticism depends greatly on whether one believes
that discrimination, in theory, can exist in competitive markets. If this section succeeds in demon-
strating that it can, there will be less reason to doubt such studies. And to the extent that the
methodologies are sound, the studies suggest the importance of the mechanisms I describe.
240 See AKERLOF, supra note 83, at 35 (contrasting existing analysis, which assumes that "cur-
rent transactions (so long as they are legal) do not result in changed relations with uninvolved
parties in subsequent transactions"); see also id. at 71-72 (arguing for a model of custom-preserv-
ing equilibrium).
241 Id. at 35.
242 Id. at 36. Akerlof develops a formal model of caste equilibrium that applies to race dis-
crimination. See id. at 37-41.
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Thus, Akerlof applies to race discrimination the same view of social
norm enforcement that Ellickson has applied to property law - be-
cause people boycott norm breakers, it often pays to follow norms. 43
This insight would be trivial, however, if it only applied when ev-
eryone in society was willing to boycott those who break the caste
rules. Surely a few individuals will always be willing to deal with
social outcasts (such as other social outcasts or near outcasts). One
could argue that, as long as the number of people willing to violate
the discriminatory norms exceeds the number of people targeted by the
norm, violators need suffer no harm.244  Further, one might predict
that if a few people violate the norm intially, their violation will
weaken the norm and induce other violations to follow, eventually
leading to the norm's complete unraveling. 245
243 According to Richard A. Epstein, The Status-Production Sideshow: Why the Antidis-
crimination Laws Are Still a Mistake, 1o8 HARv. L. REV. 1085, Io--o4 (995), the history of Jim
Crow demonstrates that discriminatory social norms require the support of violence. As he puts
it, "[c]oercion is always the main event; status production is the side show." Id. at 1092.
There are two problems with this analysis. First, I do not claim - no one in their right mind
would - that social norms could produce the level of discrimination and segregation that existed
in the Jim Crow South without support from private violence (and state law). Of course there is
no "modem system" that shuns the use of violence but "is able to maintain anything similar to the
caste-like structure of Jim Crow." Id. at 1oo. The answer to Professor Epstein's challenge -
"[w]hy would ... boycotters have ... to resort to violence if vilification" were available, id. at
11o3 - is simply that violence secures a higher level of compliance with group norms than vilifi-
cation alone. But that discrimination will be lower without violence does not, as Professor Ep-
stein assumes, mean that discrimination will cease to exist. See supra pp. io6o-63; infra pp.
io68-71 (explaining how subtle forms of discrimination have replaced overt forms). Professor
Epstein does not seriously chailenge Part I's conclusion that withholding esteem works to induce
material sacrifices for group welfare. (Although he argues that some successful civil rights boy-
cotts used violence, see Epstein, supra, at 1103, he appears to concede that others did not, see id.
at iio4-o5.) Thus, social ostracism is, to use Professor Epstein's term, a "stick." Id. at io93.
Whether or not status punishments constitute what he means by "coercion," id. at 1092 n.22, the
evidence shows they can deter free-riding.
Second, Professor Epstein assumes without explanation that violence is no longer relevant to
discriminatory social norms. He optimistically claims that "[elven if Title VII were repealed to-
morrow, ... [p]rivate violence by anyone against anyone else would still be sternly prohibited."
Id. at zo99. But whether stem prohibitions, evenly enforced, will actually preclude violence and
violent threats that support social norms is an empirical question. Not only does racial violence
persist today despite legal prohibitions, see infra note 296, but, more generally, history shows that
"no state has been able to prevent [the use of] violence to enforce rules of behavior." ELLICKSON,
supra note 76, at 14o n.9. When violence is an option, the threat of violence also enforces norms.
See id. at 213; see also id. at 58-59, 215-218 (describing violent self-help by ranchers in Shasta
County, California); SALLY E. MERRY, URBAN DANGER 178-86 (Ig8I) (listing examples of vio-
lence or threats of violence as ways of managing danger within a neighborhood); Donald Black,
Crime as Social Control, 48 AM. Soc. REv. 34, 42 (1983) (developing a sociological theory of
crimes of self-help).
244 Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note ii6, at 29-31 (arguing that discrimination by a large majority need
not harm a minority if sufficient opportunities among non-discriminators will remain for members
of the minority).
245 See J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts
and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263, 286-87 (1989).
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Akerlof responds to these arguments with a simple point that de-
pends merely on the existence of transaction costs. 246 Suppose there
are search costs for firms seeking buyers or sellers; because of imper-
fect information about the existence and reputation of buyers and sell-
ers, firms cannot instantly replace existing trading partners but must
incur costs inversely proportional to the number of potential trading
partners in the relevant geographic market.247 Under these circum-
stances, assuming that there are any parties who will boycott "innova-
tors" (those who violate discriminatory norms), the innovators
necessarily incur higher search costs in finding trading partners.248
Thus, each boycotter raises the likely search costs the innovator will
incur before locating a trading partner.249 Further, when the innova-
tor locates a non-boycotter, its higher search costs will place it "in a
weaker bargaining position, since the cost of failing to make a trade is
greater to [it] than to noninnovators."250 If the costs of innovation are
higher than the benefits, the discriminatory norm will be stable in a
competitive market.2-5
There are, however, weaknesses in Akerlof's explanation. First,
Akerlof simply posits that some discriminators will boycott those who
fail to follow the discriminatory norm. He offers no explanation of
why these boycotters are willing to bear such costs. 25 2 The status-pro-
246 See Akerlof, supra note 117, at 266.
247 This assumption is supported by relational contracts literature, which claims that firms in
ongoing relationships acquire special knowledge about each other. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra
note 17, at iioo-oi; Oliver E. Williamson, Ransaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Con-
tractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 240-42 (1979).
248 See Akerlof, supra note 117, at 266-67 (relying on the search model of Peter A. Diamond,
Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium, go J. POL. ECON. 882, 882-86 (2982)),
249 Professor Epstein makes two arguments against this analysis. First, he says that it "as-
sumes that boycotters keep their intentions secret." Epstein, supra note 243, at zixox. To the
contrary, Akerlof assumes merely that there are search costs so that, for a given time period, the
probability of finding a trading partner is less than one and varies with the number of traders in
the relevant geographic area. See Akerlof, supra note x1, at 269. Consequently, it does not
matter if boycotters are instantly recognized as such; when the density of traders in the area falls
because some are boycotters, the time (and cost) required for searching necessarily increases.
Second, Professor Epstein suggests that innovators can publicly identify themselves as willing
to deal with targets of discrimination and that they can do so "without fear of coercive retali-
ation." Epstein, supra note 243, at 1102. Even if there is no violence, however, Akerlof demon-
strates that it will not pay to innovate if sufficient numbers of traders are willing to boycott
innovators. In the employment setting, for example, an innovating employer may lose valuable
customers or employees. The analysis of Part I further suggests that the employer may lose the
approval of fellow members of his social groups. If these costs outweigh the benefits, advertising
oneself as a norm violator will merely ensure a negative return.
250 Akerlof, supra note 217, at 274.
251 See id. at 268 ("[U]nlike Becker's model, there is no excess profit to be made by entrepre-
neurs with no taste for discrimination. And entrepreneurs with a low taste for discrimination
cannot profitably purchase the capital of those with a high taste for discrimination.").
252 See Jennifer Roback, Racism as Rent Seeking, 27 ECON. INQUIRY 66x, 670 (2989) (explain-
ing that Akerlof's model assumes that "the sanctions are costless to the individual imposing
them"). Roback offers a model of racial norm enforcement- individuals "gain utility from con-
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duction model does offer such an explanation. The model shows how
individuals gain from adhering to and enforcing certain norms, why
the kind of norms individuals benefit from enforcing include norms of
discrimination, and why the groups for which this process is fre-
quently employed are racial groups. As I argued above,25 3 individuals
within racial groups benefit from raising the status of their shared
traits. One means of contributing to one's racial status is by subordi-
nating members of other races. With sufficient overlap between racial
and socially connected groups, whites have a status benefit to exploit
and the cooperative means to exploit it.254
Consider, however, a second possible weakness in Akerlof's model.
A simple caste society is an appropriate starting point, but American
society is more complex. Unquestionably, a norm exists against racial
discrimination (or at least against certain forms of racial discrimina-
tion), and some whites, as well as blacks, boycott those who overtly
discriminate. Given this reality, one might reject the Akerlof caste
model.
Yet, even with blacks and some whites "counter-boycotting" dis-
criminators, the equilibrium may entail significant discrimination. Dis-
criminators will bear a cost when targeted for a counter-boycott (or
other sanction), but unless that cost exceeds the cost that discrimina-
tors create for non-discriminators, it will pay to continue discriminat-
ing. The relative costs depend largely on the relative size and
economic power of the two groups. Because whites constitute a large
majority and possess disproportionate wealth, the costs from white
boycotts is likely to exceed the costs from black counter-boycotts. At
some point, the participation by a sufficient number of whites in the
counter-boycott would tip the balance the other way, but this outcome
seems unlikely. First, one cannot infer from the fact that opponents of
discrimination are more vocal today - when discrimination in various
forms is illegal - that white opponents of discrimination exceed sup-
porters. Second, those who rely on the power of white counter-boy-
cotts rely on the force of moral principle (or altruism) to overcome the
selfish force of status production. Under existing theory, selfishness is
thought to undermine discrimination. But given the status productiv-
forming to [a] norm themselves," and "from knowing that other people are conforming to the
norm. The utility gain may be a gain in pure psychic income, if, for example, employers gain
satisfaction from knowing that blacks are being kept properly 'in their place.'" Id. at 665 (foot-
note omitted). Her model thus describes a benefit to boycotters to offset the costs of the boycott.
But Roback merely posits that such gains exist. She does not explain why people would "gain
utility" from conforming to or observing other people conform to a norm.
253 See supra p. 1045.
254 See supra pp. 1046-48.
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ity of discrimination, the power of selfishness suggests the more pessi-
mistic outcome 255
One might object that discriminatory norms do not exist if any
whites are willing to act against them. That some whites will boycott
discriminators merely reflects, however, the fact that American whites
do not constitute a single group. "Whites" include various ethnic, reli-
gious, political, regional, and class subgroups. How much a particular
subgroup invests in subordination as a means of producing status will
depend on what its various status options are. Low-status whites have
fewer options and tend to discriminate more than high-status
whites.256 Further, white condemnation of the blatant racial discrimi-
nation common in an earlier era is consistent with a more subtle dis-
criminatory norm. Subordination works only as long as one can deny
that one is acting for the purpose of producing status.2 5 7 Whites are
less able to deny this function of racial derogation now than in the
past; consequently, overt discrimination is no longer as productive of
status as it once was. Just as a "nouveau riche" may undermine her
own status by engaging in ostentatious and wasteful consumption, a
"redneck" or bigot undermines her own status by expressing contempt
solely on the basis of race. But, there is still status in wealth if one
displays it more deftly, with the appearance of not calculating to make
a display. Likewise, there is status to be gained from race discrimina-
tion of a more subtle form, especially when one can plausibly deplore
its more flagrant manifestations.
25 8
255 Professor Epstein says I neglect how the mechanism of intra-group esteem allocation makes
forces opposing discrimination more tenacious. See Epstein, supra note 243, at xio6. To the con-
trary, I pointed out that the mechanism is necessary to explain the behavior of participants in the
civil rights movement that produced Title VII, behavior that economic critics of Title VII -
ironically - have never addressed. See supra p. xoi8. Opposition to discrimination is more tena-
cious than was previously understood only because previous economic models could not explain
why any opposition existed. Notwithstanding this tenacity, there is no reason to suppose that less
populous and poorer groups can completely eliminate subordination by the dominant group. That
opponents of discrimination sometimes succeed in using esteem allocation to engage in counter-
boycotts and other defensive measures is precisely the reason I argue that race discrimination is a
market failure. See infra pp. 1074-78. Unless one side has such an overwhelming advantage that
the other forgoes all competition for status, the endless cycle of investing and counter-investing in
zero-sum status production is inefficient.
256 See supra notes 2o6-2io and accompanying text.
257 See supra pp. 1032, io6o-62.
258 I do not refer to highly contested definitions of ultra-subtle discrimination. In American
society, discrimination is sufficiently subtle if it refrains from overt, reliance on skin color alone.
See, e.g., Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE,
DISCRm NATION, AND RACISM 61, 77-78, 84-86 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds.,
1986); Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them, But.. .": The
Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203, 230-31 (Christopher Jencks &
Paul E. Peterson eds., iggi). For example, a white employer may consider hiring a black worker
if, but only if, she stands in stark contrast to all the stereotypes the employer holds of blacks.
The employer could genuinely espouse a belief in equal opportunity, but also believe blacks are
frequently (but not inherently) indolent, obtuse, or quarrelsome. Such an employer might parade
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One might nevertheless assert that there are significant numbers of
whites who oppose even subtle forms of discrimination. One interpre-
tation of this behavior is that high-status whites who condemn low-
status whites for their discrimination may gain more by distinguishing
themselves from other whites than by investing in the subordination of
blacks or other minorities. In fact, certain classes of whites may enjoy
free-riding on the status that other whites secure and then further in-
crease their status by subordinating those whites for being discrimina-
tory. A second, more sanguine interpretation begins with Ellickson's
claim that norms tend to be efficient, at least from the perspective of
the group in which they arise.25 9  Ellickson does not discuss norms
that span a group as large as an entire society, but a weaker concern
for the esteem of strangers might give rise to norms between stran-
gers. 260 If a weak counter-norm arises against discrimination, perhaps
it is because discrimination is inefficient 261 from the perspective of the
entire society. But because the norm arises at a different and more
diffuse level, it can exist alongside more powerful discriminatory
norms that arise within or between socially connected groups.262
Becker's model does not contemplate the existence of discrimina-
tory social norms. Thus, I cannot be certain how he would respond to
the claim I make here. But Robert Cooter, who embraces Becker's
prediction that competition will drive out discrimination, does consider
social norms. 263 Cooter argues that the proper economic model for dis-
crimination is that of a cartel and that during the Jim Crow era,
southern whites advanced their material ends by using law to gain
monopoly power in various markets. 264 Like all cartels, whites faced
her decision to hire a black worker who is manifestly none of those things to prove her belief in
equality, but nonetheless think that any blacks who are not model employees fall into one of the
negative categories.
Thus, modem discrimination is less derogatory, and therefore less productive of status, than it
used to be. But that is no reason to assume that the discriminatory norm must be unraveling.
There is, after all, less material cost associated with employing such a norm, since it permits the
most materially beneficial trades with blacks (like hiring the manifestly qualified black), refusal of
which would be branded as racist. It is thus easier to understand how norms like "never take a
chance on a black" or "all things being equal, hire the white" could survive market competition.
The status benefit is less than with overt discrimination, but so is the material cost.
259 See ELLiCKSON, supra note 76, at 167.
260 See ELSTER, supra note ii, at iii; Cooter, supa note 83, at 230 n.48. Both believe there
are norms that arise among strangers, although, as Cooter notes, the process by which this occurs
"requires explaining." Id. at 231 n.48.
261 I make this argument below at pp. 1074-78.
262 The analogy to conspicuous consumption may again be helpful. Existing norms may con-
demn especially ostentatious consumption because such behavior is inefficient, yet because these
norms arise essentially between strangers, they are weak and do not deter more subtle forms of
consumption, which are more easily rationalized as something other than conspicuous consump-
tion. See McAdams, supa note 59, at 42-44, 79-80.
263 See Cooter, supra note 196, at i66.
264 See id. at 153, 155-156. Thus, Cooter seems to view discrimination as a productive activ-
ity, but one productive of material ends.
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the inherent problem of instability - that is, the incentive for each
member to cheat. Cooter agrees that discriminatory social norms
countered the incentives to free-ride, but asserts that the effectiveness
of the norms probably depended on their being supported by Jim
Crow legislation.2 65 Thus, Cooter expresses the conventional economic
skepticism that the norms that supported the white "cartel" could sur-
vive absent such legal restrictions. The material incentives in an un-
fettered market, in his view, provide a strong lure for individuals to
defect from the group enterprise.
The theory of intra-group cooperation and inter-group conflict of-
fers a reason for thinking otherwise. Cooter's skepticism about the
independent strength of social norms would be well-founded if the
only ends that individuals seek are material. Indeed, I argued previ-
ously that social norms add nothing to our understanding of coopera-
tion beyond what can be explained by reciprocity unless people value
the esteem of others as an end in itself. 266 Therefore Cooter's argu-
ment might be right if the only purpose of the white cartel were to
advance the material ends of whites and the only means of inducing
cooperation were material rewards. The whole thrust of the status-
production model, however, is that the cartel-like behavior of whites
serves to maximize the non-material end of status production (the car-
tel seeks to monopolize social status) and that the cartel employs the
non-material means of intra-group status rewards and punishments. If
this fundamental point is right, then social norms can support discrim-
ination notwithstanding market competition.
Nevertheless, Cooter's basic insight is quite helpful. Whites do act
like a cartel. But whites are more accurately described as the subset
of cartels that Posner calls "guilds," that is, cartels with "social cohe-
siveness."267 Based on a morality emphasizing loyalty and conformity,
these guilds have an "ideology" - a set of beliefs that serves to inhibit
free-riding2 68 - specifically that blacks tend to be inferior, that whites
should not interact with blacks in certain ways, and that whites must
"stick together." Posner contends that farmers and lawyers - very
large industrial groups - manage to cooperate in legislative lobbying
efforts despite incentives to free-ride. 269 Racial groups may similarly
succeed. For reasons explained above, the more observable the trait
265 See id. at i54 (citing Jennifer Roback, Racism as Rent Seeking, 27 ECON. INQUIRY 661
(I989)).
266 See supra pp. 1027-29.
267 Posner, supra note 222, at io.
268 See id. at i. Posner also expresses doubt that ideology by itself is sufficient for guilds to
survive and argues that government restrictions on competition are essential. See id. at 8 (noting
that guilds typically have government-granted power to exclude competitors because "prohibiting
entry is necessary if the guild is to have supracompetitive profits"). Posner, like Cooter, also
considers only guilds whose ends and means are material.
269 See id. at 1g.
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that links a group of people, the more status members have to gain by
cooperating and the greater the reason to expect such groups to be-
come socially connected as a means of achieving cooperation. Given
that race is more observable than these industrial affinities, there is
reason to believe racial groups can better succeed in overcoming their
collective action problems despite their large size.2 70
Consider, then, a new economic analogy for race discrimination:
not transportation costs, but an analogy to the acquisition of a public
reputation. An entrepreneur donates a large sum of money to a local
museum, or a corporate president agrees to sponsor a marathon. No
doubt, the economically inclined theorist would assert that such behav-
ior occurs not because it serves an individual's "taste" for fame, but
because it produces greater profits for entrepreneurs and firms by bol-
stering their reputation or name recognition. I suspect the main force
behind this view, however, is nothing as contingent as empirical data
on the profitability of such donations, but an inference that economic
actors would not give money away unless it was productive to do so.
I merely argue for a similar inference with respect to race discrimina-
tion. Discrimination exists because it is productive for its
practitioners.
(b) Reciprocity as a Basis for Market Discrimination. - There
is a second reason to believe that race discrimination will persist in the
face of market competition. Becker's theory does not argue that mar-
ket competition erodes social discrimination. Yet because social inter-
action facilitates more commercial reciprocity, social discrimination
may cause persistent "market" discrimination.271
According to Axelrod's analysis of iterated prisoner's dilemmas, it
often pays to seek cooperation through a reciprocal strategy such as
tit-for-tat when there is sufficient likelihood of future interaction with
another.2 72 Axelrod emphasizes that the more likely future interactions
are, the more likely it is that those who employ reciprocal strategies
will prosper. Thus, to increase the prospects of cooperation with a
particular individual, Axelrod advises (consciously) increasing the du-
rability and frequency of interactions with that individual.273 One
time-honored means of implementing Axelrod's strategy is to pursue
270 An example of political organizing by whites is the Citizens' Council, which operated in
various southern states in the ig5os and i96os in opposition to integration. "By the second anni-
versary of the public school decisions ... 'protective societies' accounted for a considerable por-
tion of the energies of perhaps as many as 250,000 to 300,0oo people from virtually every station
of southern life... . [N]one was more powerful than the Citizens' Council. . . ." McMhLLEN,
supra note 229, at ii.
271 Many commentators have decried the role of the "old-boy network" in perpetuating dis-
crimination against women and minorities. See, e.g., Michael M. Burns, The Exclusion of Women
From Influential Men's Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 321, 322-23 (983).
272 See AXELROD, sUpra note 23, at 13-24, 59.
273 See id. at 126-32.
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social interaction with the group of individuals with whom one wishes
to cooperate. When prospective business partners eat, talk, or play
together, they are not merely acquiring information about each other.
Social interaction also supports reciprocity; by joining a social group,
one increases the likelihood of future interaction with members of the
group. Most important, social interactions may themselves be rela-
tively inexpensive but might increase the chance of cooperation's
emerging in a business or market setting, where the benefits of cooper-
ation are greater. Joining a country club, a "businessman's" club, or a
particular neighborhood may "lock" one into a particular social group,
raising one's ability to cooperate with members in non-social
settings.274
We can now understand more fully the power of discriminatory
norms. Even in the absence of a social norm that restrains market
trading with other racial groups, social norms could significantly im-
pede such trades. A norm limited to preventing social contacts with
members of another race is sufficient to harm such members economi-
cally. Since social contacts affect the probability of reciprocity, the ab-
sence of such contacts places the isolated individual or the disfavored
group at a comparative disadvantage in economic trades. Conse-
quently, norm-based discrimination in one setting, such as social clubs
or housing, may cause discrimination in other settings, such as busi-
ness or employment. Social clubs that exclude women and minorities
thus cause them more harm than simply denying them information
about, and the chance to become known to, market players. They
deny them the opportunity to make reciprocity work.275
(c) The Power of Esteem-Producing Racial Biases. - A final
factor that contributes to the persistence of discrimination is racially
biased beliefs or stereotypes. As noted above, discriminatory norms
invoke rationalization mechanisms; discriminators prefer to have rea-
sons for discriminating other than a bare interest in status produc-
274 See Bums, supra note 271, at 325-34.
275 Epstein agrees that reciprocity prevents the market from eliminating discrimination, but
argues that it is efficient that such discrimination remain because members of a particular racial
or ethnic group may be able to elicit greater cooperation from members of their own group than
from non-members. For single-race firms:
The party who cheats at work now knows that he faces stricter sanctions, given the strong
likelihood that the information will be brought home to him at play, at church, or in other
business and social settings. The complex network of human interactions thus induces
persons to honor their deals.
EPSTEIN, supra note ix6, at 70; cf. Landa, supra note 177, at 361-62 (arguing that socially and
ethnically homogeneous trading groups have a comparative advantage in economies without reli-
able legal infrastructure to enforce contracts). Whether such hiring discrimination is actually effi-
cient depends, however, on why the underlying segregation - "at play, at church, or in other
business and social settings" - exists. Epstein is correct to note that, regardless of the reasons for
the underlying segregation, this form of discrimination will persist: for any particular firm, coop-
eration is easier to achieve among employees who socialize together.
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tion.2 76 Indeed, because status production is inconsistent with an overt.
strategy of subordination, it is important that discriminators have an
explanation - an "ideology" - apart from status production. 27 7 Such
an explanation can most easily take the form of negative stereotypes
- that the failure of blacks to succeed is their own fault, due to their
own shortcomings in ability, integrity, or dependability. This ideology
buttresses discriminatory norms. Whatever the social cost of violating
the norm, biased evaluations of blacks make it appear that the mate-
rial benefits of norm violation are less than they are. Self-deception
prevents cheating that would undermine the cartel.
Indeed, even if there were no discriminatory social norms, ideologi-
cally based racial stereotypes might sustain a stable level of discrimi-
nation. One might argue, to the contrary, that absent norms, market
competition would discipline whites whose evaluations of blacks were
biased. If some white employers fail to perceive black workers accu-Irately, for example, they will lose a competitive advantage to more
discerning whites.278 Yet there is one condition under which stereo-
types alone will sustain discrimination - when the material costs of
one's miscalculation is zero. In the employment setting, for example,
the employer may believe in some cases that the applicants are essen-
tially "tied," that is, they appear to have equal marginal productivi-
ties. 279 A white employer would suffer no harm from the decision to
hire a white applicant who was tied with a black applicant. Of
course, given the white employer's ideology, the employer may not ac-
tually perceive the two candidates as being equal, but rather will think
that the white candidate is better. The point, however, is that there
will be no market correction for such a perception; having white job
applicants win all "ties" is a market equilibrium. The question re-
mains how frequently such ties occur in the real world - an interest-
ing empirical question that I, like opponents of Title VIfl,28 leave to
be answered by others. I simply note that, if such ties were frequent,
stereotyping could itself add to the persistence of race discrimination.
In sum, the status-production model provides three reasons to sup-
pose that race discrimination will survive market competition: the
power of discriminatory social norms; the existence of reciprocity be-
276 See supra note 11o and accompanying text.
277 See supra pp. io6o-62.
278 See BECKER, supra note 114, at 39-42; see also Cooter, supra note I96, at 16o ("Competi-
tion can teach a sharp lesson to businesses that rely upon false signals.").
279 Although marginal productivities may vary continuously so that actual ties are extremely
rare, an employer will invest only limited resources into determining the productivity of job appli-
cants. If employers invest only enough to place applicants in one of a few ability categories, then
ties could be common.
280 By ignoring the issue, they implicitly assume that ties never occur. See, e.g., EPSTEIN,
supra note 116, at 41-44.
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tween whites; and, under certain circumstances, the effect of esteem-
producing racial biases.
2. The Efficiency of Anti-Discrimination Laws- Many legal
economists have contended that federal anti-discrimination laws are ef-
ficient only to the extent that they nullify state laws mandating dis-
crimination.281 These theorists view such laws as inefficient when they
prohibit private discrimination because their only function is to frus-
trate discriminatory preferences. But the new descriptive theory I pro-
pose requires a rethinking of this normative claim. The status-
production model views anti-discrimination laws as potentially cor-
recting a market failure in which individuals invest in essentially con-
fiscatory behavior. That discrimination is a market failure would not
itself prove that government action is desirable. We must consider
whether the regulation can correct the failure and whether the benefits
of such intervention exceed the costs.
(a) Discrimination as Market Failure: The Theft Analogy.-
Welfare economics provides a justification for laws that prohibit theft
(and other forms of force and fraud) that is not dependent on dis-
counting the gains to the thief (or other criminals).282  Even assuming
that the transfer accomplished by theft itself causes no wealth loss,
because the thief gains what the owner loses, 28 3 a system that permits
theft "results in a very substantial diversion of resources to fields
where they essentially offset each other, and produce no positive prod-
uct. 284 In other words, absent laws against theft, individuals must
expend resources merely to protect their property from seizure. They
will also forgo certain wealth-creating activities to protect what they
already have and because it may be too costly to protect some forms
of wealth from theft. In response, the thief invests in gaining tools
and knowledge to circumvent anti-theft practices and technology.
These dynamic reactions to the risk of theft result in deadweight losses
281 See sources cited supra note 9ig. But see Donohue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination, supra
note 12o, at 1347-48; Donohue, Title VII, supra note 12o, at 1423-31.
282 See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, Boxed In: Economists and Benefits From Crime, 13 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 225, 227-28 (993); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal
Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, ix96, zig8 (1985); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs,
Monopolies and Theft, 5 W. EcoN. J. 224, 228-31 (1967).
283 One might argue that the transfer often increases wealth because the thief gains more than
the owner loses. Yet because economics measures value by willingness to pay, the opposite is
likely to be the case. When transaction costs are low, prohibiting theft still permits property
transfers through voluntary market exchange. The only transfers prevented by criminalizing theft
are, therefore, those in which the thief is not willing to pay the owner enough to induce a volun-
tary exchange - where, in other words, the thief "values" the good as much as or less than the
owner. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 208 & n.3; Posner, supra note 282, at ix96. Preventing
transfers when the thief values the good less than the owner does is efficient. Economists do not,
however, rely on this argument as much as the one in the text, perhaps because they recognize
some strength in the claim that utility is often maximized by inefficient larcenous transfers from
"haves" to "have-nots." See, e.g., Posner, supra note 282, at 1196 n.9.
284 Tfillock, supra note 282, at 231.
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to society. Less is produced, and part of what is produced (burglar
alarms and burglars' tools) provides no greater satisfaction of an indi-
vidual's preferences, but merely helps the individual to retain or con-
fiscate goods that will satisfy preferences. The net effect is to decrease
wealth. The same argument applies for laws against violence. It is, of
course, Thomas Hobbes's justification for the state: that the only alter-
native, the "warre . . .of every man, against every man," is worse. 2 5
It follows from the status-production model that a society without
discrimination laws permits an unfettered status war of "every group
against every group." What is striking about Richard Epstein's For-
bidden Grounds,28 6 which argues for the repeal of laws that prohibit
employment discrimination, is not so much his controversial claim that
the only role of government is to prevent force or fraud, but that he
never considers how laws against race discrimination may fall pre-
cisely within this libertarian principle.28 7 Status "warfare" may not be
as violent as literal combat, but the term is more than just a meta-
phor. Hobbes identifies competition for honor as one of the three
causes of war; he warns that violent conflict results from attempted
subordination. 288 Similarly, Hume warned of the tendency of factions
to produce "the fiercest animosities." 28 9  Competition for group status
has generated much of America's history of interracial violence, as
when whites lynched blacks to preserve their social position 290 or
when blacks retaliated against repeated acts of derogation and
dishonor.291
Of course, laws prohibit such violence. But even with such laws,
unregulated status competition mirrors the inefficiency of a regime
without laws prohibiting theft. First, racial status preferences inher-
285 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 88-89 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press iggi)
(1651); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 116, at I5-I9 (describing Hobbes's argument for prohibitions
on force and fraud).
286 EPSTEIN, supra note 116.
287 Cf Williams, supra note 178, at 147 (referring to acts of racism as the "appropriation of
psychic property").
288 Hobbes observes:
For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon
himselfe: And upon all signes of Contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far
as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is
far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his con-
temners, by dommage; and from others, by the example.
HOBBES, supra note 285, at 88. For a more detailed criticism of Epstein's use of Hobbes in
Forbidden Grounds, see Richard H. McAdams, Epstein on His Own Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 241, 242-49 (1994).
289 HUME, supra note 9, at 55.
290 See supra notes 193-195 and accompanying text.
291 See, e.g., Melvin L. Oliver, James H. Johnson, Jr. & Walter C. Farrell, Jr., Anatomy of a
Rebellion: A Political-Economic Analysis, in READING RODNEY KING: READING URBAN UPRmS-
ING 117, 120-21 (Robert Gooding-Williams ed., 1993). For a personal narrative conveying how
disparagement leads to rage, see Williams, cited above in note 178, at 127-29.
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ently conflict. 292 Race discrimination exists because members of (at
least) one race seek for their group a status position that is incompati-
ble with the position sought by members of one or more other groups.
Even when only one group seeks superiority, if the other group seeks
equality, the struggle for social status is zero sum. Consequently, the
appropriation of status by subordinating behavior is, like theft, a mere
wealth transfer; the gain to the discriminator is at least matched by
the loss to the victim.293 Second, this form of transfer - using dis-
crimination as a mechanism of subordination - generates extremely
high costs. By definition, the discriminator makes a material sacrifice
(giving up an otherwise favorable trade or engaging in costly behavior)
as a means of lowering the status of the victim. The size of the mate-
rial sacrifice measures the investment that the discriminator makes in
status appropriation. This investment determines the initial cost of the
process of racial group status production.
But that is not the whole story. As I noted at the outset of this
Part, economic analysis of discrimination strikes many non-economists
as barren because it fails to acknowledge the full benefit to its practi-
tioners or the full harm to its victims. The status-production model
takes as its central premise that whites gain status by discriminating
against blacks. To determine the full extent of the investment in, and
therefore the costs of, status competition, we must consider the full
range of status defense mechanisms employed by victims of discrimi-
nation. Such defense mechanisms include the sometimes desperate re-
actions of those who live as targets of discrimination. These reactions
represent further investment in status production and increase the
wastefulness of the unregulated process, much like added investment
in theft-protection devices constitute waste in a society without theft
laws. Of course, the psychological mechanisms at work are vastly
more complex. I will attempt merely a brief summary of the reactions
within the framework of the status-production model.
292 See supra p. IO3I.
293 This argument is conservative in that it omits the claim that the loss to blacks exceeds the
gain to whites. Following the alternative economic argument against theft, see supra note 283,
one could observe that, like thieves, discriminators do not pay their victims for their coerced gain.
Prohibiting discrimination still permits voluntary market transactions in status; the only transfers
prevented are ones where whites value their status gain as much as or less than blacks value the
status loss. Second, though equating value with willingness to pay is controversial in the context
of theft, utilitarian concerns support this efficiency analysis in the context of race discrimination.
The argument is that the psychological damage to blacks exceeds the status pleasure for whites.
Cf. WILLIAM H. GRIER & PRICE M. COBBS, BLAcK RAGE 30-33 (1968) (discussing the psychologi-
cally devastating legacy of black subordination); ABRAM KARDINER & LIONEL OVESEY, THE
MARK OF OPPRESSION: A PSYCHOSOCIAL STUDY OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO 379 (xgx) (empha-
sizing white psychological gains by describing "the degradation of the Negro's status" during slav-
ery as "the extreme manifestation of the ego perversion of dominance"); Chester M. Pierce,
Psychiatric Problems of the Black Minority, in z AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 512,
513-18 (Silvano Arieti ed., 2d ed. 1974) (suggesting that American society's insistence that "white
skin color is superior to black skin color" comes at the expense of black mental health).
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First, enraged victims may respond in kind by attempting to dis-
parage and subordinate the original discriminator. Such behavior may
take the form of discrimination, which means the victim also makes a
wasteful material sacrifice for the sake of status.2 94 The victim may,
however, lack the opportunity or wealth to respond in kind and may
seek a cheaper means of disparagement such as an insult. Violence is
the extreme form of such an insult; it inflicts the loss of dignity inher-
ent in an intentional deprivation of bodily integrity. Even if an Afri-
can American counters with some means other than violence, the
original subordinator may resort to violence to ensure the effectiveness
of the original insult and to counter any responsive insult.2 95 Hobbes
identified this escalation over dishonor as a primary source of war.
A second response is to seek to regain status by subordinating
someone other than the original discriminator. If whites present too
difficult a target, other minority groups may be within reach. Thus,
the long and unpleasant history of status competition between minor-
ity groups exemplifies a predictable response to subordination.2 96 The
original victim may also focus on vulnerable members of her own
group, such as women or those of a different economic class.29 7 Evi-
dence suggests, for example, that African Americans discriminate
against one another on the basis of the relative lightness or darkness
of their skin.298  Finally, because the original victim may lack any
non-violent means of responding to discrimination, some of what ap-
pears to be "senseless violence" among discrimination victims may ac-
tually be a rational attempt to produce status by subordinating others.
294 Black separatism necessarily has the consequence of refusing some or all economic trades
with whites. But separatism may be intended not as an counter-insult, but as a defensive means
of achieving psychological independence from white subordination. See supra note 205.
295 Thus, an initially non-violent subordination provokes a non-violent response, but when the
subordinator's efforts are frustrated by the victim's "standing her ground," there may be an esca-
lation to violence. A number of race riots fit this pattern. See generally 9 RACE, LAW, AND
AMERICAN HISTORY 1700-1990: LYNCHING, RACIAL VIOLENCE, AND LAW passim (Paul
Finkelman ed., 1992) (illustrating how violence, riots, and lynching supported segregation).
296 See JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 376 (1978) ("Open and violent inter-
ethnic conflict has been a crucial current in American history. Earlier immigrant groups have
regularly attempted to subordinate later groups."); see also JACK LEVIN & JACK McDEvrrr,
HATE CRIMES 137-48 (1993) (recounting racial clashes between minority groups, especially other
minorities versus blacks); ROEDIGER, supra note 163, at 133-63 (relating the history of conflict
between Irish immigrants and African Americans); Sumi K. Cho, Korean Americans vs. African
Americans: Conflict and Construction, in READING RODNEY KING: READING URBAN UPRISING,
supra note 291, at 196, i96-2o4 (explaining the sources of discrimination and prejudice between
Korean Americans and African Americans). The conflict between the Jewish and African Ameri-
can communities is a timely and obvious example of this problem.
297 Black feminists, for example, have described how women of color have been subordinated
not only by white men, but by black men and white women. See, e.g., E. Frances White, Listen-
ing to the Voices of Black Feminism, 18 RADICAL AM. 7, 11-17 (1984).
298 See COLLINS, supra note 128, at 79-82; DOLLARD, supra note 125, at 68-71; Kristal B.
Zook, Light Skinned-ded Naps, in MAKING FACE, MAKING SOUL: CREATIVE AND CRITICAL PER-
SPECTIVES BY WOMEN OF COLOR 85, 85-96 (Gloria Anzaldiia ed., 199o).
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The victim's responses are not limited to subordinating others.
The victim may also withdraw from competition - by which status is
generally determined - by adopting beliefs that such competitions are
without merit. When a subordinated subgroup fails according to the
prevailing cultural values, its members may decide to reject those val-
ues completely. 299 For example, minorities facing discrimination may
decide, rather than be judged by standards of academic or economic
success, that education or employment is an overrated "white"
value.30° Like the processes of rationalization, the belief that academ-
ics is unimportant may preserve self-esteem; however, such a belief
may prove destructive in the long run because it depresses efficient
investment in human capital.
Finally, a victim of subordination may wholeheartedly adopt the
beliefs of the subordinators, including those that members of her group
are deserving of their low status. Such a response might seem un-
likely; however, for some it may be easier to accept a lower status
with the belief that such a role is natural and proper than to live out
such a role every day believing it is arbitrarily imposed. The result,
however, is a form of self-loathing.30'
In sum, many of the effects of discrimination, well-explored in
other disciplines, should be of central concern to an economic assess-
ment of the system of race discrimination. In many cases, these effects
represent investments that the victims make in defending their status.
Combined with the investments made by the original discriminators,
these resources represent the deadweight loss of race discrimination.
Consequently, considerable evidence demonstrates that race discrimi-
nation is a grossly inefficient market failure. 30 2
(b) An Efficiency Argument for Anti-Discrimination Laws. - As
with laws against theft, the benefit of prohibiting a form of discrimi-
nation is to prevent the wasteful investment of resources in such dis-
crimination. When laws prohibit theft, the primary alternative by
which the former thief can make material gains is to engage in lawful,
productive activity. The argument for laws that prohibit subordina-
tion as a means of acquiring status is exactly parallel: by raising the
costs of subordination, such laws induce people to switch to socially
productive, or at least socially benign, means of acquiring status
(either at an individual or a group level). Subordination is not the
299 See CLARK, supra note 129, at 70 ("The Negro male was, therefore, driven to seek status in
ways which seemed ... antisocial, escapist, [or] socially irresponsible.").
300 See, e.g., Janita Poe, A Black-On-Black Education Barrier, CHI. TmB., Jan. 1, 1994, § x, at
I.
301 See, e.g., KENNETH B. CLARK, PREJUDICE AND YOUR CHILD 49-51 (1955).
302 In fact, the very inefficiency of this system may explain the existence of an anti-discrimina-
tion norm or counter-norm. Because the counter-norm arises between strangers, however, it is not
likely to cancel the effect of stronger discriminatory norms that arise within and between socially
connected groups. See supra p. IO69.
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only means of group status production, and inter-group status produc-
tion is not the only means of gaining esteem.30 3
A possible distinction from theft, however, is the availability of
equally wasteful substitutes to blatant discrimination. A group with a
disproportionately large share of political power, economic wealth, and
symbols of status will have at its disposal a number of alternative
means of subordinating a minority group. Prohibiting one form of
subordinating behavior may simply cause a shift to an equally waste-
ful form of acquiring status.3° 4 Such a concern, however, may be
overstated. After all, common law larceny initially required a trespass
in the taking and thus exempted what we now think of as embezzle-
ment and fraud.303 Even though thieves were free to switch to non-
trespassory means of confiscation, the initial prohibition was nonethe-
less efficient. The opportunities remaining were more limited and
costly; a complete substitution would not occur. The same argument
can be made for prohibiting private discrimination in certain key ar-
eas, such as employment and housing. These forms of discrimination
probably represent the most productive means of subordination and
therefore induce the greatest "investment" by whites. As I previously
pointed out, employment discrimination offers for whites a double in-
sult to blacks: not only the insult inherent in shunning someone, but
.also the consequence of lowering black income in a society that ac-
cords status to wealth. Similarly, excluding blacks from neighborhoods
is not only a very public symbol of subordination, but also denies
them the material benefits of reciprocity that may arise among neigh-
bors.30 6 Effectively prohibiting employment and housing discrimina-
tion would deprive whites of their most productive private means of
subordination and would thereby lower the resources invested in this
wasteful confiscatory activity.30
7
Second, anti-discrimination laws may lower the investment in sta-
tus confiscation by increasing the incidence of "cross-membership."
Ceteris paribus, an individual prefers subordinating a group to which
303 People can concentrate, for example, on raising their group status by focusing on the posi-
tive achievements of their group rather than by derogation of other groups or by elevating the
status of groups whose welfare does not inherently conflict with other groups. Similarly, people
can decide to seek increased intra-group esteem through positive achievement or through ways
that do not inherently conflict with the preferences of other group members.
304 One might view hate speech in this manner, as potential discriminators attempt to subvert
verbally those protected by anti-discrimination laws.
305 See George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARv. L. REV. 469, 469 n.i,
496 (1976).
306 See supra p. 072. If blacks are already disproportionately poor in society, partitioning of
white and black neighborhoods will harm blacks more than it harms whites.
307 Liability works directly to raise the costs of subordination but also works indirectly. Those
who ,enforce discriminatory norms by threats or the use of low-level violence now find their
targets are - given civil liability - harder to intimidate. Norm enforcers could use higher levels
of violence, but criminal sanctions more effectively detect and deter such immoderate violence.
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she does not belong to subordinating a group to which she does be-
long. An individual always bears a cost from subordination of her
own group and that cost gives her an incentive to avoid such behav-
ior.30 In fact, an individual who is a member of group A and group
B might find it in her interest to invest in efforts to prevent members
of group A from seeking to subordinate group B. Therefore, the more
"cross-membership" between two groups, the fewer the resources that
will be invested by the two groups in subordinating each other.309
Laws forbidding race discrimination may increase the occurrence
of cross-membership and thereby undermine the effectiveness of racial
subordination as a status strategy. Race has been and remains highly
correlated with other demographic factors.310 If a white individual
lives in an all-white neighborhood, attends an all-white school, works
in an all-white firm, worships at an all-white church, belongs to an
all-white amateur sports league, and patronizes all-white hobby clubs,
she will never face the problem of cross-membership. If, however,
anti-discrimination laws were to integrate neighborhoods, schools,
firms, and private clubs, more whites would find themselves in a posi-
tion in which racial minorities belong to some of their groups. Conse-
quently, racial subordination would lower the status of these
integrated groups. One response will be for whites to flee the groups
that become integrated, but if the costs are too high, as when the law
integrates a number of social groups at the same time, the effect might
be to lower the effectiveness of racial subordination as a status strat-
egy for many whites.311
308 The cost one bears for subordinating one's own group does not completely eliminate this
strategy. One may, for example, be willing to raise the status of a group in which one has very
high intra-group status at the expense of lowering the status of a group in which one has only
average intra-group status - especially if one has few alternative options for producing esteem.
Racial minorities who denigrate members of their own race and women who demean other
women have made precisely such a choice. See supra notes 298-299 and accompanying text.
309 The corollary is that individuals join groups that do not act to subordinate each other, or
leave one of the groups when such a status conflict arises. Yet sometimes the cost of avoiding
membership in either of two such groups outweighs the benefits of avoiding the status conflict. In
such cases, the individual is less likely to invest in subordination of either group than those who
belong only to one of the two groups, and may invest in restraining other members from investing
in the subordination strategy.
310 See, e.g., David H. Swinton, The Economic Status of African Americans: "Permanent" Pov-
erty and Inequality, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1991, at 25, 25-65 (Janet Dewart ed.,
1991).
311 My argument here is not that "contact" between the races decreases prejudice. That claim
is the subject of extended discussion and debate. See, e.g., Norman Miller & Marilynn B. Brewer,
The Social Psychology of Desegregation: An Introduction, in GRouPs IN CONTACT: THE PSY.
CHOLOGY OF DESEGREGATION, supra note 227, at 1, 2-4. To the contrary, the status-production
model contemplates that people can obtain status by subordinating those with whom they have
frequent contact. My point is that cross-membership makes subordination, by either group
against the other, less productive of status.
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Finally, anti-discrimination laws may serve to correct the market
failure of discrimination by undermining the credibility of rationaliza-
tions for discrimination. Several commentators have noted that the
law shapes preferences, and that Title VII and other civil rights laws
may have reduced the preference for discrimination. 31 2 The status-
production model explains this evolution not as a change in the taste
for discrimination, but as a change in the productive capacity of cer-
tain forms of subordination. Individuals who seek status require some
rationalization for their behavior. Admitting that one seeks to
subordinate others for the sake of status conflicts with obtaining such
status. Law affects the credibility of any alternative explanation. Take
Posner's example of a guild that survives on an ideology of quality to
justify restrictions on competition.31 3 Consider the long-term effect
Posner's critique might have on such ideology were it sufficiently pub-
licized. Exposing the naked self-interest behind platitudes of public
concern erodes their effectiveness.
Law is more crude than an intellectual critique, yet it is inherently
more public, and can carry more weight. When Jim Crow laws man-
dated certain forms of segregation, whites confidently spoke of segre-
gation as the natural order of things; when the laws forbade
segregation, discriminatory whites had a greater difficulty believing
their own ideology. Rationalizations can be fragile things; sometimes
they require that dissent be held to a minimum. In the South and
elsewhere, Title VII constituted a very powerful "dissent," an indica-
tion that a large number, perhaps a majority, of Americans no longer
believed the explanations of discrimination. If people care about es-
teem, the law can change behavior merely by signaling on what
grounds the majority will henceforth give and withhold esteem.
In sum, law may correct the market failure of discrimination in
three ways: by raising the costs and lowering the productive returns of
certain forms of subordination; by increasing the racial diversity of so-
cially connected groups, which raises selfish resistance to the subordi-
nation strategy; and by symbolizing a consensus that the
rationalizations for the subordination strategy are, in fact, mere ratio-
nal ations. Whether such laws are efficient depends on the magnitude
of these benefits relative to the administrative and opportunity costs of
312 See, e.g., Donohue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination, supra note 2o, at 1338-39 & n.6; Pos-
ner, Title VII, supra note iig, at 520. Indeed, surveys suggest a profound decrease in the number
of whites who deny the principles of equal opportunity. See supra note 214. See generally Ken-
neth Dau-Schmidt, Legal Prohibitions as More Than Prices: Preference-Shaping Policies Under
the Law, in NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Robin Malloy & Chris-
topher Braun eds., forthcoming 1995) (discussing Title VII as one example of laws that attempt to
change "invidious preferences").
313 See supra pp. iO59-6o.
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the system that adjudicates discrimination claims.3 14 But under the
status-production model, the efficiency question is, like it is for the
prohibition of theft, an empirical one; one can no longer simply assert
that laws prohibiting satisfaction of discriminatory preferences are pre-
sumptively inefficient.
One might inquire about the implications of the status-production
model of discrimination for affirmative action. In what may seem like
an evasion, I believe the model provides no clear answer for affirma-
tive action, but does reveal the consequential tensions the policy repre-
sents. The "cross-membership" effect of anti-discrimination laws
provides a theoretical foundation for the claim that affirmative action
serves to combat discrimination more effectively than a mere non-dis-
crimination policy. Indeed, the benefit of cross-membership might jus-
tify a very aggressive affirmative action program. The utility of
integrating social groups by race is not limited by any principle of past
wrongful discrimination. The status-production model indicates that
we can reduce investment in future status subordination by decreasing
racial stratification in society.
Conversely, affirmative action creates a "common fate" for those of
the same race and thus raises the salience of race. As critics of affirm-
ative action have claimed, this fact may cause whites to identify them-
selves more fully with their race.315 The status-production model adds
this insight: raising the salience of race may increase the return from
racial subordination and enhance the power of whites to elicit intra-
group cooperation for the remaining avenues of racial subordination.
Affirmative action likely has already had this effect, which offsets the
positive effects of cross-membership. However difficult it is to ascer-
tain the present net effect, the more important and difficult question is
what the future effects will be. Affirmative action has, so far, done
little to integrate effectively American society.316 Therefore, we have
no reason to expect the positive consequences of that policy to have
emerged. In the end, the status-production model reveals what I think
we knew already: affirmative action is an investment in which we
bear certain costs today for the hope of a greater return tomorrow.
The model illuminates, but does not resolve, the empirical question of
whether the future benefits will outweigh the present costs.
314 See EPSTEIN, supra note i6, at 242-66 (providing a comprehensive description of such
costs). For an attempt to measure them, see John J. Donohue iT, Advocacy Versus Analysis in
Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1583, 1599-I603 (1992) (reviewing
RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS (1992)). Donohue also attempts to calculate the ben-
efits of Title VII, but not along the lines suggested here. See id. at 16o3-o7.
31S See Trry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 33, 46
(1992); William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46
U. Cm. L. REv. 775, 809 (r979).
316 See supra p. io8o.
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III. CONCLUSION
Groups inherently tend to elicit a level of cooperation from their
members and to incur a level of conflict with other groups. The coop-
eration, in fact, facilitates the conflict. Intra-group esteem allocation
permits groups to overcome certain collective action problems that
would otherwise make conflict impossible. At the same time, the de-
sire for esteem provides a new objective of group conflict - competi-
tion over social status.
What I have termed the theory of intra-group cooperation and in-
ter-group conflict is merely the logical extension of three other steps in
political and economic theory. First, Hobbes, among others, justified
the state as necessary to avoid perpetual conflict in the state of nature;
thus the state's role is to facilitate peaceful cooperation.3 17 Second,
economists have persuasively contended that certain forms of peaceful
cooperation, such as price-fixing, are detrimental to society. Conse-
quently, the government should act in such cases to prevent coopera-
tion.3 18 Third, Ellickson, among others, has written that groups use
social norms to solve collective action problems without the centralized
coercive power of the state, namely to bring about a cooperative "or-
der without law."31 9 The next step, I propose, is to recognize that sig-
nificant instances of this decentralized cooperation will inevitably be
socially destructive and, therefore, that government should obstruct
these forms of cooperation. Groups inherently tend to use their powers
of decentralized cooperation to produce status through the socially
wasteful process of subordination. As with cartels, cooperation in such
cases is a social threat that justifies state action.
Aside from these general political implications, the theory of intra-
group cooperation and inter-group conflict illuminates the complex
problem of race discrimination. Status production explains both the
historic and contemporary contours of race discrimination far better
than the prevailing associational model of discrimination. Understand-
ing race discrimination as a means of producing status helps us ex-
plain its tenacity in the face of market competition and reveals, within
an economic model, the full costs of the practice of discrimination.
The effort to gain status by taking status away from others, and the
responsive measures this effort elicits, are socially wasteful in the same
way that confiscation of material property is wasteful. The ineffi-
ciency in the system of status competition is measured by the invest-
ments each group makes in gaining or protecting its status.
Prohibiting the more productive forms of investments can reduce the
wastefulness of such actions even if it does not eliminate it.
317 See HOBBES supra note 285, at 88-89.
318 See Ayres, supra note 17, at 320-22.
319 See ELLICKSON, supra note 76, at 46, 167-69.
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In criticizing the associational preference model of discrimination, I
focused intensively on a single form of discrimination - racial dis-
crimination - and within that category, exclusively on discrimination
against African Americans. The points I made in this context, how-
ever, apply to other forms of racial and ethnic discrimination. When
substantial overlap exists between groups that share publicly observa-
ble traits and groups that are socially connected, the theory predicts
substantial investment in status production, including the subordina-
tion of other groups. With more than two racial and ethnic groups,
greater opportunity exists for movement in social position, and there
is, therefore, reason to expect greater investment in maintaining or im-
proving status.
Groups matter. Groups form for simple informational reasons, as
economics describes in considerable detail: to minimize the transaction
costs people incur in the course of satisfying their preferences.320 Yet
the formation of groups has another consequence. People have a loy-
alty to groups that goes beyond what serves their narrow pecuniary
self-interest. I have sought to explain that solidarity in self-interested
terms; doing so requires an expanded understanding of self-interest
that includes a powerful desire for esteem and status. Given the ubiq-
uity of groups, this broader social science perspective on their function
should prove useful in understanding legal issues beyond racial dis-
crimination. For now, I have argued for a sober appreciation that soli-
darity for some often means enmity for others.
320 See COASE, supra note 6, at 33-55. Firms lower the transaction costs of production. See
id. at 6-7. Chess-clubs lower the transaction costs for people who are looking for a game of
chess.
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